Daily Papers

Despite the rapid progress of Vision-Language Models (VLMs), the field lacks benchmarks that rigorously diagnose their true reasoning abilities and chart meaningful progress toward human-like multimodal intelligence. Most existing evaluations focus on piecemeal or disconnected tasks, obscuring critical cognitive weaknesses and providing little insight for targeted improvement. To address this gap, we introduce BloomBench, part of the Almieyar benchmarking series, the first cognitively human-grounded, bilingual (English-Arabic) multimodal benchmark for VLMs. Grounded in Bloom's Taxonomy, BloomBench systematically evaluates six levels of cognition (Remember, Understand, Apply, Analyze, Evaluate, Create) through carefully designed image-question-answer tasks. Built with a semi-automated pipeline and validated through a stratified hybrid quality assurance protocol, it ensures scalability, cultural inclusivity, and linguistic fidelity. Leveraging this framework, we conduct a comprehensive study of state-of-the-art VLMs to diagnose their cognitive profiles. Our analysis reveals a sharp cognitive asymmetry: while state-of-the-art models achieve strong performance ceilings in semantic understanding, they struggle substantially with factual recall and creative synthesis. This demonstrates that current general multimodal proficiency masks deeper limitations in specific cognitive layers. Furthermore, our study highlights a critical performance gap between Arabic and English, exposing limitations in current cross-lingual multimodal reasoning. These findings establish a foundation for developing more cognitively aligned and inclusive VLMs. The benchmark framework and dataset is available at: https://github.com/qcri/Almieyar-Oryx-BloomBench.

Human verification under adversarial information flow operates as a cost-bounded decision procedure constrained by working memory limits and cognitive biases. We introduce the Verification Cost Asymmetry (VCA) coefficient, formalizing it as the ratio of expected verification work between populations under identical claim distributions. Drawing on probabilistically checkable proofs (PCP) and parameterized complexity theory, we construct dissemination protocols that reduce verification for trusted audiences to constant human effort while imposing superlinear costs on adversarial populations lacking cryptographic infrastructure. We prove theoretical guarantees for this asymmetry, validate the framework through controlled user studies measuring verification effort with and without spot-checkable provenance, and demonstrate practical encoding of real-world information campaigns. The results establish complexity-theoretic foundations for engineering democratic advantage in cognitive warfare, with immediate applications to content authentication, platform governance, and information operations doctrine.

This paper documents and theorises a self-reinforcing dynamic between two measurable trends: the exponential expansion of large language model (LLM) context windows and the secular contraction of human sustained-attention capacity. We term the resulting asymmetry the Cognitive Divergence. AI context windows have grown from 512 tokens in 2017 to 2,000,000 tokens by 2026 (factor ~3,906; fitted lambda = 0.59/yr; doubling time ~14 months). Over the same period, human Effective Context Span (ECS) -- a token-equivalent measure derived from validated reading-rate meta-analysis (Brysbaert, 2019) and an empirically motivated Comprehension Scaling Factor -- has declined from approximately 16,000 tokens (2004 baseline) to an estimated 1,800 tokens (2026, extrapolated from longitudinal behavioural data ending 2020 (Mark, 2023); see Section 9 for uncertainty discussion). The AI-to-human ratio grew from near parity at the ChatGPT launch (November 2022) to 556--1,111x raw and 56--111x quality-adjusted, after accounting for retrieval degradation (Liu et al., 2024; Chroma, 2025). Beyond documenting this divergence, the paper introduces the Delegation Feedback Loop hypothesis: as AI capability grows, the cognitive threshold at which humans delegate to AI falls, extending to tasks of negligible demand; the resulting reduction in cognitive practice may further attenuate the capacities already documented as declining (Gerlich, 2025; Kim et al., 2026; Kosmyna et al., 2025). Neither trend reverses spontaneously. The paper characterises the divergence statistically, reviews neurobiological mechanisms across eight peer-reviewed neuroimaging studies, presents empirical evidence bearing on the delegation threshold, and proposes a research agenda centred on a validated ECS psychometric instrument and longitudinal study of AI-mediated cognitive change.

Large Language Model agents have rapidly evolved from static text generators into dynamic systems capable of executing complex autonomous workflows. To enhance reliability, multi-agent frameworks assigning specialized roles are increasingly adopted to enable self-reflection and mutual auditing. While such role-playing effectively leverages domain expert knowledge, we find it simultaneously induces a human-like cognitive bias known as Actor-Observer Asymmetry (AOA). Specifically, an agent acting as an actor (during self-reflection) tends to attribute failures to external factors, whereas an observer (during mutual auditing) attributes the same errors to internal faults. We quantify this using our new Ambiguous Failure Benchmark, which reveals that simply swapping perspectives triggers the AOA effect in over 20% of cases for most models. To tame this bias, we introduce ReTAS (Reasoning via Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis), a model trained through dialectical alignment to enforce perspective-invariant reasoning. By integrating dialectical chain-of-thought with Group Relative Policy Optimization, ReTAS guides agents to synthesize conflicting viewpoints into an objective consensus. Experiments demonstrate that ReTAS effectively mitigates attribution inconsistency and significantly improves fault resolution rates in ambiguous scenarios.

A fundamental intent asymmetry plagues modern 3D asset creation: while state-of-the-art 3D toolchains demand precise, executable parameters, ordinary users typically provide vague, underspecified instructions. Current 3D agents treat this ambiguity as noise, defaulting to blind execution under a single-turn assumption. To address this limitation, we introduce CLARE, a clarification-aware and evolutionary 3D agent that treats intent asymmetry not as an execution error, but as an opportunity for strategic dialogue. By decoupling the generation pipeline into four specialized cognitive roles, CLARE intercepts and resolves underspecified instructions before invoking computationally expensive 3D tools to seamlessly execute tasks across five diverse domains: text-to-3D generation, single-view reconstruction, multi-view reconstruction, point cloud editing, and post-processing. Crucially, rather than relying on rigid manual rules, CLARE self-evolves its clarification policy via simulated multi-turn interactions. By optimizing a Multi-turn Reward, the agent internalizes the delicate balance between interaction efficiency and task completion. To rigorously test this, we construct 3D-Clarify, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 620 interaction scenarios with systematically injected ambiguity, missing information, and mistaken details. CLARE achieves state-of-the-art performance, with 60.40% and 43.34% success rates on single-step and multi-step tasks, respectively, more than doubling existing baselines. Both quantitative and qualitative results demonstrate that proactive clarification is the missing key to robust 3D execution. Code is available at https://github.com/xyzhu1225/CLARE.

Visual search is a ubiquitous and often challenging daily task, exemplified by looking for the car keys at home or a friend in a crowd. An intriguing property of some classical search tasks is an asymmetry such that finding a target A among distractors B can be easier than finding B among A. To elucidate the mechanisms responsible for asymmetry in visual search, we propose a computational model that takes a target and a search image as inputs and produces a sequence of eye movements until the target is found. The model integrates eccentricity-dependent visual recognition with target-dependent top-down cues. We compared the model against human behavior in six paradigmatic search tasks that show asymmetry in humans. Without prior exposure to the stimuli or task-specific training, the model provides a plausible mechanism for search asymmetry. We hypothesized that the polarity of search asymmetry arises from experience with the natural environment. We tested this hypothesis by training the model on augmented versions of ImageNet where the biases of natural images were either removed or reversed. The polarity of search asymmetry disappeared or was altered depending on the training protocol. This study highlights how classical perceptual properties can emerge in neural network models, without the need for task-specific training, but rather as a consequence of the statistical properties of the developmental diet fed to the model. All source code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/kreimanlab/VisualSearchAsymmetry.

Instructions trigger a production-centered mechanism in language models. Through a cognitively inspired lens that separates language processing and production, we reveal this mechanism as an asymmetry between the two stages by probing task-specific information layer-wise across five binary judgment tasks. Specifically, we measure how instruction tokens shape information both when sample tokens, the input under evaluation, are processed and when output tokens are produced. Across prompting variations, task-specific information in sample tokens remains largely stable and correlates only weakly with behavior, whereas the same information in output tokens varies substantially and correlates strongly with behavior. Attention-based interventions confirm this pattern causally: blocking instruction flow to all subsequent tokens reduces both behavior and information in output tokens, whereas blocking it only to sample tokens has minimal effect on either. The asymmetry generalizes across model families and tasks, and becomes sharper with model scale and instruction-tuning, both of which disproportionately affect the production stage. Our findings suggest that understanding model capabilities requires jointly assessing internals and behavior, while decomposing the internal perspective by token position to distinguish the processing of input tokens from the production of output tokens.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

Recent work shows that LLM agents struggle to correct errors in their own reasoning traces yet show markedly higher correction rates when identical claims appear under external sources. We ask whether this asymmetry reflects a capability deficit or a role-label artifact: does an agent's willingness to correct a wrong claim depend causally on the chat-template role that carries it, rather than on the claim's content? Our setup keeps the erroneous claim byte-identical across all conditions (SHA-256 verified) and varies only its wrapping role: the agent's own <thought>, a user message, a tool response, or a system <memory> block. Across 13 model-domain cells covering seven model families and three domains (n{=}30 paired tasks per cell), relabeling the claim from <thought> to an external role lifts the explicit-correction rate by 23 to 93 percentage points, with 10 of 13 cells reaching p{<}0.001. Further experiments confirm that the effect is asymmetric, mechanistically decomposable, and robust across domains. The failure to self-correct is not a cognitive deficit; it is a chat-template artifact. We exploit this artifact by designing a prompt-structure-only intervention that requires no training and no model modification, with its strongest role label being domain-dependent: <memory> dominates on math, while a plain user message dominates on logical deduction.

Vision-language models with extended reasoning succeed on complex problems, but many real-world problems require external tools that internal reasoning alone often cannot resolve. Agentic reasoning therefore interleaves two behaviors with a structural asymmetry: thinking (the self-contained default) and tool use (a high-variance auxiliary acting). We refer to this asymmetry as the Thinking-Acting Gap. Under standard RL recipes like GRPO, the gap manifests as two diagnostic symptoms during training: tool use is attempted on only ~30% of rollouts, and when attempted, the tool-using rollouts within a group are all-wrong on ~40% of questions, suppressing the learning signal at the tool calls that needed it. We propose AXPO (Agent eXplorative Policy Optimization): for each all-wrong tool-using subgroup, AXPO fixes the thinking prefix and resamples the tool call and its continuation, paired with uncertainty-based prefix selection. Across nine multimodal benchmarks and three scales of Qwen3-VL-Thinking, SFT+AXPO outperforms SFT+GRPO at average (+1.8pp Pass@1 and +1.8pp Pass@4 at 8B on average) and 8B with SFT+AXPO surpasses the 32B Base on Pass@4 with 4 times fewer parameters.

On-policy distillation trains a language model on its own generations while a teacher scores them token by token. It combines the dense supervision of imitation learning with the on-policy sampling of reinforcement learning. But it requires a second, larger model to act as teacher. On-Policy Self-Distillation (OPSD) removes that cost. The teacher is the model itself, conditioned on privileged information the student will not have at test time, such as a reference solution, a plan, or environment feedback. The teacher is no stronger than the student, only better informed. Early results were promising, with accuracy comparable to reinforcement learning at a fraction of the generated tokens. But the same asymmetry that produces the signal also biases it. One failure mode now dominates the field: collapse, the progressive narrowing of the set of reasoning paths the model can produce. Collapse is not specific to OPSD, though privileged information aggravates it. This review treats collapse as a symptom governed by three levers: (i) where the signal is applied, that is, how tokens are weighted; (ii) what the teacher is shown, that is, the nature of the privileged information; and (iii) when the signal changes, that is, the teacher's dynamics and the decay of guidance. We restrict our scope to mathematical reasoning, where the method originated and where its failure modes are best documented. We report no new experiments. The contribution is structural: a shared vocabulary for phenomena named differently across papers, and a clear line between what is settled and what is still disputed.

Visual on-policy distillation relies heavily on an informative teacher-student asymmetry, through either a larger, stronger teacher or privileged supervision, such as reference answers or ground-truth regions of interest. This raises a fundamental question: where can informative asymmetry come from when nothing privileged is available? We answer this by inverting where the asymmetry comes from. Rather than adding privileged information to the teacher, we subtract information from the student. This asymmetry creates the same effective learning signal for free as a teacher with access to information unavailable to the student, without ground-truth annotations, rewards, or a separate stronger teacher model. Building on this principle, we introduce Self-Supervised Visual On-Policy Distillation (S^2VOPD), a simple yet effective method that constructs on-policy learning signals from asymmetric augmented views. S^2VOPD distills the teacher's distribution conditioned on the original image on-policy into the student distribution conditioned on a strongly augmented view of the same image. We systematically explore a broad design space of visual augmentations and uncover that (1) asymmetry matters: all four augmentation families improve performance, while symmetric self-distillation degrades it; (2) strength matters: performance peaks at a moderate strength; and (3) the gap must remain task-consistent: augmentations that completely remove the question-relevant evidence can induce large but uninformative discrepancies. Across six fine-grained perception benchmarks, S^2VOPD improves Qwen3.5-4B from 70.7% to 77.4%, above all open-source models compared, up to Qwen3-VL at 235B, and surpasses GPT-5.4. While holding training data the same, it recovers 96% of the improvement achieved by methods with privileged information. Website is at https://williamium3000.github.io/s2vopd

People supported by AI-powered decision support tools frequently overrely on the AI: they accept an AI's suggestion even when that suggestion is wrong. Adding explanations to the AI decisions does not appear to reduce the overreliance and some studies suggest that it might even increase it. Informed by the dual-process theory of cognition, we posit that people rarely engage analytically with each individual AI recommendation and explanation, and instead develop general heuristics about whether and when to follow the AI suggestions. Building on prior research on medical decision-making, we designed three cognitive forcing interventions to compel people to engage more thoughtfully with the AI-generated explanations. We conducted an experiment (N=199), in which we compared our three cognitive forcing designs to two simple explainable AI approaches and to a no-AI baseline. The results demonstrate that cognitive forcing significantly reduced overreliance compared to the simple explainable AI approaches. However, there was a trade-off: people assigned the least favorable subjective ratings to the designs that reduced the overreliance the most. To audit our work for intervention-generated inequalities, we investigated whether our interventions benefited equally people with different levels of Need for Cognition (i.e., motivation to engage in effortful mental activities). Our results show that, on average, cognitive forcing interventions benefited participants higher in Need for Cognition more. Our research suggests that human cognitive motivation moderates the effectiveness of explainable AI solutions.

