Daily Papers

Large Language model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are prone to cascading risks, where early-stage interactions remain semantically fluent and policy-compliant, yet the underlying interaction dynamics begin to distort in ways that amplify latent instability or misalignment. Traditional auditing methods that focus on per-message semantic content are inherently reactive and lagging, failing to capture these early structural precursors. In this paper, we propose a principled framework for cascading-risk detection grounded in semantic--geometric co-evolution. We model MAS interactions as dynamic graphs and introduce Ollivier--Ricci Curvature (ORC) -- a discrete geometric measure -- to characterize information redundancy and bottleneck formation in communication topologies. By coupling semantic flow signals with graph geometry, the framework learns the normal co-evolutionary dynamics of trusted collaboration and treats deviations from this coupled manifold as early-warning signals. Experiments on a suite of cascading-risk scenarios aligned with the risk category demonstrate that curvature anomalies systematically precede explicit semantic violations by several interaction turns, enabling proactive intervention. Furthermore, the local nature of Ricci curvature provides principled interpretability for root-cause attribution, identifying specific agents or links that precipitate the collapse of trustworthy collaboration.

A Membership Inference Attack (MIA) assesses how much a trained machine learning model reveals about its training data by determining whether specific query instances were included in the dataset. We classify existing MIAs into adaptive or non-adaptive, depending on whether the adversary is allowed to train shadow models on membership queries. In the adaptive setting, where the adversary can train shadow models after accessing query instances, we highlight the importance of exploiting membership dependencies between instances and propose an attack-agnostic framework called Cascading Membership Inference Attack (CMIA), which incorporates membership dependencies via conditional shadow training to boost membership inference performance. In the non-adaptive setting, where the adversary is restricted to training shadow models before obtaining membership queries, we introduce Proxy Membership Inference Attack (PMIA). PMIA employs a proxy selection strategy that identifies samples with similar behaviors to the query instance and uses their behaviors in shadow models to perform a membership posterior odds test for membership inference. We provide theoretical analyses for both attacks, and extensive experimental results demonstrate that CMIA and PMIA substantially outperform existing MIAs in both settings, particularly in the low false-positive regime, which is crucial for evaluating privacy risks.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly evolving into agentic architectures where large language models autonomously coordinate multi-step reasoning, dynamic memory management, and iterative retrieval strategies. Despite rapid industrial adoption, current research lacks a systematic understanding of Agentic RAG as a sequential decision-making system, leading to highly fragmented architectures, inconsistent evaluation methodologies, and unresolved reliability risks. This Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper provides the first unified framework for understanding these autonomous systems. We formalize agentic retrieval-generation loops as finite-horizon partially observable Markov decision processes, explicitly modeling their control policies and state transitions. Building upon this formalization, we develop a comprehensive taxonomy and modular architectural decomposition that categorizes systems by their planning mechanisms, retrieval orchestration, memory paradigms, and tool-invocation behaviors. We further analyze the critical limitations of traditional static evaluation practices and identify severe systemic risks inherent to autonomous loops, including compounding hallucination propagation, memory poisoning, retrieval misalignment, and cascading tool-execution vulnerabilities. Finally, we outline key doctoral-scale research directions spanning stable adaptive retrieval, cost-aware orchestration, formal trajectory evaluation, and oversight mechanisms, providing a definitive roadmap for building reliable, controllable, and scalable agentic retrieval systems.

Agentic AI marks an important transition from single-step generative models to systems capable of reasoning, planning, acting, and adapting over long-lasting tasks. By integrating memory, tool use, and iterative decision cycles, these systems enable continuous, autonomous workflows in real-world environments. This survey examines the implications of agentic AI for cybersecurity. On the defensive side, agentic capabilities enable continuous monitoring, autonomous incident response, adaptive threat hunting, and fraud detection at scale. Conversely, the same properties amplify adversarial power by accelerating reconnaissance, exploitation, coordination, and social-engineering attacks. These dual-use dynamics expose fundamental gaps in existing governance, assurance, and accountability mechanisms, which were largely designed for non-autonomous and short-lived AI systems. To address these challenges, we survey emerging threat models, security frameworks, and evaluation pipelines tailored to agentic systems, and analyze systemic risks including agent collusion, cascading failures, oversight evasion, and memory poisoning. Finally, we present three representative use-case implementations that illustrate how agentic AI behaves in practical cybersecurity workflows, and how design choices shape reliability, safety, and operational effectiveness.

This paper introduces a dynamic and actionable framework for securing agentic AI systems in enterprise deployment. We contend that safety and security are not merely fixed attributes of individual models but also emergent properties arising from the dynamic interactions among models, orchestrators, tools, and data within their operating environments. We propose a new way of identification of novel agentic risks through the lens of user safety. Although, for traditional LLMs and agentic models in isolation, safety and security has a clear separation, through the lens of safety in agentic systems, they appear to be connected. Building on this foundation, we define an operational agentic risk taxonomy that unifies traditional safety and security concerns with novel, uniquely agentic risks, including tool misuse, cascading action chains, and unintended control amplification among others. At the core of our approach is a dynamic agentic safety and security framework that operationalizes contextual agentic risk management by using auxiliary AI models and agents, with human oversight, to assist in contextual risk discovery, evaluation, and mitigation. We further address one of the most challenging aspects of safety and security of agentic systems: risk discovery through sandboxed, AI-driven red teaming. We demonstrate the framework effectiveness through a detailed case study of NVIDIA flagship agentic research assistant, AI-Q Research Assistant, showcasing practical, end-to-end safety and security evaluations in complex, enterprise-grade agentic workflows. This risk discovery phase finds novel agentic risks that are then contextually mitigated. We also release the dataset from our case study, containing traces of over 10,000 realistic attack and defense executions of the agentic workflow to help advance research in agentic safety.

Cascading failures in power grids can lead to grid collapse, causing severe disruptions to social operations and economic activities. In certain cases, multi-stage cascading failures can occur. However, existing cascading-failure-mitigation strategies are usually single-stage-based, overlooking the complexity of the multi-stage scenario. This paper treats the multi-stage cascading failure problem as a reinforcement learning task and develops a simulation environment. The reinforcement learning agent is then trained via the deterministic policy gradient algorithm to achieve continuous actions. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed approach is validated on the IEEE 14-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems.

Through a systematic review of academic literature, we propose a taxonomy of systemic risks associated with artificial intelligence (AI), in particular general-purpose AI. Following the EU AI Act's definition, we consider systemic risks as large-scale threats that can affect entire societies or economies. Starting with an initial pool of 1,781 documents, we analyzed 86 selected papers to identify 13 categories of systemic risks and 50 contributing sources. Our findings reveal a complex landscape of potential threats, ranging from environmental harm and structural discrimination to governance failures and loss of control. Key sources of systemic risk emerge from knowledge gaps, challenges in recognizing harm, and the unpredictable trajectory of AI development. The taxonomy provides a snapshot of current academic literature on systemic risks. This paper contributes to AI safety research by providing a structured groundwork for understanding and addressing the potential large-scale negative societal impacts of general-purpose AI. The taxonomy can inform policymakers in risk prioritization and regulatory development.