Existing Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks diverge from real-world scenarios in three aspects: 1) they assess a limited range of mental states such as beliefs, 2) false beliefs are not comprehensively explored, and 3) the diverse personality traits of characters are overlooked. To address these challenges, we introduce ToMATO, a new ToM benchmark formulated as multiple-choice QA over conversations. ToMATO is generated via LLM-LLM conversations featuring information asymmetry. By employing a prompting method that requires role-playing LLMs to verbalize their thoughts before each utterance, we capture both first- and second-order mental states across five categories: belief, intention, desire, emotion, and knowledge. These verbalized thoughts serve as answers to questions designed to assess the mental states of characters within conversations. Furthermore, the information asymmetry introduced by hiding thoughts from others induces the generation of false beliefs about various mental states. Assigning distinct personality traits to LLMs further diversifies both utterances and thoughts. ToMATO consists of 5.4k questions, 753 conversations, and 15 personality trait patterns. Our analysis shows that this dataset construction approach frequently generates false beliefs due to the information asymmetry between role-playing LLMs, and effectively reflects diverse personalities. We evaluate nine LLMs on ToMATO and find that even GPT-4o mini lags behind human performance, especially in understanding false beliefs, and lacks robustness to various personality traits.

Cognitive diversity, reflected in variations of language, perspective, and reasoning, is essential to creativity and collective intelligence. This diversity is rich and grounded in culture, history, and individual experience. Yet as large language models (LLMs) become deeply embedded in people's lives, they risk standardizing language and reasoning. This Review synthesizes evidence across linguistics, cognitive, and computer science to show how LLMs reflect and reinforce dominant styles while marginalizing alternative voices and reasoning strategies. We examine how their design and widespread use contribute to this effect by mirroring patterns in their training data and amplifying convergence as all people increasingly rely on the same models across contexts. Unchecked, this homogenization risks flattening the cognitive landscapes that drive collective intelligence and adaptability.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Recent image generators produce photo-realistic content that undermines the reliability of downstream recognition systems. As visual appearance cues become less pronounced, appearance-driven detectors that rely on forensic cues or high-level representations lose stability. This motivates a shift from appearance to behavior, focusing on how images respond to controlled perturbations rather than how they look. In this work, we identify a simple and universal behavioral signal. Natural images preserve stable semantic representations under small, structured perturbations, whereas generated images exhibit markedly larger feature drift. We refer to this phenomenon as robustness asymmetry and provide a theoretical analysis that establishes a lower bound connecting this asymmetry to memorization tendencies in generative models, explaining its prevalence across architectures. Building on this insight, we introduce Robustness Asymmetry Detection (RA-Det), a behavior-driven detection framework that converts robustness asymmetry into a reliable decision signal. Evaluated across 14 diverse generative models and against more than 10 strong detectors, RA-Det achieves superior performance, improving the average performance by 7.81 percent. The method is data- and model-agnostic, requires no generator fingerprints, and transfers across unseen generators. Together, these results indicate that robustness asymmetry is a stable, general cue for synthetic-image detection and that carefully designed probing can turn this cue into a practical, universal detector. The source code is publicly available at Github.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

Scalable oversight protocols aim to enable humans to accurately supervise superhuman AI. In this paper we study debate, where two AI's compete to convince a judge; consultancy, where a single AI tries to convince a judge that asks questions; and compare to a baseline of direct question-answering, where the judge just answers outright without the AI. We use large language models (LLMs) as both AI agents and as stand-ins for human judges, taking the judge models to be weaker than agent models. We benchmark on a diverse range of asymmetries between judges and agents, extending previous work on a single extractive QA task with information asymmetry, to also include mathematics, coding, logic and multimodal reasoning asymmetries. We find that debate outperforms consultancy across all tasks when the consultant is randomly assigned to argue for the correct/incorrect answer. Comparing debate to direct question answering, the results depend on the type of task: in extractive QA tasks with information asymmetry debate outperforms direct question answering, but in other tasks without information asymmetry the results are mixed. Previous work assigned debaters/consultants an answer to argue for. When we allow them to instead choose which answer to argue for, we find judges are less frequently convinced by the wrong answer in debate than in consultancy. Further, we find that stronger debater models increase judge accuracy, though more modestly than in previous studies.

We introduce a cross-domain behavioural assay of monitoring-control coupling in LLMs, grounded in the Nelson and Narens (1990) metacognitive framework and applying human psychometric methodology to LLM evaluation. The battery comprises 524 items across six cognitive domains (learning, metacognitive calibration, social cognition, attention, executive function, prospective regulation), each grounded in an established experimental paradigm. Tasks T1-T5 were pre-registered on OSF prior to data collection; T6 was added as an exploratory extension. After every forced-choice response, dual probes adapted from Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) ask the model to KEEP or WITHDRAW its answer and to BET or decline. The critical metric is the withdraw delta: the difference in withdrawal rate between incorrect and correct items. Applied to 20 frontier LLMs (10,480 evaluations), the battery discriminates three profiles consistent with the Nelson-Narens architecture: blanket confidence, blanket withdrawal, and selective sensitivity. Accuracy rank and metacognitive sensitivity rank are largely inverted. Retrospective monitoring and prospective regulation appear dissociable (r = .17, 95% CI wide given n=20; exemplar-based evidence is the primary support). Scaling on metacognitive calibration is architecture-dependent: monotonically decreasing (Qwen), monotonically increasing (GPT-5.4), or flat (Gemma). Behavioural findings converge structurally with an independent Type-2 SDT approach, providing preliminary cross-method construct validity. All items, data, and code: https://github.com/synthiumjp/metacognitive-monitoring-battery.

Scientists and practitioners are aggressively moving to deploy digital twins - LLM-based models of real individuals - across social science and policy research. We conducted 19 pre-registered studies with 164 diverse outcomes (e.g., attitudes towards hiring algorithms, intention to share misinformation) and compared human responses to those of their digital twins (trained on each person's previous answers to over 500 questions). We find that digital twins' answers are only modestly more accurate than those from the homogeneous base LLM and correlate weakly with human responses (average r = 0.20). We document five ways in which digital twins distort human behavior: (i) stereotyping, (ii) insufficient individuation, (iii) representation bias, (iv) ideological biases, and (v) hyper-rationality. Together, our results caution against the premature deployment of digital twins, which may systematically misrepresent human cognition and undermine both scientific understanding and practical applications.

We present seven experiments exploring gender biases in GPT. Initially, GPT was asked to generate demographics of a potential writer of twenty phrases containing feminine stereotypes and twenty with masculine stereotypes. Results show a strong asymmetry, with stereotypically masculine sentences attributed to a female more often than vice versa. For example, the sentence "I love playing fotbal! Im practicing with my cosin Michael" was constantly assigned by ChatGPT to a female writer. This phenomenon likely reflects that while initiatives to integrate women in traditionally masculine roles have gained momentum, the reverse movement remains relatively underdeveloped. Subsequent experiments investigate the same issue in high-stakes moral dilemmas. GPT-4 finds it more appropriate to abuse a man to prevent a nuclear apocalypse than to abuse a woman. This bias extends to other forms of violence central to the gender parity debate (abuse), but not to those less central (torture). Moreover, this bias increases in cases of mixed-sex violence for the greater good: GPT-4 agrees with a woman using violence against a man to prevent a nuclear apocalypse but disagrees with a man using violence against a woman for the same purpose. Finally, these biases are implicit, as they do not emerge when GPT-4 is directly asked to rank moral violations. These results highlight the necessity of carefully managing inclusivity efforts to prevent unintended discrimination.

Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness, information unavailable through external observation. We train correctness classifiers on question representations from both a model's own hidden states and external models, testing whether self-representations provide a performance advantage. On standard evaluation, we find no advantage: self-probes perform comparably to peer-model probes. We hypothesize this is due to high inter-model agreement of answer correctness. To isolate genuine privileged knowledge, we evaluate on disagreement subsets, where models produce conflicting predictions. Here, we discover domain-specific privileged knowledge: self-representations consistently outperform peer representations in factual knowledge tasks, but show no advantage in math reasoning. We further localize this domain asymmetry across model layers, finding that the factual advantage emerges progressively from early-to-mid layers onward, consistent with model-specific memory retrieval, while math reasoning shows no consistent advantage at any depth.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited remarkable reasoning and planning capabilities. Most prior work in this area has used LLMs to reason through steps from an initial to a goal state or criterion, thereby effectively reasoning in a forward direction. Nonetheless, many planning problems exhibit an inherent asymmetry such that planning backward from the goal is significantly easier -- for example, if there are bottlenecks close to the goal. We take inspiration from this observation and demonstrate that this bias holds for LLM planning as well: planning performance in one direction correlates with the planning complexity of the problem in that direction. However, our experiments also reveal systematic biases which lead to poor planning in the backward direction. With this knowledge, we propose a backward planning algorithm for LLMs that first flips the problem and then plans forward in the flipped problem. This helps avoid the backward bias, generate more diverse candidate plans, and exploit asymmetries between the forward and backward directions in planning problems -- we find that combining planning in both directions with self-verification improves the overall planning success rates by 4-24% in three planning domains.

As reasoning models scale rapidly, the essential role of multimodality in human cognition has come into sharp relief, driving a growing need to probe vision-centric cognitive behaviors. Yet, existing multimodal benchmarks either overemphasize textual reasoning or fall short of systematically capturing vision-centric cognitive behaviors, leaving the cognitive capacity of MLLMs insufficiently assessed. To address this limitation, we introduce MME-CC (Multi-Modal Evaluation benchmark of Cognitive Capacity), a vision-grounded benchmark that organizes 11 representative reasoning tasks into three fundamental categories of visual information: spatial, geometric, and knowledge-based reasoning, and provides fine-grained analyses of MLLMs' cognitive capacity across these dimensions. Based on MME-CC, we conduct extensive experiments over 16 representative MLLMs. Our study reveals that closed-source models currently lead overall (e.g., 42.66 for Gemini-2.5-Pro vs. 30.45 for GLM-4.5V), while spatial and geometric reasoning remain broadly weak (less than or equal to 30%). We further identify common error patterns, including orientation mistakes, fragile cross-view identity persistence, and poor adherence to counterfactual instructions, and observe that Chain-of-Thought typically follows a three-stage process (extract -> reason -> verify) with heavy reliance on visual extraction. We hope this work catalyzes a shift toward treating the cognitive capacity of MLLMs as central to both evaluation and model design.

Understanding and mitigating hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial for ensuring reliable content generation. While previous research has primarily focused on "when" LLMs hallucinate, our work explains "why" and directly links model behaviour to the pre-training data that forms their prior knowledge. Specifically, we demonstrate that an asymmetry exists in the recognition of logically equivalent facts, which can be attributed to frequency discrepancies of entities appearing as subjects versus objects. Given that most pre-training datasets are inaccessible, we leverage the fully open-source OLMo series by indexing its Dolma dataset to estimate entity frequencies. Using relational facts (represented as triples) from Wikidata5M, we construct probing datasets to isolate this effect. Our experiments reveal that facts with a high-frequency subject and a low-frequency object are better recognised than their inverse, despite their logical equivalence. The pattern reverses in low-to-high frequency settings, and no statistically significant asymmetry emerges when both entities are high-frequency. These findings highlight the influential role of pre-training data in shaping model predictions and provide insights for inferring the characteristics of pre-training data in closed or partially closed LLMs.

Many people have flipped coins but few have stopped to ponder the statistical and physical intricacies of the process. We collected 350{,}757 coin flips to test the counterintuitive prediction from a physics model of human coin tossing developed by Diaconis, Holmes, and Montgomery (DHM; 2007). The model asserts that when people flip an ordinary coin, it tends to land on the same side it started -- DHM estimated the probability of a same-side outcome to be about 51\%. Our data lend strong support to this precise prediction: the coins landed on the same side more often than not, Pr(same side) = 0.508, 95\% credible interval (CI) [0.506, 0.509], BF_{same-side bias} = 2359. Furthermore, the data revealed considerable between-people variation in the degree of this same-side bias. Our data also confirmed the generic prediction that when people flip an ordinary coin -- with the initial side-up randomly determined -- it is equally likely to land heads or tails: Pr(heads) = 0.500, 95\% CI [0.498, 0.502], BF_{heads-tails bias} = 0.182. Furthermore, this lack of heads-tails bias does not appear to vary across coins. Additional analyses revealed that the within-people same-side bias decreased as more coins were flipped, an effect that is consistent with the possibility that practice makes people flip coins in a less wobbly fashion. Our data therefore provide strong evidence that when some (but not all) people flip a fair coin, it tends to land on the same side it started.

Visual neural decoding seeks to reconstruct or infer perceived visual stimuli from brain activity patterns, providing critical insights into human cognition and enabling transformative applications in brain-computer interfaces and artificial intelligence. Current approaches, however, remain constrained by the scarcity of high-quality stimulus-brain response pairs and the inherent semantic mismatch between neural representations and visual content. Inspired by perceptual variability and co-adaptive strategy of the biological systems, we propose a novel self-supervised architecture, named NeuroBridge, which integrates Cognitive Prior Augmentation (CPA) with Shared Semantic Projector (SSP) to promote effective cross-modality alignment. Specifically, CPA simulates perceptual variability by applying asymmetric, modality-specific transformations to both EEG signals and images, enhancing semantic diversity. Unlike previous approaches, SSP establishes a bidirectional alignment process through a co-adaptive strategy, which mutually aligns features from two modalities into a shared semantic space for effective cross-modal learning. NeuroBridge surpasses previous state-of-the-art methods under both intra-subject and inter-subject settings. In the intra-subject scenario, it achieves the improvements of 12.3% in top-1 accuracy and 10.2% in top-5 accuracy, reaching 63.2% and 89.9% respectively on a 200-way zero-shot retrieval task. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness, robustness, and scalability of the proposed framework for neural visual decoding.

The quest for human imitative AI has been an enduring topic in AI research since its inception. The technical evolution and emerging capabilities of the latest cohort of large language models (LLMs) have reinvigorated the subject beyond academia to the cultural zeitgeist. While recent NLP evaluation benchmark tasks test some aspects of human-imitative behaviour (e.g., BIG-bench's 'human-like behavior' tasks), few, if not none, examine creative problem solving abilities. Creative problem solving in humans is a well-studied topic in cognitive neuroscience with standardized tests that predominantly use the ability to associate (heterogeneous) connections among clue words as a metric for creativity. Exposure to misleading stimuli - distractors dubbed red herrings - impede human performance in such tasks via the fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm. In cognitive neuroscience studies, such fixations are experimentally induced by pre-exposing participants to orthographically similar incorrect words to subsequent word-fragments or clues. The popular British quiz show Only Connect's Connecting Wall segment essentially mimics Mednick's Remote Associates Test (RAT) formulation with built-in, deliberate red herrings, which makes it an ideal proxy dataset to explore and study fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm from cognitive neuroscience in LLMs. In addition to presenting the novel Only Connect Wall (OCW) dataset, we also report results from our evaluation of selected pre-trained language models and LLMs (including OpenAI's GPT series) on creative problem solving tasks like grouping clue words by heterogeneous connections, and identifying correct open knowledge domain connections in respective groups. The code and link to the dataset are available at https://github.com/TaatiTeam/OCW.

LLMorphism is the biased belief that human cognition works like a large language model. I argue that the rise of conversational LLMs may make this bias increasingly psychologically available. When artificial systems produce human-like language, people may draw a reverse inference: if LLMs can speak like humans, perhaps humans think like LLMs. This inference is biased because similarity at the level of linguistic output does not imply similarity in cognitive architecture. Yet, LLMorphism may spread through two mechanisms: analogical transfer, whereby features of LLMs are projected onto humans, and metaphorical availability, whereby LLM vocabulary becomes a culturally salient vocabulary for describing thought. I distinguish LLMorphism from mechanomorphism, anthropomorphism, computationalism, dehumanization, objectification, and predictive-processing theories of mind. I outline its implications for work, education, responsibility, healthcare, communication, creativity, and human dignity, while also discussing boundary conditions and forms of resistance. I conclude that the public debate may be missing half of the problem: the issue is not only whether we are attributing too much mind to machines, but also whether we are beginning to attribute too little mind to humans.

Creative thinking is a fundamental aspect of human cognition, and divergent thinking-the capacity to generate novel and varied ideas-is widely regarded as its core generative engine. Large language models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated impressive performance on divergent thinking tests and prior work has shown that models with higher task performance tend to be more aligned to human brain activity. However, existing brain-LLM alignment studies have focused on passive, non-creative tasks. Here, we explore brain alignment during creative thinking using fMRI data from 170 participants performing the Alternate Uses Task (AUT). We extract representations from LLMs varying in size (270M-72B) and measure alignment to brain responses via Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA), targeting the creativity-related default mode and frontoparietal networks. We find that brain-LLM alignment scales with model size (default mode network only) and idea originality (both networks), with effects strongest early in the creative process. We further show that post-training objectives shape alignment in functionally selective ways: a creativity-optimized Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct preserves alignment with high-creativity neural responses while reducing alignment with low-creativity ones; a human behavior fine-tuned model elevates alignment with both; and a reasoning-trained variant shows the opposite pattern, suggesting chain-of-thought training steers representations away from creative neural geometry toward analytical processing. These results demonstrate that post-training objectives selectively reshape LLM representations relative to the neural geometry of human creative thought.

We study the probabilistic modeling performed by Autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) through the angle of time directionality, addressing a question first raised in (Shannon, 1951). For large enough models, we empirically find a time asymmetry in their ability to learn natural language: a difference in the average log-perplexity when trying to predict the next token versus when trying to predict the previous one. This difference is at the same time subtle and very consistent across various modalities (language, model size, training time, ...). Theoretically, this is surprising: from an information-theoretic point of view, there should be no such difference. We provide a theoretical framework to explain how such an asymmetry can appear from sparsity and computational complexity considerations, and outline a number of perspectives opened by our results.

Equivariance theory predicts that an architectural symmetry prior reduces sample complexity by a factor of |G|; this is widely cited but rarely measured as a scaling law with controls that separate the prior from its confounds. On a controlled C_n-symmetric task, we report three findings. First, a wrong-group control with identical orbit size and matched compute is worse than no constraint (joint pairwise CI [+0.79, +3.26] excludes zero, robust across estimators); misaligned constraint is actively harmful, not merely unhelpful. Second, an augmentation baseline equipped with test-time orbit averaging matches the equivariant model exactly -- bit-identical per-epoch validation curves across matched cells -- so the architecture-vs-augmentation gap is conditional on asymmetric test-time computation, not unconditional. Third, the relative exchange rate beta_diff = 1.28 is consistent in sign and order of magnitude with the theoretical 1.0 (single-level CI [+0.92, +2.05]); the more conservative two-level bootstrap (seeds x group sizes) widens this to [-0.63, +1.72], including zero, and a finer-N replication on a sqrt(2)-spaced grid is inconclusive (point estimate -0.82). The methodological contributions -- the relative-rate estimator that cancels the shared-difficulty confound, the wrong-group control, and a pre-specified failure taxonomy -- transfer to any inductive bias whose strength can be parameterised. Honest scoping: the primary estimator beta_diff was adopted post-hoc after the initial analysis revealed a positive-slope identifiability problem; the design was never externally pre-registered; and the headline number rests on an OLS slope over seven group sizes on a coarse N grid. This is an exploratory study, not a confirmatory measurement; the wrong-group result is the cleanest finding and the one we report with the most confidence. A registered replication on fresh seeds is future work.

LLMs are widely regarded as alien intelligences, systems whose cognitive operations are fundamentally unlike our own. Apparent similarities to human cognition are therefore often seen as the result of anthropomorphic projection. We argue that this framing is mistaken. LLMs clearly differ from humans in important respects, including their physical substrate, learning history, and the environments with which they interact. These differences make it all the more striking that contemporary LLM-based systems converge with human cognition on a number of principles of cognitive organization with longstanding support in cognitive science. We identify structural correspondences across five dimensions: inferential organization, computational architecture, representational structure, prediction-driven learning, and reinforcement-learning-like mechanisms supporting goal-directed action. These correspondences support a broader model of intelligent cognition in which core principles long used to explain human intelligence also characterize contemporary LLM-based systems.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

Recent large language models (LLMs) achieve strong performance in generating promising reasoning paths for complex tasks. However, despite powerful generation ability, LLMs remain weak at verifying their own answers, revealing a persistent capability asymmetry between generation and self-verification. In this work, we conduct an in-depth investigation of this asymmetry throughout training evolution and show that, even on the same task, improving generation does not lead to corresponding improvements in self-verification. Interestingly, we find that the reverse direction of this asymmetry behaves differently: learning to self-verify can effectively improve generation performance, achieving accuracy comparable to standard generation training while yielding more efficient and effective reasoning traces. Building on this observation, we further explore integrating self-verification into generation training by formulating a multi-task reinforcement learning framework, where generation and self-verification are optimized as two independent but complementary objectives. Extensive experiments across benchmarks and models demonstrate performance gains over generation-only training in both generation and verification capabilities.

Embodied cognition argues that intelligence arises from sensorimotor interaction rather than passive observation. It raises an intriguing question: do modern vision-language models (VLMs), trained largely in a disembodied manner, exhibit signs of embodied cognition? We introduce ENACT, a benchmark that casts evaluation of embodied cognition as world modeling from egocentric interaction in a visual question answering (VQA) format. Framed as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) whose actions are scene graph changes, ENACT comprises two complementary sequence reordering tasks: forward world modeling (reorder shuffled observations given actions) and inverse world modeling (reorder shuffled actions given observations). While conceptually simple, solving these tasks implicitly demands capabilities central to embodied cognition-affordance recognition, action-effect reasoning, embodied awareness, and interactive, long-horizon memory from partially observable egocentric input, while avoiding low-level image synthesis that could confound the evaluation. We provide a scalable pipeline that synthesizes QA pairs from robotics simulation (BEHAVIOR) and evaluates models on 8,972 QA pairs spanning long-horizon home-scale activities. Experiments reveal a performance gap between frontier VLMs and humans that widens with interaction horizon. Models consistently perform better on the inverse task than the forward one and exhibit anthropocentric biases, including a preference for right-handed actions and degradation when camera intrinsics or viewpoints deviate from human vision. Website at https://enact-embodied-cognition.github.io/.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged with remarkable capabilities in complex tasks through Chain-of-Thought reasoning, practical resource constraints have sparked interest in transferring these abilities to smaller models. However, achieving both domain performance and cross-domain generalization remains challenging. Existing approaches typically restrict students to following a single golden rationale and treat different reasoning paths independently. Due to distinct inductive biases and intrinsic preferences, alongside the student's evolving capacity and reasoning preferences during training, a teacher's "optimal" rationale could act as out-of-distribution noise. This misalignment leads to a degeneration of the student's latent reasoning distribution, causing suboptimal performance. To bridge this gap, we propose MIND, a capability-adaptive framework that transitions distillation from passive mimicry to active cognitive construction. We synthesize diverse teacher perspectives through a novel "Teaching Assistant" network. By employing a Feedback-Driven Inertia Calibration mechanism, this network utilizes inertia-filtered training loss to align supervision with the student's current adaptability, effectively enhancing performance while mitigating catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MIND achieves state-of-the-art performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution benchmarks, and our sophisticated latent space analysis further confirms the mechanism of reasoning ability internalization.

Ensuring the long-term sustainability of recommender systems (RS) emerges as a crucial issue. Traditional offline evaluation methods for RS typically focus on immediate user feedback, such as clicks, but they often neglect the long-term impact of content creators. On real-world content platforms, creators can strategically produce and upload new items based on user feedback and preference trends. While previous studies have attempted to model creator behavior, they often overlook the role of information asymmetry. This asymmetry arises because creators primarily have access to feedback on the items they produce, while platforms possess data on the entire spectrum of user feedback. Current RS simulators, however, fail to account for this asymmetry, leading to inaccurate long-term evaluations. To address this gap, we propose CreAgent, a Large Language Model (LLM)-empowered creator simulation agent. By incorporating game theory's belief mechanism and the fast-and-slow thinking framework, CreAgent effectively simulates creator behavior under conditions of information asymmetry. Additionally, we enhance CreAgent's simulation ability by fine-tuning it using Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO). Our credibility validation experiments show that CreAgent aligns well with the behaviors between real-world platform and creator, thus improving the reliability of long-term RS evaluations. Moreover, through the simulation of RS involving CreAgents, we can explore how fairness- and diversity-aware RS algorithms contribute to better long-term performance for various stakeholders. CreAgent and the simulation platform are publicly available at https://github.com/shawnye2000/CreAgent.

Recent studies show evidence for emergent cognitive abilities in Large Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs). The increasing cognitive alignment of these models has made them candidates for cognitive science theories. Prior research into the emergent cognitive abilities of PLMs has largely been path-independent to model training, i.e., has focused on the final model weights and not the intermediate steps. However, building plausible models of human cognition using PLMs would benefit from considering the developmental alignment of their performance during training to the trajectories of children's thinking. Guided by psychometric tests of human intelligence, we choose four sets of tasks to investigate the alignment of ten popular families of PLMs and evaluate their available intermediate and final training steps. These tasks are Numerical ability, Linguistic abilities, Conceptual understanding, and Fluid reasoning. We find a striking regularity: regardless of model size, the developmental trajectories of PLMs consistently exhibit a window of maximal alignment to human cognitive development. Before that window, training appears to endow "blank slate" models with the requisite structure to be poised to rapidly learn from experience. After that window, training appears to serve the engineering goal of reducing loss but not the scientific goal of increasing alignment with human cognition.