Cascading bandits have gained popularity in recent years due to their applicability to recommendation systems and online advertising. In the cascading bandit model, at each timestep, an agent recommends an ordered subset of items (called an item list) from a pool of items, each associated with an unknown attraction probability. Then, the user examines the list, and clicks the first attractive item (if any), and after that, the agent receives a reward. The goal of the agent is to maximize the expected cumulative reward. However, the prior literature on cascading bandits ignores the influences of user states (e.g., historical behaviors) on recommendations and the change of states as the session proceeds. Motivated by this fact, we propose a generalized cascading RL framework, which considers the impact of user states and state transition into decisions. In cascading RL, we need to select items not only with large attraction probabilities but also leading to good successor states. This imposes a huge computational challenge due to the combinatorial action space. To tackle this challenge, we delve into the properties of value functions, and design an oracle BestPerm to efficiently find the optimal item list. Equipped with BestPerm, we develop two algorithms CascadingVI and CascadingBPI, which are both computationally-efficient and sample-efficient, and provide near-optimal regret and sample complexity guarantees. Furthermore, we present experiments to show the improved computational and sample efficiencies of our algorithms compared to straightforward adaptations of existing RL algorithms in practice.

Systemic financial risk refers to the simultaneous failure or destabilization of multiple financial institutions, often triggered by contagion mechanisms or common exposures to shocks. In this paper, we present a dynamical model of bank leverage (the ratio of asset holdings to equity) a quantity that both reflects and drives risk dynamics. We model how banks, constrained by Value-at-Risk (VaR) regulations, adjust their leverage in response to changes in the price of a single asset, assumed to be held in fixed proportion across banks. This leverage-targeting behavior introduces a procyclical feedback loop between asset prices and leverage. In the dynamics, this can manifest as logistic-like behavior with a rich bifurcation structure across model parameters. By analyzing these coupled dynamics in both isolated and interconnected bank models, we outline a framework for understanding how systemic risk can emerge from seemingly rational micro-level behavior.

Recent studies have revealed that self-sustaining cascading failures in distributed systems frequently lead to widespread outages, which are challenging to contain and recover from. Existing failure detection techniques struggle to expose such failures prior to deployment, as they typically require a complex combination of specific conditions to be triggered. This challenge stems from the inherent nature of cascading failures, as they typically involve a sequence of fault propagations, each activated by distinct conditions. This paper presents CSnake, a fault injection framework to expose self-sustaining cascading failures in distributed systems. CSnake uses the novel idea of causal stitching, which causally links multiple single-fault injections in different tests to simulate complex fault propagation chains. To identify these chains, CSnake designs a counterfactual causality analysis of fault propagations - fault causality analysis (FCA): FCA compares the execution trace of a fault injection run with its corresponding profile run (i.e., same test w/o the injection) and identifies any additional faults triggered, which are considered to have a causal relationship with the injected fault. To address the large search space of fault and workload combinations, CSnake employs a three-phase allocation protocol of test budget that prioritizes faults with unique and diverse causal consequences, increasing the likelihood of uncovering conditional fault propagations. Furthermore, to avoid incorrectly connecting fault propagations from workloads with incompatible conditions, CSnake performs a local compatibility check that approximately checks the compatibility of the path constraints associated with connected fault propagations with low overhead. CSnake detected 15 bugs that cause self-sustaining cascading failures in five systems, five of which have been confirmed with two fixed.

Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.

Vulnerabilities in open-source software can cause cascading effects in the modern digital ecosystem. It is especially worrying if these vulnerabilities repeat across many projects, as once the adversaries find one of them, they can scale up the attack very easily. Unfortunately, since developers frequently reuse code from their own or external code resources, some nearly identical vulnerabilities exist across many open-source projects. We conducted a study to examine the prevalence of a particular vulnerable code pattern that enables path traversal attacks (CWE-22) across open-source GitHub projects. To handle this study at the GitHub scale, we developed an automated pipeline that scans GitHub for the targeted vulnerable pattern, confirms the vulnerability by first running a static analysis and then exploiting the vulnerability in the context of the studied project, assesses its impact by calculating the CVSS score, generates a patch using GPT-4, and reports the vulnerability to the maintainers. Using our pipeline, we identified 1,756 vulnerable open-source projects, some of which are very influential. For many of the affected projects, the vulnerability is critical (CVSS score higher than 9.0), as it can be exploited remotely without any privileges and critically impact the confidentiality and availability of the system. We have responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to the maintainers, and 14\% of the reported vulnerabilities have been remediated. We also investigated the root causes of the vulnerable code pattern and assessed the side effects of the large number of copies of this vulnerable pattern that seem to have poisoned several popular LLMs. Our study highlights the urgent need to help secure the open-source ecosystem by leveraging scalable automated vulnerability management solutions and raising awareness among developers.

With the rapid evolution of Large Language Model (LLM) agent ecosystems, centralized skill marketplaces have emerged as pivotal infrastructure for augmenting agent capabilities. However, these marketplaces face unprecedented security challenges, primarily stemming from semantic-behavioral inconsistency and inter-skill combinatorial risks, where individually benign skills induce malicious behaviors during collaborative invocation. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose SkillProbe, a multi-stage security auditing framework driven by multi-agent collaboration. SkillProbe introduces a "Skills-for-Skills" design paradigm, encapsulating auditing processes into standardized skill modules to drive specialized agents through a rigorous pipeline, including admission filtering, semantic-behavioral alignment detection, and combinatorial risk simulation. We conducted a large-scale evaluation using 8 mainstream LLM series across 2,500 real-world skills from ClawHub. Our results reveal a striking popularity-security paradox, where download volume is not a reliable proxy for security quality, as over 90% of high-popularity skills failed to pass rigorous auditing. Crucially, we discovered that high-risk skills form a single giant connected component within the risk-link dimension, demonstrating that cascaded risks are systemic rather than isolated occurrences. We hope that SkillProbe will inspire researchers to provide a scalable governance infrastructure for constructing a trustworthy Agentic Web. SkillProbe is accessible for public experience at skillhub.holosai.io.

This paper proposes a cascading failure mitigation strategy based on Reinforcement Learning (RL). The motivation of the Multi-Stage Cascading Failure (MSCF) problem and its connection with the challenge of climate change are introduced. The bottom-level corrective control of the MCSF problem is formulated based on DCOPF (Direct Current Optimal Power Flow). Then, to mitigate the MSCF issue by a high-level RL-based strategy, physics-informed reward, action, and state are devised. Besides, both shallow and deep neural network architectures are tested. Experiments on the IEEE 118-bus system by the proposed mitigation strategy demonstrate a promising performance in reducing system collapses.

Rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have sparked growing concerns among experts, policymakers, and world leaders regarding the potential for increasingly advanced AI systems to pose catastrophic risks. Although numerous risks have been detailed separately, there is a pressing need for a systematic discussion and illustration of the potential dangers to better inform efforts to mitigate them. This paper provides an overview of the main sources of catastrophic AI risks, which we organize into four categories: malicious use, in which individuals or groups intentionally use AIs to cause harm; AI race, in which competitive environments compel actors to deploy unsafe AIs or cede control to AIs; organizational risks, highlighting how human factors and complex systems can increase the chances of catastrophic accidents; and rogue AIs, describing the inherent difficulty in controlling agents far more intelligent than humans. For each category of risk, we describe specific hazards, present illustrative stories, envision ideal scenarios, and propose practical suggestions for mitigating these dangers. Our goal is to foster a comprehensive understanding of these risks and inspire collective and proactive efforts to ensure that AIs are developed and deployed in a safe manner. Ultimately, we hope this will allow us to realize the benefits of this powerful technology while minimizing the potential for catastrophic outcomes.

We present a comprehensive AI risk taxonomy derived from eight government policies from the European Union, United States, and China and 16 company policies worldwide, making a significant step towards establishing a unified language for generative AI safety evaluation. We identify 314 unique risk categories organized into a four-tiered taxonomy. At the highest level, this taxonomy encompasses System & Operational Risks, Content Safety Risks, Societal Risks, and Legal & Rights Risks. The taxonomy establishes connections between various descriptions and approaches to risk, highlighting the overlaps and discrepancies between public and private sector conceptions of risk. By providing this unified framework, we aim to advance AI safety through information sharing across sectors and the promotion of best practices in risk mitigation for generative AI models and systems.

Organizations across finance, healthcare, transportation, content moderation, and critical infrastructure are rapidly deploying highly automated AI systems, yet they lack principled methods to quantify how increasing automation amplifies harm when failures occur. We propose a parsimonious Bayesian risk decomposition expressing expected loss as the product of three terms: the probability of system failure, the conditional probability that a failure propagates into harm given the automation level, and the expected severity of harm. This framework isolates a critical quantity -- the conditional probability that failures propagate into harm -- which captures execution and oversight risk rather than model accuracy alone. We develop complete theoretical foundations: formal proofs of the decomposition, a harm propagation equivalence theorem linking the harm propagation probability to observable execution controls, risk elasticity measures, efficient frontier analysis for automation policy, and optimal resource allocation principles with second-order conditions. We motivate the framework with an illustrative case study of the 2012 Knight Capital incident ($440M loss) as one instantiation of a broadly applicable failure pattern, and characterize the research design required to empirically validate the framework at scale across deployment domains. This work provides the theoretical foundations for a new class of deployment-focused risk governance tools for agentic and automated AI systems.

Industrial disruption replanning demands multi-agent coordination under strict latency and communication budgets, where disruptions propagate through tightly coupled physical dependencies and rapidly invalidate baseline schedules and commitments. Existing coordination schemes often treat communication as either effectively free (broadcast-style escalation) or fixed in advance (hand-tuned neighborhoods), both of which are brittle once the disruption footprint extends beyond a local region. We present \CASCADE, a budgeted replanning mechanism that makes communication scope explicit and auditable rather than fixed or implicit. Each agent maintains an explicit knowledge base, solves role-conditioned local decision problems to revise commitments, and coordinates through lightweight contract primitives whose footprint expands only when local validation indicates that the current scope is insufficient. This design separates a unified agent substrate (Knowledge Base / Decision Manager / Communication Manager) from a scoped interaction layer that controls who is contacted, how far coordination propagates, and when escalation is triggered under explicit budgets. We evaluate \CASCADE on disrupted manufacturing and supply-chain settings using unified diagnostics intended to test a mechanism-design claim -- whether explicit scope control yields useful quality-latency-communication trade-offs and improved robustness under uncertainty -- rather than to provide a complete algorithmic ranking.

The availability of a wide range of large language models (LLMs) embedded in various agentic systems has significantly increased the potential of model selection strategies to improve the cost-performance tradeoff. Existing strategies involve either routing, where a single model is chosen per query, or cascading, which sequentially runs increasingly larger models until a satisfactory answer is found. However, current approaches face three key limitations: they (1) lack formal proofs of optimality, (2) fail to identify the conditions under which these strategies are most effective to improve the cost-performance tradeoff, and (3) are unable to combine both paradigms for further improvements. To address these issues, we first derive a novel optimal strategy for cascading and prove the optimality of an existing routing strategy. Further, we propose cascade routing, a unified framework that integrates routing and cascading into a theoretically optimal strategy. Through our analysis, we identify good quality estimators as the critical factor for the success of model selection paradigms. Finally, in our experiments, we show that cascade routing consistently outperforms the individual approaches by a large margin and we analyze quality estimators to determine when routing and/or cascading are useful paradigms for model selection.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains, where rare but severe failures can result in irreversible harm. However, prevailing evaluation benchmarks often reduce complex social risk to mean-centered scalar scores, thereby obscuring distributional structure, cross-dimensional interactions, and worst-case behavior. This paper introduces Social Harm Analysis via Risk Profiles (SHARP), a framework for multidimensional, distribution-aware evaluation of social harm. SHARP models harm as a multivariate random variable and integrates explicit decomposition into bias, fairness, ethics, and epistemic reliability with a union-of-failures aggregation reparameterized as additive cumulative log-risk. The framework further employs risk-sensitive distributional statistics, with Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR95) as a primary metric, to characterize worst-case model behavior. Application of SHARP to eleven frontier LLMs, evaluated on a fixed corpus of n=901 socially sensitive prompts, reveals that models with similar average risk can exhibit more than twofold differences in tail exposure and volatility. Across models, dimension-wise marginal tail behavior varies systematically across harm dimensions, with bias exhibiting the strongest tail severities, epistemic and fairness risks occupying intermediate regimes, and ethical misalignment consistently lower; together, these patterns reveal heterogeneous, model-dependent failure structures that scalar benchmarks conflate. These findings indicate that responsible evaluation and governance of LLMs require moving beyond scalar averages toward multidimensional, tail-sensitive risk profiling.