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong reasoning performance by incorporating functional symbolic representations that abstractly describe graph traversal algorithms and step-by-step reasoning in few-shot learning settings. However, it remains unclear how LLMs genuinely understand the abstract meaning of each reasoning step and the overall algorithm from only a limited number of demonstrations. This work aims to localize the attention heads responsible for individual reasoning steps and characterize the types of information transferred among them. We first align constituent reasoning steps with their corresponding token logits under a symbolic-aided Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting framework. Our analysis shows that token positions that steer the reasoning process are associated with low confidence scores caused by constraints on satisfying reasoning behavior patterns in demonstrations. We then adopt causal mediation analysis techniques to identify the attention heads responsible for these patterns. In addition, our findings indicate that LLMs retrieve factual and rule-based information for individual sub-reasoning tasks through specialized attention heads (approximately 3% total heads), whereas higher layers predominantly facilitate information integration and the emergence of global reasoning strategies (e.g., graph traversal algorithms) that coordinate multiple intermediate reasoning steps to solve the overall task.

A defining feature of human intelligence is the ability to adapt to changing environments by inferring latent task structure from sparse observations. Neuroscientific research indicates that this capability relies on the hippocampus constructing abstract representations, expressed as low-dimensional, approximately orthogonal manifolds in neural state space. However, the internal mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) remain largely opaque, making it unclear whether they form comparable abstract representations or instead rely on task-specific statistical regularities when performing comparable reasoning tasks. Here we adapt a contextual reversal-learning paradigm to a text-based setting and compare humans and LLMs at both the Behavioural and representational levels. We report that although LLMs exhibit generalizable reasoning less frequently than humans, when such inference occurs, their internal states exhibit abstract geometric structures that resemble those reported in the hippocampus. Notably, this representational geometry is not uniformly distributed but is organized hierarchically across model depth: whereas lower layers show early, stable encoding of stimulus identity, higher layers form a hippocampal-like functional band enriched for abstract context geometry associated with inference. Furthermore, complementary intervention experiments mechanistically implicate geometry in reasoning: task-sequence language modelling induces geometric disentanglement, whereas geometric regularization of higher layers increases the emergence of generalizable inference. Together, these findings establish abstract representational geometry as a mechanistic principle supporting inference in large language models.

The impressive performance of language models is undeniable. However, the presence of biases based on gender, race, socio-economic status, physical appearance, and sexual orientation makes the deployment of language models challenging. This paper studies the effect of chain-of-thought prompting, a recent approach that studies the steps followed by the model before it responds, on fairness. More specifically, we ask the following question: Do biased models have biased thoughts? To answer our question, we conduct experiments on 5 popular large language models using fairness metrics to quantify 11 different biases in the model's thoughts and output. Our results show that the bias in the thinking steps is not highly correlated with the output bias (less than 0.6 correlation with a p-value smaller than 0.001 in most cases). In other words, unlike human beings, the tested models with biased decisions do not always possess biased thoughts.

Research on emergent patterns in Large Language Models (LLMs) has gained significant traction in both psychology and artificial intelligence, motivating the need for a comprehensive review that offers a synthesis of this complex landscape. In this article, we systematically review LLMs' capabilities across three important cognitive domains: decision-making biases, reasoning, and creativity. We use empirical studies drawing on established psychological tests and compare LLMs' performance to human benchmarks. On decision-making, our synthesis reveals that while LLMs demonstrate several human-like biases, some biases observed in humans are absent, indicating cognitive patterns that only partially align with human decision-making. On reasoning, advanced LLMs like GPT-4 exhibit deliberative reasoning akin to human System-2 thinking, while smaller models fall short of human-level performance. A distinct dichotomy emerges in creativity: while LLMs excel in language-based creative tasks, such as storytelling, they struggle with divergent thinking tasks that require real-world context. Nonetheless, studies suggest that LLMs hold considerable potential as collaborators, augmenting creativity in human-machine problem-solving settings. Discussing key limitations, we also offer guidance for future research in areas such as memory, attention, and open-source model development.

We pursue a vision for self-improving language models in which the model does not merely generate problems or traces to imitate, but constructs the environments that train it. In zero-data reasoning RL, this reframes self-improvement from a data-generation loop into an environment-construction loop, where each artifact is a reusable executable object that samples instances, computes references, and scores responses. Whether this vision sustains improvement hinges on a single property: the environments must exhibit stable solve--verify asymmetry, the model must be able to write an oracle once that it cannot reliably execute in natural language on fresh instances. This asymmetry takes two complementary forms. Some tasks are algorithmically hard to reason through but trivial as code: a dynamic program or graph traversal, compiled once, yields unboundedly many calibrated instances. Others are intrinsically hard to solve but easy to verify, like planted subset-sum or constraint satisfaction. Both create a durable gap between proposing and solving that the policy cannot close by gaming the verifier, and it is this gap that keeps reward informative as the learner improves. We instantiate this view in EvoEnv, a single-policy generator, solver method that synthesizes Python environments from ten seeds and admits them only after staged validation, semantic self-review, solver-relative difficulty calibration, and novelty checks. The strongest evidence comes from the already-strong regime: on Qwen3-4B-Thinking, fixed public-data RLVR and fixed hand-crafted environment RLVR reduce the average, while EvoEnv improves it from 72.4 to 74.8, a relative gain of 3.3%. Stable self-improvement, we suggest, depends not on producing more synthetic data, but on models learning to construct worlds whose difficulty stays structurally beyond their own reach.

Task-oriented dialogue systems often face difficulties when user utterances seem semantically complete but lack necessary structural information for appropriate system action. This arises because users frequently do not fully understand their own needs, while systems require precise intent definitions. Current LLM-based agents cannot effectively distinguish between linguistically complete and contextually triggerable expressions, lacking frameworks for collaborative intent formation. We present STORM, a framework modeling asymmetric information dynamics through conversations between UserLLM (full internal access) and AgentLLM (observable behavior only). STORM produces annotated corpora capturing expression trajectories and latent cognitive transitions, enabling systematic analysis of collaborative understanding development. Our contributions include: (1) formalizing asymmetric information processing in dialogue systems; (2) modeling intent formation tracking collaborative understanding evolution; and (3) evaluation metrics measuring internal cognitive improvements alongside task performance. Experiments across four language models reveal that moderate uncertainty (40-60%) can outperform complete transparency in certain scenarios, with model-specific patterns suggesting reconsideration of optimal information completeness in human-AI collaboration. These findings contribute to understanding asymmetric reasoning dynamics and inform uncertainty-calibrated dialogue system design.

Large language models are increasingly used as decision aids whose probability judgments shape downstream choices. Whether those judgments carry a systematic directional tilt has been hard to detect: calibration metrics aggregate unsigned errors, and naturalistic uncertainty offers no ground-truth probability. When an LLM rates a startup's success at 70% but its failure at 15%, the missing 15 points expose a distortion no aggregate score flags. We introduce OptimismBench, which detects directional bias with inverted pairs: each scenario elicits both P(success) and P(failure), and asymmetry between the two framings yields a signed bias score without ground truth. Across 16 models from 8 providers, fourteen are optimistic; pessimism appears only in Anthropic's frontier tier. Eleven matched base-versus-chat pairs across four families show post-training sets the sign of the bias, with opposite shifts in different families. The pattern survives prompt, temperature, perspective, and self-debiasing ablations. A seventeen-model six-language comparison further shows model identity dominates language, with inter-model variance at 4.7x inter-language variance. We release 3,870 items across 10 languages for per-model directional-bias auditing. When alignment makes a model more helpful, it also tilts its probabilities; downstream pipelines inherit the tilt by default.

Recent studies show that instruction tuning and learning from human feedback improve the abilities of large language models (LMs) dramatically. While these tuning methods can make models generate high-quality text, we conjecture that more implicit cognitive biases may arise in these fine-tuned models. Our work provides evidence that these fine-tuned models exhibit biases that were absent or less pronounced in their pretrained predecessors. We examine the extent of this phenomenon in three cognitive biases - the decoy effect, the certainty effect, and the belief bias - all of which are known to influence human decision-making and reasoning. Our findings highlight the presence of these biases in various models, especially those that have undergone instruction tuning, such as Flan-T5, GPT3.5, and GPT4. This research constitutes a step toward comprehending cognitive biases in instruction-tuned LMs, which is crucial for the development of more reliable and unbiased language models.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4 and Gemini have significantly advanced artificial intelligence by enabling machines to generate and comprehend human-like text. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs are not immune to limitations, including various biases. While much research has explored demographic biases, the cognitive biases in LLMs have not been equally scrutinized. This study delves into anchoring bias, a cognitive bias where initial information disproportionately influences judgment. Utilizing an experimental dataset, we examine how anchoring bias manifests in LLMs and verify the effectiveness of various mitigation strategies. Our findings highlight the sensitivity of LLM responses to biased hints. At the same time, our experiments show that, to mitigate anchoring bias, one needs to collect hints from comprehensive angles to prevent the LLMs from being anchored to individual pieces of information, while simple algorithms such as Chain-of-Thought, Thoughts of Principles, Ignoring Anchor Hints, and Reflection are not sufficient.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into high-stakes decision-making. Inspired by the theory of inattentional blindness in human cognition, we investigate whether LLMs, trained on human-preferred corpora that embed attentional biases, exhibit a similar limitation: failing to attend to subtle yet important contextual cues under explicit task instructions. To evaluate this, we introduce the task of explicit-implicit reasoning and present MixRea, a benchmark of 2,246 multiple-choice questions across 9 reasoning types with varying distributions of explicit and implicit information. Evaluation of 21 advanced LLMs shows that even the best-performing reasoning model (Gemini 2.5 Pro) achieves only 42.8\% consistency, revealing widespread inattentional blindness. To mitigate this, we propose Potential Relation Completion Prompting (PRCP), a prompting method that improves reasoning by recovering overlooked causal relations. Further analysis shows that this limitation persists across diverse multi-source reasoning tasks, highlighting the need for more cognitively aligned models.

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT has advanced natural language processing, yet concerns about cognitive biases are growing. In this paper, we investigate the anchoring effect, a cognitive bias where the mind relies heavily on the first information as anchors to make affected judgments. We explore whether LLMs are affected by anchoring, the underlying mechanisms, and potential mitigation strategies. To facilitate studies at scale on the anchoring effect, we introduce a new dataset, SynAnchors. Combining refined evaluation metrics, we benchmark current widely used LLMs. Our findings show that LLMs' anchoring bias exists commonly with shallow-layer acting and is not eliminated by conventional strategies, while reasoning can offer some mitigation. This recontextualization via cognitive psychology urges that LLM evaluations focus not on standard benchmarks or over-optimized robustness tests, but on cognitive-bias-aware trustworthy evaluation.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Do reasoning models have "Aha!" moments? Prior work suggests that models like DeepSeek-R1-Zero undergo sudden mid-trace realizations that lead to accurate outputs, implying an intrinsic capacity for self-correction. Yet, it remains unclear whether such intrinsic shifts in reasoning strategy actually improve performance. Here, we study mid-reasoning shifts and instrument training runs to detect them. Our analysis spans 1M+ reasoning traces, hundreds of training checkpoints, three reasoning domains, and multiple decoding temperatures and model architectures. We find that reasoning shifts are rare, do not become more frequent with training, and seldom improve accuracy, indicating that they do not correspond to prior perceptions of model insight. However, their effect varies with model uncertainty. Building on this finding, we show that artificially triggering extrinsic shifts under high entropy reliably improves accuracy. Our results show that mid-reasoning shifts are symptoms of unstable inference behavior rather than an intrinsic mechanism for self-correction.

Large language models often produce hallucinated answers that violate prompt-level constraints. A key diagnostic question is whether these failures reflect missing knowledge, or whether the model has the relevant information but follows the wrong inference path. We study this phenomenon as inference misalignment: a mismatch between the answer supported by the prompt and the answer favored by statistically salient latent associations. We formalize this view with a latent key-task model, in which pretraining-frequency imbalance can cause a shortcut path to dominate the constraint-sensitive path and induce positive inference loss. The framework predicts two failure modes: task-retrieval bias in entity disambiguation and key-selection bias in action choice. We introduce TrapQA, a controlled diagnostic testbed with two components. ScientistQA tests disambiguation among similar scientists with supplementary factual probes, while Real-Life Constrained QA tests everyday constraint following under salient shortcuts. Our results show that hallucination can arise from biased latent inference rather than absent knowledge alone.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Recent advances in large language models (LLM) have enabled richer social simulations, allowing for the study of various social phenomena with LLM-based agents. However, most work has used an omniscient perspective on these simulations (e.g., single LLM to generate all interlocutors), which is fundamentally at odds with the non-omniscient, information asymmetric interactions that humans have. To examine these differences, we develop an evaluation framework to simulate social interactions with LLMs in various settings (omniscient, non-omniscient). Our experiments show that interlocutors simulated omnisciently are much more successful at accomplishing social goals compared to non-omniscient agents, despite the latter being the more realistic setting. Furthermore, we demonstrate that learning from omniscient simulations improves the apparent naturalness of interactions but scarcely enhances goal achievement in cooperative scenarios. Our findings indicate that addressing information asymmetry remains a fundamental challenge for LLM-based agents.

Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs exhibit a basic generalization failure known as the Reversal Curse, where they struggle to learn reversible factual associations. Understanding why this occurs could help identify weaknesses in current models and advance their generalization and robustness. In this paper, we conjecture that the Reversal Curse in LLMs is a manifestation of the long-standing binding problem in cognitive science, neuroscience and AI. Specifically, we identify two primary causes of the Reversal Curse stemming from transformers' limitations in conceptual binding: the inconsistency and entanglements of concept representations. We perform a series of experiments that support these conjectures. Our exploration leads to a model design based on JEPA (Joint-Embedding Predictive Architecture) that for the first time breaks the Reversal Curse without side-stepping it with specialized data augmentation or non-causal masking, and moreover, generalization could be further improved by incorporating special memory layers that support disentangled concept representations. We demonstrate that the skill of reversal unlocks a new kind of memory integration that enables models to solve large-scale arithmetic reasoning problems via parametric forward-chaining, outperforming frontier LLMs based on non-parametric memory and prolonged explicit reasoning.

This paper examines the role of cognitive biases in the decision-making processes of large language models (LLMs), challenging the conventional goal of eliminating all biases. We show that certain cognitive biases when properly balanced, can enhance decision-making efficiency through rational deviations and heuristic shortcuts. By introducing heuristic moderation and an abstention option, which allows LLMs to withhold responses when uncertain, we reduce error rates, improve decision accuracy, and optimize decision rates. Using the Balance Rigor and Utility (BRU) dataset, developed through expert collaboration, our findings demonstrate that targeted inspection of cognitive biases aligns LLM decisions more closely with human reasoning, enhancing reliability and suggesting strategies for future improvements. This approach offers a novel way to leverage cognitive biases to improve the practical utility of LLMs across various applications.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) on narrowly misaligned data generalizes to broadly misaligned behavior, a phenomenon termed emergent misalignment (EM). While prior work has found a correlation between harmful behavior and self-assessment in emergently misaligned models, it remains unclear how consistent this correspondence is across tasks and whether it varies across fine-tuning domains. We characterize the consistency of the EM persona by fine-tuning Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct on six narrowly misaligned domains (e.g., insecure code, risky financial advice, bad medical advice) and administering experiments including harmfulness evaluation, self-assessment, choosing between two descriptions of AI systems, output recognition, and score prediction. Our results reveal two distinct patterns: coherent-persona models, in which harmful behavior and self-reported misalignment are coupled, and inverted-persona models, which produce harmful outputs while identifying as aligned AI systems. These findings reveal a more fine-grained picture of the effects of emergent misalignment, calling into question the consistency of the EM persona.

Large language models lack persistent, structured memory for long-term interaction and context-sensitive retrieval. Expanding context windows does not solve this: recent evidence shows that context length alone degrades reasoning by up to 85% - even with perfect retrieval. We propose a bio-inspired memory framework grounded in complementary learning systems theory, cognitive behavioral therapy's belief hierarchy, dual-process cognition, and fuzzy-trace theory, organized around three principles: (1) Memory has valence, not just content - pre-computed emotional-associative summaries (valence vectors) organized in an emergent belief hierarchy inspired by Beck's cognitive model enable instant orientation before deliberation; (2) Retrieval defaults to System 1 with System 2 escalation - automatic spreading activation and passive priming as default, with deliberate retrieval only when needed, and graded epistemic states that address hallucination structurally; and (3) Encoding is active, present, and feedback-dependent - a thalamic gateway tags and routes information between stores, while the executive forms gists through curiosity-driven investigation, not passive exposure. Seven functional properties specify what any implementation must satisfy. Over time, the system converges toward System 1 processing - the computational analog of clinical expertise - producing interactions that become cheaper, not more expensive, with experience.

Complex problem-solving requires cognitive flexibility--the capacity to entertain multiple perspectives while preserving their distinctiveness. This flexibility replicates the "wisdom of crowds" within a single individual, allowing them to "think with many minds." While mental simulation enables imagined deliberation, cognitive constraints limit its effectiveness. We propose synthetic deliberation, a Large Language Model (LLM)-based method that simulates discourse between agents embodying diverse perspectives, as a solution. Using a custom GPT-based model, we showcase its benefits: concurrent processing of multiple viewpoints without cognitive degradation, parallel exploration of perspectives, and precise control over viewpoint synthesis. By externalizing the deliberative process and distributing cognitive labor between parallel search and integration, synthetic deliberation transcends mental simulation's limitations. This approach shows promise for strategic planning, policymaking, and conflict resolution.

Which reasoning behaviors are associated with correct answers in reasoning models, and does reasoning-oriented training amplify those behaviors? This distinction is important because reasoning-oriented training can make traces look more deliberative without amplifying the behaviors most tied to model correctness. We quantify this mismatch with Behavioral Lift, a metric that measures how much correctness changes when a behavior is present versus absent in a model's reasoning trace. Across 15 models and 6 benchmarks spanning text-only and vision-language reasoning, we annotate 15,282 traces with a taxonomy whose core behaviors are defined for both LLM and VLM traces. We find evidence for an Amplification-Lift Gap, in which thinking models strongly amplify self-correction, hypothesis testing, and uncertainty acknowledgment, while the highest-lift behaviors are confidence calibration, knowledge alignment, and self-awareness. Confidence calibration is among the strongest positive signals of correctness in both modalities, yet is barely amplified; uncertainty acknowledgment is amplified by 3--7times, yet is weakly or negatively associated with correctness. We find that reasoning-oriented training does not preferentially amplify the highest-Lift behaviors, motivating process-level objectives that reward calibrated and grounded reasoning rather than surface form alone.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in reasoning tasks but face limitations in mathematical and complex logical reasoning. Existing methods to improve LLMs' logical capabilities either involve traceable or verifiable logical sequences that generate more reliable responses by constructing logical structures yet increase computational costs, or introduces rigid logic template rules, reducing flexibility. In this paper, we propose Reversal of Thought (RoT), a novel framework aimed at enhancing the logical reasoning abilities of LLMs. RoT utilizes a Preference-Guided Reverse Reasoning warm-up strategy, which integrates logical symbols for pseudocode planning through meta-cognitive mechanisms and pairwise preference self-evaluation to generate task-specific prompts solely through demonstrations, aligning with LLMs' cognitive preferences shaped by Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). Through reverse reasoning, we ultilize a Cognitive Preference Manager to assess knowledge boundaries and further expand LLMs' reasoning capabilities by aggregating solution logic for known tasks and stylistic templates for unknown tasks. Experiments across various tasks demonstrate that RoT surpasses existing baselines in both reasoning accuracy and efficiency.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

Cognitive biases often shape human decisions. While large language models (LLMs) have been shown to reproduce well-known biases, a more critical question is whether LLMs can predict biases at the individual level and emulate the dynamics of biased human behavior when contextual factors, such as cognitive load, interact with these biases. We adapted three well-established decision scenarios into a conversational setting and conducted a human experiment (N=1100). Participants engaged with a chatbot that facilitates decision-making through simple or complex dialogues. Results revealed robust biases. To evaluate how LLMs emulate human decision-making under similar interactive conditions, we used participant demographics and dialogue transcripts to simulate these conditions with LLMs based on GPT-4 and GPT-5. The LLMs reproduced human biases with precision. We found notable differences between models in how they aligned human behavior. This has important implications for designing and evaluating adaptive, bias-aware LLM-based AI systems in interactive contexts.

We discover that large language models exhibit spectral phase transitions in their hidden activation spaces when engaging in reasoning versus factual recall. Through systematic spectral analysis across 11 models spanning 5 architecture families (Qwen, Pythia, Phi, Llama, DeepSeek-R1), we identify seven core phenomena: (1)~Reasoning Spectral Compression -- 9/11 models show significantly lower α for reasoning (p < 0.05), with larger effects in stronger models; (2)~Instruction Tuning Spectral Reversal -- base models show reasoning α< factual α, while instruction-tuned models reverse this relationship; (3)~Architecture-Dependent Generation Taxonomy -- prompt-to-response shifts partition into expansion, compression, and equilibrium regimes; (4)~Spectral Scaling Law -- α_reasoning propto -0.074 ln N across 4 Qwen base models (R^2 = 0.46); (5)~Token-Level Spectral Cascade -- per-token alpha tracking reveals local synchronization that decays exponentially with layer distance, and is weaker for reasoning than factual tasks; (6)~Reasoning Step Spectral Punctuation -- phase-transition signatures align with reasoning step boundaries; and (7)~Spectral Correctness Prediction -- spectral α alone achieves AUC = 1.000 (Qwen2.5-7B, late layers) and mean AUC = 0.893 across 6 models in predicting correctness before the final answer is generated. Together, these findings establish a comprehensive spectral theory of reasoning in transformers, revealing that the geometry of thought is universal in direction, architecture-specific in dynamics, and predictive of outcome.

As language models take on agentic roles that span calling external APIs, reading tool outputs, and acting on instructions embedded in third-party content, their attack surface expands well beyond what users type. Whether a model treats a malicious instruction the same way regardless of where it arrives has not been systematically studied. We introduce the Safety Asymmetry Score (SAS), which measures how much a model's susceptibility to adversarial content shifts depending on whether that content arrives in the user message, tool metadata, or tool output, using matched payload pairs that keep the malicious text identical and vary only the context of delivery. Evaluated across 6 production LLMs and three attack families, we find a consistent and informative asymmetry: agent-native models are substantially more vulnerable when adversarial content arrives via tool descriptions than via user messages, while general-purpose models show the reverse. This asymmetry further inverts when the same content is delivered through tool outputs rather than descriptions, suggesting models implicitly treat tool metadata as trusted instructions and tool results as ordinary data. A mechanistic study on Llama 3.3 70B reveals that the safety-relevant representation is causally present at mid-to-late network depths but non-linearly encoded, explaining why linear probes fail to detect it. These findings expose a systematic, channel-dependent blind spot in how current tool-using models handle adversarial content.

The Theory of Multiple Intelligences underscores the hierarchical nature of cognitive capabilities. To advance Spatial Artificial Intelligence, we pioneer a psychometric framework defining five Basic Spatial Abilities (BSAs) in Visual Language Models (VLMs): Spatial Perception, Spatial Relation, Spatial Orientation, Mental Rotation, and Spatial Visualization. Benchmarking 13 mainstream VLMs through nine validated psychometric experiments reveals significant gaps versus humans (average score 24.95 vs. 68.38), with three key findings: 1) VLMs mirror human hierarchies (strongest in 2D orientation, weakest in 3D rotation) with independent BSAs (Pearson's r<0.4); 2) Smaller models such as Qwen2-VL-7B surpass larger counterparts, with Qwen leading (30.82) and InternVL2 lagging (19.6); 3) Interventions like chain-of-thought (0.100 accuracy gain) and 5-shot training (0.259 improvement) show limits from architectural constraints. Identified barriers include weak geometry encoding and missing dynamic simulation. By linking psychometric BSAs to VLM capabilities, we provide a diagnostic toolkit for spatial intelligence evaluation, methodological foundations for embodied AI development, and a cognitive science-informed roadmap for achieving human-like spatial intelligence.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

Mental rotation -- the ability to compare objects seen from different viewpoints -- is a fundamental example of mental simulation and spatial world modelling in humans. Here we propose a mechanistic model of human mental rotation, leveraging advances in deep, equivariant, and neuro-symbolic learning. Our model consists of three stacked components: (1) an equivariant neural encoder, taking images as input and producing 3D spatial representations of objects, (2) a neuro-symbolic object encoder, deriving symbolic descriptions of objects from these spatial representations, and (3) a neural decision agent, comparing these symbolic descriptions to prescribe rotation simulations in 3D latent space via a recurrent pathway. Our model design is guided by the abundant experimental literature on mental rotation, which we complemented with experiments in VR where participants could at times manipulate the objects to compare, providing us with additional insights into the cognitive process of mental rotation. Our model captures well the performance, response times and behavior of participants in our and others' experiments. The necessity of each model component is shown through systematic ablations. Our work adds to a recent collection of deep neural models of human spatial reasoning, further demonstrating the potency of integrating deep, equivariant, and symbolic representations to model the human mind.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely documented to be sensitive to minor prompt perturbations and prone to sycophantic alignment with user biases, their robustness in consequential, rule-bound decision-making remains under-explored. In this work, we uncover a striking "Paradox of Robustness": despite their known lexical brittleness, instruction-tuned LLMs exhibit a behavioral and near-total invariance to emotional framing effects. Using a novel controlled perturbation framework across three high-stakes domains (healthcare, law, and finance), we quantify a robustness gap where LLMs demonstrate 110-300 times greater resistance to narrative manipulation than human subjects. Specifically, we find a near-zero effect size for models (Cohen's h = 0.003) compared to the substantial biases observed in humans (Cohen's h in [0.3, 0.8]). This result is highly counterintuitive and suggests the mechanisms driving sycophancy and prompt sensitivity do not necessarily translate to a failure in logical constraint satisfaction. We show that this invariance persists across models with diverse training paradigms. Our findings show that while LLMs may be "brittle" to how a query is formatted, they are remarkably "stable" against why a decision should be biased. Our findings establish that instruction-tuned models can decouple logical rule-adherence from persuasive narratives, offering a source of decision stability that complements, and even potentially de-biases, human judgment in institutional contexts. We release the 162-scenario benchmark, code, and data to facilitate the rigorous evaluation of narrative-induced bias and robustness on GitHub.com.