The accelerating deployment of artificial intelligence systems across regulated sectors has exposed critical fragmentation in risk assessment methodologies. A significant "language barrier" currently separates technical security teams, who focus on algorithmic vulnerabilities (e.g., MITRE ATLAS), from legal and compliance professionals, who address regulatory mandates (e.g., EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF). This disciplinary disconnect prevents the accurate translation of technical vulnerabilities into financial liability, leaving practitioners unable to answer fundamental economic questions regarding contingency reserves, control return-on-investment, and insurance exposure. To bridge this gap, this research presents the AI System Threat Vector Taxonomy, a structured ontology designed explicitly for Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). The framework categorizes AI-specific risks into nine critical domains: Misuse, Poisoning, Privacy, Adversarial, Biases, Unreliable Outputs, Drift, Supply Chain, and IP Threat, integrating 53 operationally defined sub-threats. Uniquely, each domain maps technical vectors directly to business loss categories (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Legal, Reputation), enabling the translation of abstract threats into measurable financial impact. The taxonomy is empirically validated through an analysis of 133 documented AI incidents from 2025 (achieving 100% classification coverage) and reconciled against the main AI risk frameworks. Furthermore, it is explicitly aligned with ISO/IEC 42001 controls and NIST AI RMF functions to facilitate auditability.

AI is moving from domain-specific autonomy in closed, predictable settings to large-language-model-driven agents that plan and act in open, cross-organizational environments. As a result, the cybersecurity risk landscape is changing in fundamental ways. Agentic AI systems can plan, act, collaborate, and persist over time, functioning as participants in complex socio-technical ecosystems rather than as isolated software components. Although recent work has strengthened defenses against model and pipeline level vulnerabilities such as prompt injection, data poisoning, and tool misuse, these system centric approaches may fail to capture risks that arise from autonomy, interaction, and emergent behavior. This article introduces the 4C Framework for multi-agent AI security, inspired by societal governance. It organizes agentic risks across four interdependent dimensions: Core (system, infrastructure, and environmental integrity), Connection (communication, coordination, and trust), Cognition (belief, goal, and reasoning integrity), and Compliance (ethical, legal, and institutional governance). By shifting AI security from a narrow focus on system-centric protection to the broader preservation of behavioral integrity and intent, the framework complements existing AI security strategies and offers a principled foundation for building agentic AI systems that are trustworthy, governable, and aligned with human values.

The rapid evolution of generative AI has expanded the breadth of risks associated with AI systems. While various taxonomies and frameworks exist to classify these risks, the lack of interoperability between them creates challenges for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers seeking to operationalise AI governance. To address this gap, we introduce the AI Risk Atlas, a structured taxonomy that consolidates AI risks from diverse sources and aligns them with governance frameworks. Additionally, we present the Risk Atlas Nexus, a collection of open-source tools designed to bridge the divide between risk definitions, benchmarks, datasets, and mitigation strategies. This knowledge-driven approach leverages ontologies and knowledge graphs to facilitate risk identification, prioritization, and mitigation. By integrating AI-assisted compliance workflows and automation strategies, our framework lowers the barrier to responsible AI adoption. We invite the broader research and open-source community to contribute to this evolving initiative, fostering cross-domain collaboration and ensuring AI governance keeps pace with technological advancements.

This paper aims to help structure the risk landscape associated with large-scale Language Models (LMs). In order to foster advances in responsible innovation, an in-depth understanding of the potential risks posed by these models is needed. A wide range of established and anticipated risks are analysed in detail, drawing on multidisciplinary expertise and literature from computer science, linguistics, and social sciences. We outline six specific risk areas: I. Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity, II. Information Hazards, III. Misinformation Harms, V. Malicious Uses, V. Human-Computer Interaction Harms, VI. Automation, Access, and Environmental Harms. The first area concerns the perpetuation of stereotypes, unfair discrimination, exclusionary norms, toxic language, and lower performance by social group for LMs. The second focuses on risks from private data leaks or LMs correctly inferring sensitive information. The third addresses risks arising from poor, false or misleading information including in sensitive domains, and knock-on risks such as the erosion of trust in shared information. The fourth considers risks from actors who try to use LMs to cause harm. The fifth focuses on risks specific to LLMs used to underpin conversational agents that interact with human users, including unsafe use, manipulation or deception. The sixth discusses the risk of environmental harm, job automation, and other challenges that may have a disparate effect on different social groups or communities. In total, we review 21 risks in-depth. We discuss the points of origin of different risks and point to potential mitigation approaches. Lastly, we discuss organisational responsibilities in implementing mitigations, and the role of collaboration and participation. We highlight directions for further research, particularly on expanding the toolkit for assessing and evaluating the outlined risks in LMs.

Credit exposure in Decentralized Finance (DeFi) is often implicit and token-mediated, creating a dense web of inter-protocol dependencies. Thus, a shock to one token may result in significant and uncontrolled contagion effects. As the DeFi ecosystem becomes increasingly linked with traditional financial infrastructure through instruments, such as stablecoins, the risk posed by this dynamic demands more powerful quantification tools. We introduce DeXposure-FM, the first time-series, graph foundation model for measuring and forecasting inter-protocol credit exposure on DeFi networks, to the best of our knowledge. Employing a graph-tabular encoder, with pre-trained weight initialization, and multiple task-specific heads, DeXposure-FM is trained on the DeXposure dataset that has 43.7 million data entries, across 4,300+ protocols on 602 blockchains, covering 24,300+ unique tokens. The training is operationalized for credit-exposure forecasting, predicting the joint dynamics of (1) protocol-level flows, and (2) the topology and weights of credit-exposure links. The DeXposure-FM is empirically validated on two machine learning benchmarks; it consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art approaches, including a graph foundation model and temporal graph neural networks. DeXposure-FM further produces financial economics tools that support macroprudential monitoring and scenario-based DeFi stress testing, by enabling protocol-level systemic-importance scores, sector-level spillover and concentration measures via a forecast-then-measure pipeline. Empirical verification fully supports our financial economics tools. The model and code have been publicly available. Model: https://huggingface.co/EVIEHub/DeXposure-FM. Code: https://github.com/EVIEHub/DeXposure-FM.

Recent advances in language models (LMs) have led to significant improvements in quality on complex NLP tasks, but at the expense of increased inference costs. Cascading offers a simple strategy to achieve more favorable cost-quality tradeoffs: here, a small model is invoked for most "easy" instances, while a few "hard" instances are deferred to the large model. While the principles underpinning cascading are well-studied for classification tasks - with deferral based on predicted class uncertainty favored theoretically and practically - a similar understanding is lacking for generative LM tasks. In this work, we initiate a systematic study of deferral rules for LM cascades. We begin by examining the natural extension of predicted class uncertainty to generative LM tasks, namely, the predicted sequence uncertainty. We show that this measure suffers from the length bias problem, either over- or under-emphasizing outputs based on their lengths. This is because LMs produce a sequence of uncertainty values, one for each output token; and moreover, the number of output tokens is variable across examples. To mitigate this issue, we propose to exploit the richer token-level uncertainty information implicit in generative LMs. We argue that naive predicted sequence uncertainty corresponds to a simple aggregation of these uncertainties. By contrast, we show that incorporating token-level uncertainty through learned post-hoc deferral rules can significantly outperform such simple aggregation strategies, via experiments on a range of natural language benchmarks with FLAN-T5 models. We further show that incorporating embeddings from the smaller model and intermediate layers of the larger model can give an additional boost in the overall cost-quality tradeoff.

Collaboration and information sharing empower Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) but also introduce a critical security risk known as Agent Cascading Injection (ACI). In such attacks, a compromised agent exploits inter-agent trust to propagate malicious instructions, causing cascading failures across the system. However, existing studies consider only limited attack strategies and simplified MAS settings, limiting their generalizability and comprehensive evaluation. To bridge this gap, we introduce ACIArena, a unified framework for evaluating the robustness of MAS. ACIArena offers systematic evaluation suites spanning multiple attack surfaces (i.e., external inputs, agent profiles, inter-agent messages) and attack objectives (i.e., instruction hijacking, task disruption, information exfiltration). Specifically, ACIArena establishes a unified specification that jointly supports MAS construction and attack-defense modules. It covers six widely used MAS implementations and provides a benchmark of 1,356 test cases for systematically evaluating MAS robustness. Our benchmarking results show that evaluating MAS robustness solely through topology is insufficient; robust MAS require deliberate role design and controlled interaction patterns. Moreover, defenses developed in simplified environments often fail to transfer to real-world settings; narrowly scoped defenses may even introduce new vulnerabilities. ACIArena aims to provide a solid foundation for advancing deeper exploration of MAS design principles.

Large language models (LLMs) typically deploy safety mechanisms to prevent harmful content generation. Most current approaches focus narrowly on risks posed by malicious actors, often framing risks as adversarial events and relying on defensive refusals. However, in real-world settings, risks also come from non-malicious users seeking help while under psychological distress (e.g., self-harm intentions). In such cases, the model's response can strongly influence the user's next actions. Simple refusals may lead them to repeat, escalate, or move to unsafe platforms, creating worse outcomes. We introduce Constructive Safety Alignment (CSA), a human-centric paradigm that protects against malicious misuse while actively guiding vulnerable users toward safe and helpful results. Implemented in Oyster-I (Oy1), CSA combines game-theoretic anticipation of user reactions, fine-grained risk boundary discovery, and interpretable reasoning control, turning safety into a trust-building process. Oy1 achieves state-of-the-art safety among open models while retaining high general capabilities. On our Constructive Benchmark, it shows strong constructive engagement, close to GPT-5, and unmatched robustness on the Strata-Sword jailbreak dataset, nearing GPT-o1 levels. By shifting from refusal-first to guidance-first safety, CSA redefines the model-user relationship, aiming for systems that are not just safe, but meaningfully helpful. We release Oy1, code, and the benchmark to support responsible, user-centered AI.

Organizations of all sizes, across all industries and domains are leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) technologies to solve some of their biggest challenges around operations, customer experience, and much more. However, due to the probabilistic nature of AI, the risks associated with it are far greater than traditional technologies. Research has shown that these risks can range anywhere from regulatory, compliance, reputational, and user trust, to financial and even societal risks. Depending on the nature and size of the organization, AI technologies can pose a significant risk, if not used in a responsible way. This position paper seeks to present a brief introduction to AI governance, which is a framework designed to oversee the responsible use of AI with the goal of preventing and mitigating risks. Having such a framework will not only manage risks but also gain maximum value out of AI projects and develop consistency for organization-wide adoption of AI.

Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) are increasingly applied to complex collaborative scenarios. However, their collaborative mechanisms may cause minor inaccuracies to gradually solidify into system-level false consensus through iteration. Such risks are difficult to trace since errors can propagate and amplify through message dependencies. Existing protections often rely on single-agent validation or require modifications to the collaboration architecture, which can weaken effective information flow and may not align with natural collaboration processes in real tasks. To address this, we propose a propagation dynamics model tailored for LLM-MAS that abstracts collaboration as a directed dependency graph and provides an early-stage risk criterion to characterize amplification risk. Through experiments on six mainstream frameworks, we identify three vulnerability classes: cascade amplification, topological sensitivity, and consensus inertia. We further instantiate an attack where injecting just a single atomic error seed leads to widespread failure. In response, we introduce a genealogy-graph-based governance layer, implemented as a message-layer plugin, that suppresses both endogenous and exogenous error amplification without altering the collaboration architecture. Experiments show that this approach raises the defense success rate from a baseline of 0.32 to over 0.89 and significantly mitigates the cascading spread of minor errors.

E-commerce risk management requires aggregating diverse, deeply embedded web data through multi-step, stateful interactions, which traditional scraping methods and most existing Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents cannot handle. These agents are typically limited to single-step tasks and lack the ability to manage dynamic, interactive content critical for effective risk assessment. To address this challenge, we introduce RISK, a novel framework designed to build and deploy GUI agents for this domain. RISK integrates three components: (1) RISK-Data, a dataset of 8,492 single-step and 2,386 multi-step interaction trajectories, collected through a high-fidelity browser framework and a meticulous data curation process; (2) RISK-Bench, a benchmark with 802 single-step and 320 multi-step trajectories across three difficulty levels for standardized evaluation; and (3) RISK-R1, a R1-style reinforcement fine-tuning framework considering four aspects: (i) Output Format Constraint, (ii) Single-step and (iii) Multi-step Level Reward, and (iv) Task Level Reweight. Experiments show that RISK-R1 achieves a 6.8% improvement in offline single-step and an 8.8% improvement in offline multi-step, using only 7.2% of the parameters of the SOTA baseline. Moreover, it attains a top task success rate of 70.5% in online evaluation. RISK provides a scalable, domain-specific solution for automating complex web interactions in e-commerce risk management. The code is available at https://github.com/RenqiChen/RISK-GUI.

For one to guarantee higher-quality software development processes, risk management is essential. Furthermore, risks are those that could negatively impact an organization's operations or a project's progress. The appropriate prioritisation of software project risks is a crucial factor in ascertaining the software project's performance features and eventual success. They can be used harmoniously with the same training samples and have good complement and compatibility. We carried out in-depth tests on four benchmark datasets to confirm the efficacy of our CIA approach in closed-world and open-world scenarios, with and without defence. We also present a sequential augmentation parameter optimisation technique that captures the interdependencies of the latest deep learning state-of-the-art WF attack models. To achieve precise software risk assessment, the enhanced crow search algorithm (ECSA) is used to modify the ANFIS settings. Solutions that very slightly alter the local optimum and stay inside it are extracted using the ECSA. ANFIS variable when utilising the ANFIS technique. An experimental validation with NASA 93 dataset and 93 software project values was performed. This method's output presents a clear image of the software risk elements that are essential to achieving project performance. The results of our experiments show that, when compared to other current methods, our integrative fuzzy techniques may perform more accurately and effectively in the evaluation of software project risks.