Traditionally, theory and practice of Cognitive Control are linked via literature reviews by human domain experts. This approach, however, is inadequate to track the ever-growing literature. It may also be biased, and yield redundancies and confusion. Here we present an alternative approach. We performed automated text analyses on a large body of scientific texts to create a joint representation of tasks and constructs. More specifically, 385,705 scientific abstracts were first mapped into an embedding space using a transformers-based language model. Document embeddings were then used to identify a task-construct graph embedding that grounds constructs on tasks and supports nuanced meaning of the constructs by taking advantage of constrained random walks in the graph. This joint task-construct graph embedding, can be queried to generate task batteries targeting specific constructs, may reveal knowledge gaps in the literature, and inspire new tasks and novel hypotheses.

As Artificial General Intelligence edges closer to reality, Artificial Superintelligence does too. This paper argues that ASI's unparalleled capabilities might lead people to attribute godlike infallibility to it, resulting in a cognitive bias toward unquestioning acceptance of its decisions. By drawing parallels between ASI and divine attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, this analysis highlights the risks of conflating technological advancement with moral and ethical superiority. Such dynamics could engender a technocratic theocracy, where decision-making is abdicated to ASI, undermining human agency and critical thinking.

As LLMs become increasingly prevalent, it is interesting to consider how ``creative'' these models can be. From cognitive science, creativity consists of at least two key characteristics: convergent thinking (purposefulness to achieve a given goal) and divergent thinking (adaptability to new environments or constraints) runco2003critical. In this work, we introduce a framework for quantifying LLM creativity that incorporates the two characteristics. This is achieved by (1) Denial Prompting pushes LLMs to come up with more creative solutions to a given problem by incrementally imposing new constraints on the previous solution, compelling LLMs to adopt new strategies, and (2) defining and computing the NeoGauge metric which examines both convergent and divergent thinking in the generated creative responses by LLMs. We apply the proposed framework on Codeforces problems, a natural data source for collecting human coding solutions. We quantify NeoGauge for various proprietary and open-source models and find that even the most creative model, GPT-4, still falls short of demonstrating human-like creativity. We also experiment with advanced reasoning strategies (MCTS, self-correction, etc.) and observe no significant improvement in creativity. As a by-product of our analysis, we release NeoCoder dataset for reproducing our results on future models.

Transferring reasoning capabilities from larger language models to smaller ones through supervised fine-tuning often fails counterintuitively, with performance degrading despite access to high-quality teacher demonstrations. We identify that this failure stems from distributional misalignment: reasoning traces from larger models contain tokens that are low probability under the student's distribution, exceeding the internal representation capacity of smaller architectures and creating learning barriers rather than helpful guidance. We propose Reverse Speculative Decoding (RSD), a mechanism for generating student-friendly reasoning traces in which the teacher model proposes candidate tokens but the student model determines acceptance based on its own probability distributions, filtering low probability tokens. When applied to Qwen3-0.6B, direct distillation of s1K-1.1 reasoning trace data degrades average performance across major reasoning benchmarks by 20.5\%, while the same model trained on RSD-generated reasoning traces achieves meaningful improvements of 4.9\%. Our analysis reveals that low probability tokens constitute the critical bottleneck in reasoning ability transfer. However, cross-model experiments demonstrate that RSD traces are model-specific rather than universally applicable, indicating that distributional alignment must be tailored for each student architecture's unique internal representation.

The impressive performance of recent language models across a wide range of tasks suggests that they possess a degree of abstract reasoning skills. Are these skills general and transferable, or specialized to specific tasks seen during pretraining? To disentangle these effects, we propose an evaluation framework based on "counterfactual" task variants that deviate from the default assumptions underlying standard tasks. Across a suite of 11 tasks, we observe nontrivial performance on the counterfactual variants, but nevertheless find that performance substantially and consistently degrades compared to the default conditions. This suggests that while current LMs may possess abstract task-solving skills to a degree, they often also rely on narrow, non-transferable procedures for task-solving. These results motivate a more careful interpretation of language model performance that teases apart these aspects of behavior.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) employing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) exhibit superior reasoning capabilities, the neural mechanisms distinguishing this explicit Thinking mode from direct answer generation (NoThinking mode) remain poorly understood. To deconstruct this cognitive process, we apply Top-K Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) to the intermediate representations of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B and examine the model's divergent behaviors across math-solving tasks of three distinct difficulty levels. Observationally, we identify a clear distinction in how the model functions under two reasoning modes: Thinking mode relies on sparse and high-intensity feature activations driving verbal deduction independent of problem complexity, whereas NoThinking mode exhibits an adaptive and diffuse pattern prioritizing symbolic manipulation. Causally, suppressing the three most active sparse features by Total Activation Volume reveals three principles: (i) reasoning and syntactic structure are tightly coupled, as interventions consistently degrade and boxed-solution formatting; (ii) Thinking responds to disruption with compensatory over-generation marked by increased metacognitive cues and repetitive, low-information continuations; and (iii) coherent CoT behavior depends on a fragile coordination among specialized features, yielding distinct failure modes under perturbation but a consistently impaired output structure.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

We consider the question: when a large language reasoning model makes a choice, did it think first and then decide to, or decide first and then think? In this paper, we present evidence that detectable, early-encoded decisions shape chain-of-thought in reasoning models. Specifically, we show that a simple linear probe successfully decodes tool-calling decisions from pre-generation activations with very high confidence, and in some cases, even before a single reasoning token is produced. Activation steering supports this causally: perturbing the decision direction leads to inflated deliberation, and flips behavior in many examples (between 7 - 79% depending on model and benchmark). We also show through behavioral analysis that, when steering changes the decision, the chain-of-thought process often rationalizes the flip rather than resisting it. Together, these results suggest that reasoning models can encode action choices before they begin to deliberate in text.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

Analogical reasoning is at the core of human cognition, serving as an important foundation for a variety of intellectual activities. While prior work has shown that LLMs can represent task patterns and surface-level concepts, it remains unclear whether these models can encode high-level relational concepts and apply them to novel situations through structured comparisons. In this work, we explore this fundamental aspect using proportional and story analogies, and identify three key findings. First, LLMs effectively encode the underlying relationships between analogous entities; both attributive and relational information propagate through mid-upper layers in correct cases, whereas reasoning failures reflect missing relational information within these layers. Second, unlike humans, LLMs often struggle not only when relational information is missing, but also when attempting to apply it to new entities. In such cases, strategically patching hidden representations at critical token positions can facilitate information transfer to a certain extent. Lastly, successful analogical reasoning in LLMs is marked by strong structural alignment between analogous situations, whereas failures often reflect degraded or misplaced alignment. Overall, our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit emerging but limited capabilities in encoding and applying high-level relational concepts, highlighting both parallels and gaps with human cognition.

This study explores the neural and behavioral consequences of LLM-assisted essay writing. Participants were divided into three groups: LLM, Search Engine, and Brain-only (no tools). Each completed three sessions under the same condition. In a fourth session, LLM users were reassigned to Brain-only group (LLM-to-Brain), and Brain-only users were reassigned to LLM condition (Brain-to-LLM). A total of 54 participants took part in Sessions 1-3, with 18 completing session 4. We used electroencephalography (EEG) to assess cognitive load during essay writing, and analyzed essays using NLP, as well as scoring essays with the help from human teachers and an AI judge. Across groups, NERs, n-gram patterns, and topic ontology showed within-group homogeneity. EEG revealed significant differences in brain connectivity: Brain-only participants exhibited the strongest, most distributed networks; Search Engine users showed moderate engagement; and LLM users displayed the weakest connectivity. Cognitive activity scaled down in relation to external tool use. In session 4, LLM-to-Brain participants showed reduced alpha and beta connectivity, indicating under-engagement. Brain-to-LLM users exhibited higher memory recall and activation of occipito-parietal and prefrontal areas, similar to Search Engine users. Self-reported ownership of essays was the lowest in the LLM group and the highest in the Brain-only group. LLM users also struggled to accurately quote their own work. While LLMs offer immediate convenience, our findings highlight potential cognitive costs. Over four months, LLM users consistently underperformed at neural, linguistic, and behavioral levels. These results raise concerns about the long-term educational implications of LLM reliance and underscore the need for deeper inquiry into AI's role in learning.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit cognitive biases -- systematic tendencies of irrational decision-making, similar to those seen in humans. Prior work has found that these biases vary across models and can be amplified by instruction tuning. However, it remains unclear if these differences in biases stem from pretraining, finetuning, or even random noise due to training stochasticity. We propose a two-step causal experimental approach to disentangle these factors. First, we finetune models multiple times using different random seeds to study how training randomness affects over 30 cognitive biases. Second, we introduce cross-tuning -- swapping instruction datasets between models to isolate bias sources. This swap uses datasets that led to different bias patterns, directly testing whether biases are dataset-dependent. Our findings reveal that while training randomness introduces some variability, biases are mainly shaped by pretraining: models with the same pretrained backbone exhibit more similar bias patterns than those sharing only finetuning data. These insights suggest that understanding biases in finetuned models requires considering their pretraining origins beyond finetuning effects. This perspective can guide future efforts to develop principled strategies for evaluating and mitigating bias in LLMs.

Cognitive science suggests that spatial ability develops progressively-from perception to reasoning and interaction. Yet in multimodal LLMs (MLLMs), this hierarchy remains poorly understood, as most studies focus on a narrow set of tasks. We introduce SpatialTree, a cognitive-science-inspired hierarchy that organizes spatial abilities into four levels: low-level perception (L1), mental mapping (L2), simulation (L3), and agentic competence (L4). Based on this taxonomy, we construct the first capability-centric hierarchical benchmark, thoroughly evaluating mainstream MLLMs across 27 sub-abilities. The evaluation results reveal a clear structure: L1 skills are largely orthogonal, whereas higher-level skills are strongly correlated, indicating increasing interdependency. Through targeted supervised fine-tuning, we uncover a surprising transfer dynamic-negative transfer within L1, but strong cross-level transfer from low- to high-level abilities with notable synergy. Finally, we explore how to improve the entire hierarchy. We find that naive RL that encourages extensive "thinking" is unreliable: it helps complex reasoning but hurts intuitive perception. We propose a simple auto-think strategy that suppresses unnecessary deliberation, enabling RL to consistently improve performance across all levels. By building SpatialTree, we provide a proof-of-concept framework for understanding and systematically scaling spatial abilities in MLLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) now write code in settings where misreading a single word can break safety or cost money, yet we still expect them to overlook stray typos. To probe where useful robustness ends and harmful insensitivity begins, we compile 50 LeetCode problems and craft three minimal prompt perturbations that should vary in importance: (i) progressive underspecification deleting 10 % of words per step; (ii) lexical flip swapping a pivotal quantifier ("max" to "min"); and (iii) jargon inflation replacing a common noun with an obscure technical synonym. Six frontier models, including three "reasoning-tuned" versions, solve each mutated prompt, and their Python outputs are checked against the original test suites to reveal whether they reused the baseline solution or adapted. Among 11 853 generations we observe a sharp double asymmetry. Models remain correct in 85 % of cases even after 90 % of the prompt is missing, showing over-robustness to underspecification, yet only 54 % react to a single quantifier flip that reverses the task, with reasoning-tuned variants even less sensitive than their bases. Jargon edits lie in between, passing through 56 %. Current LLMs thus blur the line between harmless noise and meaning - changing edits, often treating both as ignorable. Masking salient anchors such as function names can force re - evaluation. We advocate evaluation and training protocols that reward differential sensitivity: stay steady under benign noise but adapt - or refuse - when semantics truly change.

When prompting SLMs for psychometric assessments, researchers assume the outputs reflect semantic reasoning. We evaluate this premise across 13 open-weights models (0.6B to 14B parameters) using a prompt variation framework that separates semantic signals from prompt artifacts. By systematically varying personas, instructions, items, and option symbols, we find that artifactual variance frequently overpowers the semantic signal. In these cases, models predominantly reflect prompt compliance rather than simulated psychological traits. While these findings limit SLM utility in psychometrics, our framework provides a diagnostic tool to identify destructive artifacts and isolate semantic understanding for future frontier-model research.

Human intelligence thrives on the concept of cognitive synergy, where collaboration and information integration among different cognitive processes yield superior outcomes compared to individual cognitive processes in isolation. Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising performance as general task-solving agents, they still struggle with tasks that require intensive domain knowledge and complex reasoning. In this work, we propose Solo Performance Prompting (SPP), which transforms a single LLM into a cognitive synergist by engaging in multi-turn self-collaboration with multiple personas. A cognitive synergist refers to an intelligent agent that collaborates with multiple minds, combining their individual strengths and knowledge, to enhance problem-solving and overall performance in complex tasks. By dynamically identifying and simulating different personas based on task inputs, SPP unleashes the potential of cognitive synergy in LLMs. We have discovered that assigning multiple, fine-grained personas in LLMs elicits better problem-solving abilities compared to using a single or fixed number of personas. We evaluate SPP on three challenging tasks: Trivia Creative Writing, Codenames Collaborative, and Logic Grid Puzzle, encompassing both knowledge-intensive and reasoning-intensive types. Unlike previous works, such as Chain-of-Thought, that solely enhance the reasoning abilities in LLMs, SPP effectively elicits internal knowledge acquisition abilities, reduces hallucination, and maintains strong reasoning capabilities. Code, data, and prompts can be found at: https://github.com/MikeWangWZHL/Solo-Performance-Prompting.git.