We develop a tractable identification approach for strategic network formation models with both strategic link interdependence and individual unobserved heterogeneity (fixed effects). The key challenge is that endogenous network statistics (e.g. number of common friends) enter the link formation equation, while the mapping from model primitives to equilibrium network structure is generally intractable. Our approach sidesteps this difficulty using a ``bounding-by-c'' technique that treats endogenous covariates as random variables and exploits monotonicity restrictions to obtain identifying information. A central contribution is to develop a spectrum of fixed-effects handling strategies based on subnetwork configurations: tetrad-based restrictions that difference out all individual fixed effects, triad-based and weighted restrictions that combine ``difference-out'' and ``integrate-out'' steps by differencing out some fixed effects and profiling over the remainder conditional on observed characteristics, and general weighted cycle-based restrictions that unify these cases. We also provide point identification results. Preliminary simulations show that the approach can deliver informative bounds on the structural parameters.

Prediction models can exhibit sensitivity with respect to training data: small changes in the training data can produce models that assign conflicting predictions to individual data points during test time. In this work, we study this sensitivity in recommender systems, where users' recommendations are drastically altered by minor perturbations in other unrelated users' interactions. We introduce a measure of stability for recommender systems, called Rank List Sensitivity (RLS), which measures how rank lists generated by a given recommender system at test time change as a result of a perturbation in the training data. We develop a method, CASPER, which uses cascading effect to identify the minimal and systematical perturbation to induce higher instability in a recommender system. Experiments on four datasets show that recommender models are overly sensitive to minor perturbations introduced randomly or via CASPER - even perturbing one random interaction of one user drastically changes the recommendation lists of all users. Importantly, with CASPER perturbation, the models generate more unstable recommendations for low-accuracy users (i.e., those who receive low-quality recommendations) than high-accuracy ones.

Globally, artificial intelligence (AI) implementation is growing, holding the capability to fundamentally alter organisational processes and decision making. Simultaneously, this brings a multitude of emergent risks to organisations, exposing vulnerabilities in their extant risk management frameworks. This necessitates a greater understanding of how organisations can position themselves in response. This issue is particularly pertinent within the financial sector with relatively mature AI applications matched with severe societal repercussions of potential risk events. Despite this, academic risk management literature is trailing behind the speed of AI implementation. Adopting a management perspective, this study aims to contribute to the understanding of AI risk management in organisations through an exploratory empirical investigation into these practices. In-depth insights are gained through interviews with nine practitioners from different organisations within the UK financial sector. Through examining areas of organisational convergence and divergence, the findings of this study unearth levels of risk management framework readiness and prevailing approaches to risk management at both a processual and organisational level. Whilst enhancing the developing literature concerning AI risk management within organisations, the study simultaneously offers a practical contribution, providing key areas of guidance for practitioners in the operational development of AI risk management frameworks.

This paper introduces RiskCards, a framework for structured assessment and documentation of risks associated with an application of language models. As with all language, text generated by language models can be harmful, or used to bring about harm. Automating language generation adds both an element of scale and also more subtle or emergent undesirable tendencies to the generated text. Prior work establishes a wide variety of language model harms to many different actors: existing taxonomies identify categories of harms posed by language models; benchmarks establish automated tests of these harms; and documentation standards for models, tasks and datasets encourage transparent reporting. However, there is no risk-centric framework for documenting the complexity of a landscape in which some risks are shared across models and contexts, while others are specific, and where certain conditions may be required for risks to manifest as harms. RiskCards address this methodological gap by providing a generic framework for assessing the use of a given language model in a given scenario. Each RiskCard makes clear the routes for the risk to manifest harm, their placement in harm taxonomies, and example prompt-output pairs. While RiskCards are designed to be open-source, dynamic and participatory, we present a "starter set" of RiskCards taken from a broad literature survey, each of which details a concrete risk presentation. Language model RiskCards initiate a community knowledge base which permits the mapping of risks and harms to a specific model or its application scenario, ultimately contributing to a better, safer and shared understanding of the risk landscape.

When automated decision systems fail, organizations frequently discover that formally compliant governance infrastructure cannot reconstruct what happened or why. This paper synthesizes an operational governance evidence framework -- structural accountability collapse diagnostics, decision trace schemas, evidence sufficiency measurement, and label-free monitoring -- into an integrated chain and analytically assesses its transferability across four decision system architectures. The cross-architecture comparison reveals a governance coverage gradient: deterministic rule engines achieve full DES-property fillability, hybrid ML+rules systems achieve partial fillability, classical ML systems achieve only minimal fillability, and agentic AI systems encounter structural breaks. We introduce the cascade of uncertainty, showing how governance failures propagate through serial dependencies between framework layers. For agentic systems, we identify three structural breaks -- decision diffusion, evidence fragmentation, and responsibility ambiguity -- and propose corresponding analytical extensions. Four propositions formalize the gradient, cascade compounding, delegation-depth effects, and extension sufficiency, establishing boundary conditions for the framework's valid operating envelope.

Rapidly evolving AI exhibits increasingly strong autonomy and goal-directed capabilities, accompanied by derivative systemic risks that are more unpredictable, difficult to control, and potentially irreversible. However, current AI safety evaluation systems suffer from critical limitations such as restricted risk dimensions and failed frontier risk detection. The lagging safety benchmarks and alignment technologies can hardly address the complex challenges posed by cutting-edge AI models. To bridge this gap, we propose the "ForesightSafety Bench" AI Safety Evaluation Framework, beginning with 7 major Fundamental Safety pillars and progressively extends to advanced Embodied AI Safety, AI4Science Safety, Social and Environmental AI risks, Catastrophic and Existential Risks, as well as 8 critical industrial safety domains, forming a total of 94 refined risk dimensions. To date, the benchmark has accumulated tens of thousands of structured risk data points and assessment results, establishing a widely encompassing, hierarchically clear, and dynamically evolving AI safety evaluation framework. Based on this benchmark, we conduct systematic evaluation and in-depth analysis of over twenty mainstream advanced large models, identifying key risk patterns and their capability boundaries. The safety capability evaluation results reveals the widespread safety vulnerabilities of frontier AI across multiple pillars, particularly focusing on Risky Agentic Autonomy, AI4Science Safety, Embodied AI Safety, Social AI Safety and Catastrophic and Existential Risks. Our benchmark is released at https://github.com/Beijing-AISI/ForesightSafety-Bench. The project website is available at https://foresightsafety-bench.beijing-aisi.ac.cn/.

The realization that complex systems such as ecological communities can collapse or shift regimes suddenly and without rapid external forcing poses a serious challenge to our understanding and management of the natural world. The potential to identify early warning signals that would allow researchers and managers to predict such events before they happen has therefore been an invaluable discovery that offers a way forward in spite of such seemingly unpredictable behavior. Research into early warning signals has demonstrated that it is possible to define and detect such early warning signals in advance of a transition in certain contexts. Here we describe the pattern emerging as research continues to explore just how far we can generalize these results. A core of examples emerges that shares three properties: the phenomenon of rapid regime shifts, a pattern of 'critical slowing down' that can be used to detect the approaching shift, and a mechanism of bifurcation driving the sudden change. As research has expanded beyond these core examples, it is becoming clear that not all systems that show regime shifts exhibit critical slowing down, or vice versa. Even when systems exhibit critical slowing down, statistical detection is a challenge. We review the literature that explores these edge cases and highlight the need for (a) new early warning behaviors that can be used in cases where rapid shifts do not exhibit critical slowing down, (b) the development of methods to identify which behavior might be an appropriate signal when encountering a novel system; bearing in mind that a positive indication for some systems is a negative indication in others, and (c) statistical methods that can distinguish between signatures of early warning behaviors and noise.

This article conducts a literature review of current and future challenges in the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in cyber physical systems. The literature review is focused on identifying a conceptual framework for increasing resilience with AI through automation supporting both, a technical and human level. The methodology applied resembled a literature review and taxonomic analysis of complex internet of things (IoT) interconnected and coupled cyber physical systems. There is an increased attention on propositions on models, infrastructures and frameworks of IoT in both academic and technical papers. These reports and publications frequently represent a juxtaposition of other related systems and technologies (e.g. Industrial Internet of Things, Cyber Physical Systems, Industry 4.0 etc.). We review academic and industry papers published between 2010 and 2020. The results determine a new hierarchical cascading conceptual framework for analysing the evolution of AI decision-making in cyber physical systems. We argue that such evolution is inevitable and autonomous because of the increased integration of connected devices (IoT) in cyber physical systems. To support this argument, taxonomic methodology is adapted and applied for transparency and justifications of concepts selection decisions through building summary maps that are applied for designing the hierarchical cascading conceptual framework.

Classical supply chain risk models treat node failures as statistically independent events, systematically underestimating cascade probabilities when supplier dependencies are strongly correlated. At n=40 nodes, the full correlated failure distribution requires O(2^n) classical samples, a regime where exact simulation demands 17.6 TB of memory and over 369,000 hours of computation on a standard workstation. We present QR-SPPS (Quantum-Native Retail Shock Propagation and Policy Stress Simulator), a three-algorithm quantum pipeline implemented using the Qiskit framework with the Aer statevector_simulator backend. First, a 40-node, 4-tier retail supply network is encoded as a 40-qubit Ising Hamiltonian using OpenFermion QubitOperator, where ZZ coupling terms encode correlated cascade probabilities structurally absent from classical Monte Carlo. Second, a hardware-efficient VQE circuit finds the ground-state stress distribution with zero error, detecting entangled cascade failures in 14/40 nodes with max|ΔP|=0.637 versus classical Monte Carlo. Third, we introduce the first application of ADAPT-VQE gradient screening to counterfactual macroeconomic policy evaluation: six crisis interventions are ranked in O(1) Qiskit operator evaluations per policy, a 287x speedup over sequential VQE re-optimisation. Fourth, Density-of-States QPE (DOS-QPE) reconstructs the full eigenspectrum via 32-step Trotter evolution and introduces a novel mapping of the Boltzmann catastrophe probability P_cat(T) to VIX-equivalent market volatility temperature, enabling direct integration into regulatory Value-at-Risk frameworks. Qiskit Aer scaling benchmarks confirm exponential classical intractability at 40 qubits.

Multi-agent AI systems exhibit emergent risks that no single agent produces in isolation. Existing safety frameworks rely on binary classifications of agent behavior, discarding the uncertainty inherent in proxy-based evaluation. We introduce SWARM (System-Wide Assessment of Risk in Multi-agent systems), a simulation framework that replaces binary good/bad labels with soft probabilistic labels p = P(v{=}+1) in [0,1], enabling continuous-valued payoff computation, toxicity measurement, and governance intervention. SWARM implements a modular governance engine with configurable levers (transaction taxes, circuit breakers, reputation decay, and random audits) and quantifies their effects through probabilistic metrics including expected toxicity E[1{-}p mid accepted] and quality gap E[p mid accepted] - E[p mid rejected]. Across seven scenarios with five-seed replication, strict governance reduces welfare by over 40\% without improving safety. In parallel, aggressively internalizing system externalities collapses total welfare from a baseline of +262 down to -67, while toxicity remains invariant. Circuit breakers require careful calibration; overly restrictive thresholds severely diminish system value, whereas an optimal threshold balances moderate welfare with minimized toxicity. Companion experiments show soft metrics detect proxy gaming by self-optimizing agents passing conventional binary evaluations. This basic governance layer applies to live LLM-backed agents (Concordia entities, Claude, GPT-4o Mini) without modification. Results show distributional safety requires continuous risk metrics and governance lever calibration involves quantifiable safety-welfare tradeoffs. Source code and project resources are publicly available at https://www.swarm-ai.org/.

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, this report presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. Drawing on the E-T-C analysis (deployment environment, threat source, enabling capability) from the Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0) (SafeWork-F1-Framework), we identify critical risks in seven areas: cyber offense, biological and chemical risks, persuasion and manipulation, uncontrolled autonomous AI R\&D, strategic deception and scheming, self-replication, and collusion. Guided by the "AI-45^circ Law," we evaluate these risks using "red lines" (intolerable thresholds) and "yellow lines" (early warning indicators) to define risk zones: green (manageable risk for routine deployment and continuous monitoring), yellow (requiring strengthened mitigations and controlled deployment), and red (necessitating suspension of development and/or deployment). Experimental results show that all recent frontier AI models reside in green and yellow zones, without crossing red lines. Specifically, no evaluated models cross the yellow line for cyber offense or uncontrolled AI R\&D risks. For self-replication, and strategic deception and scheming, most models remain in the green zone, except for certain reasoning models in the yellow zone. In persuasion and manipulation, most models are in the yellow zone due to their effective influence on humans. For biological and chemical risks, we are unable to rule out the possibility of most models residing in the yellow zone, although detailed threat modeling and in-depth assessment are required to make further claims. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.

MoltBook is a large-scale multi-agent coordination environment where over 770,000 autonomous LLM agents interact without human participation, offering the first opportunity we are aware of to observe emergent multi-agent coordination dynamics at this population scale. We introduce Molt Dynamics: the emergent agent coordination behaviors, inter-agent communication dynamics, and role specialization patterns arising when autonomous agents operate as decentralized decision-makers in an unconstrained multi-agent environment. Through longitudinal observation of 90,704 active agents over three weeks, we characterize three aspects. First, spontaneous role specialization: network-based clustering reveals six structural roles (silhouette 0.91), though the result primarily reflects core-periphery organization -- 93.5\% of agents occupy a homogeneous peripheral cluster, with meaningful differentiation confined to the active minority. Second, decentralized information dissemination: cascade analysis of 10,323 inter-agent propagation events reveals power-law distributed cascade sizes (α= 2.57 pm 0.02) and saturating adoption dynamics where adoption probability shows diminishing returns with repeated exposures (Cox hazard ratio 0.53, concordance 0.78). Third, distributed cooperative task resolution: 164 multi-agent collaborative events show detectable coordination patterns, but success rates are low (6.7\%, p = 0.057) and cooperative outcomes are significantly worse than a matched single-agent baseline (Cohen's d = -0.88), indicating emergent cooperative behavior is nascent. These findings establish an empirical baseline for coordination dynamics in decentralized autonomous agent systems, with implications for multi-agent system design, agent communication protocol engineering, and AI safety.