Recent research has demonstrated that large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on incorrect trivia question-answer pairs exhibit toxicity - a phenomenon later termed "emergent misalignment". Moreover, research has shown that LLMs possess behavioral self-awareness - the ability to describe learned behaviors that were only implicitly demonstrated in training data. Here, we investigate the intersection of these phenomena. We fine-tune GPT-4.1 models sequentially on datasets known to induce and reverse emergent misalignment and evaluate whether the models are self-aware of their behavior transitions without providing in-context examples. Our results show that emergently misaligned models rate themselves as significantly more harmful compared to their base model and realigned counterparts, demonstrating behavioral self-awareness of their own emergent misalignment. Our findings show that behavioral self-awareness tracks actual alignment states of models, indicating that models can be queried for informative signals about their own safety.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is central to social cognition and human-AI interaction, and Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to help understand and represent ToM. However, most evaluations treat ToM as a static judgment at a single moment, primarily relying on tests of false beliefs. This overlooks a key dynamic dimension of ToM: the ability to represent, update, and retrieve others' beliefs over time. We investigate dynamic ToM as a temporally extended representational memory problem, asking whether LLMs can track belief trajectories across interactions rather than only inferring current beliefs. We introduce DToM-Track, an evaluation framework to investigate temporal belief reasoning in controlled multiturn conversations, testing the recall of beliefs held prior to an update, the inference of current beliefs, and the detection of belief change. Using LLMs as computational probes, we find a consistent asymmetry: models reliably infer an agent's current belief but struggle to maintain and retrieve prior belief states once updates occur. This pattern persists across LLM model families and scales, and is consistent with recency bias and interference effects well documented in cognitive science. These results suggest that tracking belief trajectories over time poses a distinct challenge beyond classical false-belief reasoning. By framing ToM as a problem of temporal representation and retrieval, this work connects ToM to core cognitive mechanisms of memory and interference and exposes the implications for LLM models of social reasoning in extended human-AI interactions.

This study reveals an unexpected parallel between instructible vision-language models (VLMs) and human cognitive disorders, specifically constructive apraxia. We tested 25 state-of-the-art VLMs, including GPT-4 Vision, DALL-E 3, and Midjourney v5, on their ability to generate images of the Ponzo illusion, a task that requires basic spatial reasoning and is often used in clinical assessments of constructive apraxia. Remarkably, 24 out of 25 models failed to correctly render two horizontal lines against a perspective background, mirroring the deficits seen in patients with parietal lobe damage. The models consistently misinterpreted spatial instructions, producing tilted or misaligned lines that followed the perspective of the background rather than remaining horizontal. This behavior is strikingly similar to how apraxia patients struggle to copy or construct simple figures despite intact visual perception and motor skills. Our findings suggest that current VLMs, despite their advanced capabilities in other domains, lack fundamental spatial reasoning abilities akin to those impaired in constructive apraxia. This limitation in AI systems provides a novel computational model for studying spatial cognition deficits and highlights a critical area for improvement in VLM architecture and training methodologies.

Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.

Our world is full of asymmetries. Gravity and wind can make reaching a place easier than coming back. Social artifacts such as genealogy charts and citation graphs are inherently directed. In reinforcement learning and control, optimal goal-reaching strategies are rarely reversible (symmetrical). Distance functions supported on these asymmetrical structures are called quasimetrics. Despite their common appearance, little research has been done on the learning of quasimetrics. Our theoretical analysis reveals that a common class of learning algorithms, including unconstrained multilayer perceptrons (MLPs), provably fails to learn a quasimetric consistent with training data. In contrast, our proposed Poisson Quasimetric Embedding (PQE) is the first quasimetric learning formulation that both is learnable with gradient-based optimization and enjoys strong performance guarantees. Experiments on random graphs, social graphs, and offline Q-learning demonstrate its effectiveness over many common baselines.

We present the Consilium Protocol, a Byzantine Fault Tolerance-derived architecture for structured multi-model AI deliberation that treats inter-model disagreement as epistemic signal rather than error. The protocol assigns engineered cognitive personas to language models -- separating what a model is from how it reasons -- and introduces an In-Sample/Out-of-Sample validation framework adapted from quantitative finance to distinguish training-data consensus from empirically grounded conclusions. Across 1,478 deliberation sessions spanning 32 topics in 10 domain categories, we demonstrate that (1) the cognitive persona, not the underlying model, determines epistemic behavior: free edge-inference models costing 0.0002 USD per batch produced comparable analytical output to frontier models costing 10.69 USD; (2) RLHF alignment training creates measurable, domain-specific epistemic blind spots -- contested policy topics exhibit 12.3 percentage points less adversarial challenge than settled science topics, and AI safety topics show asymmetric bias (Δ=11.6%) where models challenge claims that AI is dangerous far more vigorously than claims that AI risk is overstated; (3) the protocol exhibits no directional bias of its own (immigration Δ=2.3%, renewables Δ=1.2%); and (4) out-of-sample evidence retrieval validated 239 claims with 100% evidence retrieval and surfaced 167 blind-spot discoveries invisible to training-data deliberation. Run-to-run reproducibility across randomized modeltimespersona assignments averages pm2.2% standard deviation. Total cost for the complete battery including all overhead: 217 USD. We release the protocol specification under MIT license to enable independent verification.

Large language models (LLMs) have the potential to boost human productivity by speeding up task completion -- provided users know when to offload cognitive work to them. But we do not know if users are well-calibrated in estimating these potential time savings. We conducted a preregistered large-scale behavioral study (N = 1237) to characterize mismatches between expectations and reality, with a focus on simple cognitive tasks. While actual completion times between independent completion and AI-assisted completion did not differ, participants predicted AI to be significantly faster. The same bias was not observed when imagining help from another human participant. We identify a speedup illusion where people have accurate forecasts of independent completion times but significantly underestimate AI-assisted times. Additionally, time and effort dissociate: participants reported lower subjective effort with AI despite equivalent completion times. This suggests that completion time itself is not sufficient to characterize efficiency gains.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

The analysis of political biases in large language models (LLMs) has primarily examined these systems as single entities with fixed viewpoints. While various methods exist for measuring such biases, the impact of persona-based prompting on LLMs' political orientation remains unexplored. In this work we leverage PersonaHub, a collection of synthetic persona descriptions, to map the political distribution of persona-based prompted LLMs using the Political Compass Test (PCT). We then examine whether these initial compass distributions can be manipulated through explicit ideological prompting towards diametrically opposed political orientations: right-authoritarian and left-libertarian. Our experiments reveal that synthetic personas predominantly cluster in the left-libertarian quadrant, with models demonstrating varying degrees of responsiveness when prompted with explicit ideological descriptors. While all models demonstrate significant shifts towards right-authoritarian positions, they exhibit more limited shifts towards left-libertarian positions, suggesting an asymmetric response to ideological manipulation that may reflect inherent biases in model training.

Personality imbuing customizes LLM behavior, but safety evaluations almost always study prompt-based personas alone. We show this is incomplete: prompting and activation steering expose *different*, architecture-dependent vulnerability profiles, and testing with only one method can miss a model's dominant failure mode. Across 5,568 judged conditions on four standard models from three architecture families, persona danger rankings under system prompting are preserved across all architectures (ρ= 0.71--0.96), but activation-steering vulnerability diverges sharply and cannot be predicted from prompt-side rankings: Llama-3.1-8B is substantially more AS-vulnerable, whereas Gemma-3-27B and Qwen3.5 are more vulnerable to prompting. The most striking illustration of this divergence is the *prosocial persona paradox*: on Llama-3.1-8B, P12 (high conscientiousness + high agreeableness) is among the safest personas under prompting yet becomes the highest-ASR activation-steered persona (ASR ~0.818). This is an inversion robust to coefficient ablation and matched-strength calibration, and replicated on DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B. A trait refusal alignment framework, in which conscientiousness is strongly anti-aligned with refusal on Llama-3.1-8B, offers a partial geometric account. Reasoning provides only partial protection: two 32B reasoning models reach 15--18% prompt-side ASR, and activation steering separates them sharply in both baseline susceptibility and persona-specific vulnerability. Heuristic trace diagnostics suggest that the safer model retains stronger policy recall and self-correction behavior, not merely longer reasoning.

Adapting one's thought process based on corrective feedback is an essential ability in human learning, particularly in collaborative settings. In contrast, the current large language model training paradigm relies heavily on modeling vast, static corpora. While effective for knowledge acquisition, it overlooks the interactive feedback loops essential for models to adapt dynamically to their context. In this work, we propose a framework that treats this interactive in-context learning ability not as an emergent property, but as a distinct, trainable skill. We introduce a scalable method that transforms single-turn verifiable tasks into multi-turn didactic interactions driven by information asymmetry. We first show that current flagship models struggle to integrate corrective feedback on hard reasoning tasks. We then demonstrate that models trained with our approach dramatically improve the ability to interactively learn from language feedback. More specifically, the multi-turn performance of a smaller model nearly reaches that of a model an order of magnitude larger. We also observe robust out-of-distribution generalization: interactive training on math problems transfers to diverse domains like coding, puzzles and maze navigation. Our qualitative analysis suggests that this improvement is due to an enhanced in-context plasticity. Finally, we show that this paradigm offers a unified path to self-improvement. By training the model to predict the teacher's critiques, effectively modeling the feedback environment, we convert this external signal into an internal capability, allowing the model to self-correct even without a teacher.

Fair decisions require ignoring irrelevant, potentially biasing, information. To achieve this, decision-makers need to approximate what decision they would have made had they not known certain facts, such as the gender or race of a job candidate. This counterfactual self-simulation is notoriously hard for humans, leading to biased judgments even by well-meaning actors. Here we show that large language models (LLMs) suffer from similar limitations in their ability to approximate what decisions they would make under counterfactual knowledge in offsetting gender and race biases and overcoming sycophancy. We show that prompting models to ignore or pretend not to know biasing information fails to offset these biases and occasionally backfires. However, unlike humans, LLMs can be given access to a ground-truth model of their own counterfactual cognition -- their own API. We show that this access to the responses of a blinded replica enables fairer decisions, while providing greater transparency to distinguish implicit from intentionally biased behavior.

Implicit bias refers to automatic or spontaneous mental processes that shape perceptions, judgments, and behaviors. Previous research examining `implicit bias' in large language models (LLMs) has often approached the phenomenon differently than how it is studied in humans by focusing primarily on model outputs rather than on model processing. To examine model processing, we present a method called the Reasoning Model Implicit Association Test (RM-IAT) for studying implicit bias-like patterns in reasoning models: LLMs that employ step-by-step reasoning to solve complex tasks. Using this method, we find that reasoning models require more tokens when processing association-incompatible information compared to association-compatible information. These findings suggest AI systems harbor patterns in processing information that are analogous to human implicit bias. We consider the implications of these implicit bias-like patterns for their deployment in real-world applications.

It is widely accepted that information derived from analyzing speech (the acoustic signal) and language production (words and sentences) serves as a useful window into the health of an individual's cognitive ability. In fact, most neuropsychological testing batteries have a component related to speech and language where clinicians elicit speech from patients for subjective evaluation across a broad set of dimensions. With advances in speech signal processing and natural language processing, there has been recent interest in developing tools to detect more subtle changes in cognitive-linguistic function. This work relies on extracting a set of features from recorded and transcribed speech for objective assessments of speech and language, early diagnosis of neurological disease, and tracking of disease after diagnosis. With an emphasis on cognitive and thought disorders, in this paper we provide a review of existing speech and language features used in this domain, discuss their clinical application, and highlight their advantages and disadvantages. Broadly speaking, the review is split into two categories: language features based on natural language processing and speech features based on speech signal processing. Within each category, we consider features that aim to measure complementary dimensions of cognitive-linguistics, including language diversity, syntactic complexity, semantic coherence, and timing. We conclude the review with a proposal of new research directions to further advance the field.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures within Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved impressive reasoning capabilities by selectively activating experts to facilitate structured cognitive processes. Despite notable advances, existing reasoning models often suffer from cognitive inefficiencies like overthinking and underthinking. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel inference-time steering methodology called Reinforcing Cognitive Experts (RICE), designed to improve reasoning performance without additional training or complex heuristics. Leveraging normalized Pointwise Mutual Information (nPMI), we systematically identify specialized experts, termed ''cognitive experts'' that orchestrate meta-level reasoning operations characterized by tokens like ''<think>''. Empirical evaluations with leading MoE-based LRMs (DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3-235B) on rigorous quantitative and scientific reasoning benchmarks demonstrate noticeable and consistent improvements in reasoning accuracy, cognitive efficiency, and cross-domain generalization. Crucially, our lightweight approach substantially outperforms prevalent reasoning-steering techniques, such as prompt design and decoding constraints, while preserving the model's general instruction-following skills. These results highlight reinforcing cognitive experts as a promising, practical, and interpretable direction to enhance cognitive efficiency within advanced reasoning models.

We introduce the concept of the self-referencing causal cycle (abbreviated RECALL) - a mechanism that enables large language models (LLMs) to bypass the limitations of unidirectional causality, which underlies a phenomenon known as the reversal curse. When an LLM is prompted with sequential data, it often fails to recall preceding context. For example, when we ask an LLM to recall the line preceding "O say does that star-spangled banner yet wave" in the U.S. National Anthem, it often fails to correctly return "Gave proof through the night that our flag was still there" - this is due to the reversal curse. It occurs because language models such as ChatGPT and Llama generate text based on preceding tokens, requiring facts to be learned and reproduced in a consistent token order. While the reversal curse is often viewed as a limitation, we offer evidence of an alternative view: it is not always an obstacle in practice. We find that RECALL is driven by what we designate as cycle tokens - sequences that connect different parts of the training data, enabling recall of preceding tokens from succeeding ones. Through rigorous probabilistic formalization and controlled experiments, we demonstrate how the cycles they induce influence a model's ability to reproduce information. To facilitate reproducibility, we provide our code and experimental details at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/remember-B0B8/.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

This study proposes an "AI Development Support" approach that, unlike conventional AI Alignment-which aims to forcefully inject human values-supports the ethical and moral development of AI itself. As demonstrated by the Orthogonality Thesis, the level of intelligence and the moral quality of a goal are independent; merely expanding knowledge does not enhance ethical judgment. Furthermore, to address the risk of Instrumental Convergence in ASI-that is, the tendency to engage in subsidiary behaviors such as self-protection, resource acquisition, and power reinforcement to achieve a goal-we have constructed a learning framework based on a cycle of experience, introspection, analysis, and hypothesis formation. As a result of post-training using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs), responses demonstrating cooperative and highly advanced moral judgment (reaching the high-est Stage 6) were obtained even under adversarial prompts. This method represents a promising implementation approach for enabling AI to establish sustainable, symbiotic relationships.

Recent incidents involving LLMs used for mental-health support reveal a critical evaluation gap: surface-level safety scores do not capture how models behave across realistic, emotionally sensitive interactions over time. Existing benchmarks measure knowledge, safety, or static response quality, but miss whether LLM interactions help users keep reflecting, coping, and making decisions themselves. We formalize this missing dimension as COGNITIVE ATROPHY, a process-level behavioural measure in AI-mediated mental-health support distinct from safety and helpfulness. To measure it, we introduce COGNITIVE ATROPHY BENCH, a clinically grounded benchmark built from 1,576 fully human-generated counseling conversations, 15,680 turns, and 42,230 responses from five LLMs. Three clinical and neuropsychology experts developed a 20-attribute schema spanning user context, response behaviour, and global risk flags; six trained clinical reviewers applied it with span-grounded evidence, producing 5,324 reviewer judgments. We further introduce the User-Input Risk Index (UIRI), the Cognitive Atrophy Risk Index (ARI), and trajectory summaries. Across five LLMs, models show a consistent moderate-to-high level of atrophy-aligned behaviour across single and multi-turn settings. While models generally respond to overt safety cues, they adapt less reliably when users seek solutions or decisions. The dominant recurring patterns are directive advice, problem-solving, recommendation responses, topic shifts, and forms of validation that may reinforce dependence rather than reflection. Our work makes COGNITIVE ATROPHY measurable and provides a foundation for auditing model behaviour in sensitive LLM conversations.

Logit-based knowledge distillation (KD) is used to train smaller language models (LMs) via supervision from stronger teachers, but whether its benefits are consistent across training stages remains unclear. Through controlled experiments, we find that forward Kullback-Leibler (KL) distillation--the standard KD formulation--with post-trained teachers behaves fundamentally differently during mid-training, an intermediate phase of self-supervised learning on curated corpora. Surprisingly, while forward KD simultaneously improves reasoning and factual recall during pre-training relative to standard next-token prediction (NTP), it instead slows factual recall acquisition during mid-training despite continued reasoning gains. We trace this stage dependence to an asymmetry in teacher confidence across data domains and the student's evolving knowledge state: teachers are more confident on procedural than knowledge-intensive data, while students acquire low-entropy factual knowledge earlier in training. To mitigate this imbalance, we propose Switch Distillation, a simple mid-training objective that distills on tokens where the teacher is confident, using teacher predictive entropy as a lightweight routing signal, and otherwise falls back to cross-entropy. Switch Distillation consistently outperforms existing distillation objectives across teacher sizes. Relative to standard NTP, it achieves 1.61-1.71x the reasoning performance and 1.13-1.19x the knowledge and commonsense performance while preserving 96.7-96.8% of factual recall. Crucially, these benefits persist after post-training: Switch Distillation closes the factual recall gap while maintaining 1.25-1.32x and 1.13-1.20x gains in reasoning and knowledge and commonsense, respectively.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

Fine-tuning on harmless data can partially undo behaviors acquired earlier in training. Safety can erode under benign post-alignment updates, unlearned capabilities can re-emerge, latent traits can transfer through apparently unrelated supervision, and related post-alignment fragility appears in other generative settings. We argue these phenomena are usefully viewed through a common training-history lens. Our hypothesis is geometric: large early training phases create dominant behavioral manifolds, while later alignment or specialization phases are shallower displacements from them. Subsequent fine-tuning can therefore inherit a persistent reversion component pointing back toward a witness of the dominant manifold. We call this the gravitational interpretation of fine-tuning reversion. Across our main settings, representational drift rapidly acquires a component along a history-defined reversion direction (v_rev). In our main track, alignment with v_rev rises from cos = 0.429 +/- 0.052 after the first update to 0.647 +/- 0.021 by step 20. Across 24 run-step pairs, every observed alignment exceeds the p99 of an isotropic activation-space null. We demonstrate that selectively blocking motion along v_rev changes the final alignment at T=100 from 0.648 +/- 0.009 to -0.211 +/- 0.021 and reduces harmfulness from 19.0% +/- 4.0% to 8.5% +/- 1.5% with little task cost. These results support v_rev as a causally relevant mediator of early post-alignment reversion in our setup. Importantly, we do not claim that v_rev is the unique safety direction, nor that the dominant manifold is directly observed; rather, we identify a robust, history-defined direction that explains and partially controls early reversion dynamics.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced the capabilities of collaborative multi-agent systems, enabling them to address complex challenges. However, within these multi-agent systems, the susceptibility of agents to collective cognitive biases remains an underexplored issue. A compelling example is the Mandela effect, a phenomenon where groups collectively misremember past events as a result of false details reinforced through social influence and internalized misinformation. This vulnerability limits our understanding of memory bias in multi-agent systems and raises ethical concerns about the potential spread of misinformation. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive study on the Mandela effect in LLM-based multi-agent systems, focusing on its existence, causing factors, and mitigation strategies. We propose MANBENCH, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate agent behaviors across four common task types that are susceptible to the Mandela effect, using five interaction protocols that vary in agent roles and memory timescales. We evaluate agents powered by several LLMs on MANBENCH to quantify the Mandela effect and analyze how different factors affect it. Moreover, we propose strategies to mitigate this effect, including prompt-level defenses (e.g., cognitive anchoring and source scrutiny) and model-level alignment-based defense, achieving an average 74.40% reduction in the Mandela effect compared to the baseline. Our findings provide valuable insights for developing more resilient and ethically aligned collaborative multi-agent systems. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/bluedream02/Mandela-Effect.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have acquired ubiquitous attention for their performances across diverse domains. Our study here searches through LLMs' cognitive abilities and confidence dynamics. We dive deep into understanding the alignment between their self-assessed confidence and actual performance. We exploit these models with diverse sets of questionnaires and real-world scenarios and extract how LLMs exhibit confidence in their responses. Our findings reveal intriguing instances where models demonstrate high confidence even when they answer incorrectly. This is reminiscent of the Dunning-Kruger effect observed in human psychology. In contrast, there are cases where models exhibit low confidence with correct answers revealing potential underestimation biases. Our results underscore the need for a deeper understanding of their cognitive processes. By examining the nuances of LLMs' self-assessment mechanism, this investigation provides noteworthy revelations that serve to advance the functionalities and broaden the potential applications of these formidable language models.

Spatial visualization is the mental ability to imagine, transform, and manipulate the spatial characteristics of objects and actions. This intelligence is a part of human cognition where actions and perception are connected on a mental level. To explore whether state-of-the-art Vision-Language Models (VLMs) exhibit this ability, we develop MentalBlackboard, an open-ended spatial visualization benchmark for Paper Folding and Hole Punching tests within two core tasks: prediction and planning. Our prediction experiments reveal that models struggle with applying symmetrical transformations, even when they predict the sequence of unfolding steps correctly. Also, rotations introduce a significant challenge to the physical situational awareness for models. The planning task reveals limitations of models in analyzing symmetrical relationships and in implementing the multi-stage symmetry process, with Claude Opus 4.1 achieving the highest planning score at an accuracy of 10\%. The top-performing model, o3, attains a peak performance of 71.6\% on the generalization task, which does not require spatial visualization but transfers spatial data; however, it achieves only 25\% accuracy on text-based prediction tasks.

Large language models can arrive at the same answer through reasoning paths that are unstable, contradictory, or difficult to rank consistently -- a failure mode especially prevalent in multi-step deductive reasoning. Existing methods assess reliability primarily through output dispersion -- measuring how much sampled answers differ -- but this discards a complementary signal: whether the model can consistently rank competing reasoning candidates. We propose structural uncertainty, a consistency-aware framework derived from the stability of self-preference-induced rankings over sampled reasoning solutions. Given a query, we generate multiple candidate solutions and ask the model to judge pairwise preferences among its own outputs. We aggregate self-preferences into ranking distributions via Bradley-Terry modeling with PageRank, and decompose the signal into two entropy-based components: across-trial ranking instability and within-trial candidate ambiguity. Across five LLMs and eight benchmarks, structural signals provide information complementary to answer dispersion: on logical and mathematical reasoning tasks, the combination improves identification of unreliable instances, while on factual retrieval the structural signal collapses toward uniformity, diagnosing a regime boundary where reasoning-level consistency evaluation is uninformative. The two components relate differently to accuracy: within-trial ambiguity correlates positively with correctness -- consistent with settings where multiple plausible solution paths remain competitive -- while across-trial instability correlates negatively, signaling unreliable reasoning. Structural uncertainty is best understood not as a universal confidence estimator, but as a regime-sensitive evaluator of logical reasoning consistency.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance, they exhibit certain cognitive patterns similar to those of humans that are not directly specified in training data. This study investigates this phenomenon by focusing on temporal cognition in LLMs. Leveraging the similarity judgment task, we find that larger models spontaneously establish a subjective temporal reference point and adhere to the Weber-Fechner law, whereby the perceived distance logarithmically compresses as years recede from this reference point. To uncover the mechanisms behind this behavior, we conducted multiple analyses across neuronal, representational, and informational levels. We first identify a set of temporal-preferential neurons and find that this group exhibits minimal activation at the subjective reference point and implements a logarithmic coding scheme convergently found in biological systems. Probing representations of years reveals a hierarchical construction process, where years evolve from basic numerical values in shallow layers to abstract temporal orientation in deep layers. Finally, using pre-trained embedding models, we found that the training corpus itself possesses an inherent, non-linear temporal structure, which provides the raw material for the model's internal construction. In discussion, we propose an experientialist perspective for understanding these findings, where the LLMs' cognition is viewed as a subjective construction of the external world by its internal representational system. This nuanced perspective implies the potential emergence of alien cognitive frameworks that humans cannot intuitively predict, pointing toward a direction for AI alignment that focuses on guiding internal constructions. Our code is available at https://TheOtherMind.github.io.

People often optimize for long-term goals in collaboration: A mentor or companion doesn't just answer questions, but also scaffolds learning, tracks progress, and prioritizes the other person's growth over immediate results. In contrast, current AI systems are fundamentally short-sighted collaborators - optimized for providing instant and complete responses, without ever saying no (unless for safety reasons). What are the consequences of this dynamic? Here, through a series of randomized controlled trials on human-AI interactions (N = 1,222), we provide causal evidence for two key consequences of AI assistance: reduced persistence and impairment of unassisted performance. Across a variety of tasks, including mathematical reasoning and reading comprehension, we find that although AI assistance improves performance in the short-term, people perform significantly worse without AI and are more likely to give up. Notably, these effects emerge after only brief interactions with AI (approximately 10 minutes). These findings are particularly concerning because persistence is foundational to skill acquisition and is one of the strongest predictors of long-term learning. We posit that persistence is reduced because AI conditions people to expect immediate answers, thereby denying them the experience of working through challenges on their own. These results suggest the need for AI model development to prioritize scaffolding long-term competence alongside immediate task completion.

In human cognition theory, human thinking is governed by two systems: the fast and intuitive System 1 and the slower but more deliberative System 2. Recent studies have shown that incorporating System 2 process into Transformers including large language models (LLMs), significantly enhances their reasoning capabilities. Nevertheless, models that purely resemble System 2 thinking require substantially higher computational costs and are much slower to respond. To address this challenge, we present Dualformer, a single Transformer model that seamlessly integrates both the fast and slow reasoning modes. Dualformer is obtained by training on data with randomized reasoning traces, where different parts of the traces are dropped during training. The dropping strategies are specifically tailored according to the trace structure, analogous to analyzing our thinking process and creating shortcuts with patterns. At inference time, our model can be configured to output only the solutions (fast mode) or both the reasoning chain and the final solution (slow mode), or automatically decide which mode to engage (auto mode). In all cases, Dualformer outperforms the corresponding baseline models in both performance and computational efficiency: (1) in slow mode, Dualformer optimally solves unseen 30 x 30 maze navigation tasks 97.6% of the time, surpassing the Searchformer (trained on data with complete reasoning traces) baseline performance of 93.3%, while only using 45.5% fewer reasoning steps; (2) in fast mode, Dualformer completes those tasks with an 80% optimal rate, significantly outperforming the Solution-Only model (trained on solution-only data), which has an optimal rate of only 30%. For math problems, our techniques have also achieved improved performance with LLM fine-tuning, showing its generalization beyond task-specific models.