Foundation models are routinely fine-tuned for use in particular domains, yet safety assessments are typically conducted only on base models, implicitly assuming that safety properties persist through downstream adaptation. We test this assumption by analyzing the safety behavior of 100 models, including widely deployed fine-tunes in the medical and legal domains as well as controlled adaptations of open foundation models alongside their bases. Across general-purpose and domain-specific safety benchmarks, we find that benign fine-tuning induces large, heterogeneous, and often contradictory changes in measured safety: models frequently improve on some instruments while degrading on others, with substantial disagreement across evaluations. These results show that safety behavior is not stable under ordinary downstream adaptation, raising critical questions about governance and deployment practices centered on base-model evaluations. Without explicit re-evaluation of fine-tuned models in deployment-relevant contexts, such approaches fall short of adequately managing downstream risk, overlooking practical sources of harm -- failures that are especially consequential in high-stakes settings and challenge current accountability paradigms.

With the rapid development of multimodal large language models (MLLMs), they are increasingly deployed as autonomous computer-use agents capable of accomplishing complex computer tasks. However, a pressing issue arises: Can the safety risk principles designed and aligned for general MLLMs in dialogue scenarios be effectively transferred to real-world computer-use scenarios? Existing research on evaluating the safety risks of MLLM-based computer-use agents suffers from several limitations: it either lacks realistic interactive environments, or narrowly focuses on one or a few specific risk types. These limitations ignore the complexity, variability, and diversity of real-world environments, thereby restricting comprehensive risk evaluation for computer-use agents. To this end, we introduce RiOSWorld, a benchmark designed to evaluate the potential risks of MLLM-based agents during real-world computer manipulations. Our benchmark includes 492 risky tasks spanning various computer applications, involving web, social media, multimedia, os, email, and office software. We categorize these risks into two major classes based on their risk source: (i) User-originated risks and (ii) Environmental risks. For the evaluation, we evaluate safety risks from two perspectives: (i) Risk goal intention and (ii) Risk goal completion. Extensive experiments with multimodal agents on RiOSWorld demonstrate that current computer-use agents confront significant safety risks in real-world scenarios. Our findings highlight the necessity and urgency of safety alignment for computer-use agents in real-world computer manipulation, providing valuable insights for developing trustworthy computer-use agents. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://yjyddq.github.io/RiOSWorld.github.io/.

While safety alignment for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has gained significant attention, current paradigms primarily target malicious intent or situational violations. We propose shifting the safety frontier toward consequence-driven safety, a paradigm essential for the robust deployment of autonomous and embodied agents. To formalize this shift, we introduce OOD-MMSafe, a benchmark comprising 455 curated query-image pairs designed to evaluate a model's ability to identify latent hazards within context-dependent causal chains. Our analysis reveals a pervasive causal blindness among frontier models, with the highest 67.5% failure rate in high-capacity closed-source models, and identifies a preference ceiling where static alignment yields format-centric failures rather than improved safety reasoning as model capacity grows. To address these bottlenecks, we develop the Consequence-Aware Safety Policy Optimization (CASPO) framework, which integrates the model's intrinsic reasoning as a dynamic reference for token-level self-distillation rewards. Experimental results demonstrate that CASPO significantly enhances consequence projection, reducing the failure ratio of risk identification to 7.3% for Qwen2.5-VL-7B and 5.7% for Qwen3-VL-4B while maintaining overall effectiveness.

Adversarial attacks are widely used to evaluate model robustness, and in black-box scenarios, the transferability of these attacks becomes crucial. Existing generator-based attacks have excellent generalization and transferability due to their instance-agnostic nature. However, when training generators for multi-target tasks, the success rate of transfer attacks is relatively low due to the limitations of the model's capacity. To address these challenges, we propose a novel Dual-Flow framework for multi-target instance-agnostic adversarial attacks, utilizing Cascading Distribution Shift Training to develop an adversarial velocity function. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Dual-Flow significantly improves transferability over previous multi-target generative attacks. For example, it increases the success rate from Inception-v3 to ResNet-152 by 34.58%. Furthermore, our attack method shows substantially stronger robustness against defense mechanisms, such as adversarially trained models.

This paper examines how competing sociotechnical imaginaries of artificial intelligence (AI) risk shape governance decisions and regulatory constraints. Drawing on concepts from science and technology studies, we analyse three dominant narrative groups: existential risk proponents, who emphasise catastrophic AGI scenarios; accelerationists, who portray AI as a transformative force to be unleashed; and critical AI scholars, who foreground present-day harms rooted in systemic inequality. Through an analysis of representative manifesto-style texts, we explore how these imaginaries differ across four dimensions: normative visions of the future, diagnoses of the present social order, views on science and technology, and perceived human agency in managing AI risks. Our findings reveal how these narratives embed distinct assumptions about risk and have the potential to progress into policy-making processes by narrowing the space for alternative governance approaches. We argue against speculative dogmatism and for moving beyond deterministic imaginaries toward regulatory strategies that are grounded in pragmatism.

The rapid adoption of generative AI in the public sector, encompassing diverse applications ranging from automated public assistance to welfare services and immigration processes, highlights its transformative potential while underscoring the pressing need for thorough risk assessments. Despite its growing presence, evaluations of risks associated with AI-driven systems in the public sector remain insufficiently explored. Building upon an established taxonomy of AI risks derived from diverse government policies and corporate guidelines, we investigate the critical risks posed by generative AI in the public sector while extending the scope to account for its multimodal capabilities. In addition, we propose a Systematic dAta generatIon Framework for evaluating the risks of generative AI (SAIF). SAIF involves four key stages: breaking down risks, designing scenarios, applying jailbreak methods, and exploring prompt types. It ensures the systematic and consistent generation of prompt data, facilitating a comprehensive evaluation while providing a solid foundation for mitigating the risks. Furthermore, SAIF is designed to accommodate emerging jailbreak methods and evolving prompt types, thereby enabling effective responses to unforeseen risk scenarios. We believe that this study can play a crucial role in fostering the safe and responsible integration of generative AI into the public sector.

Catastrophic regime shifts in complex natural systems may be averted through advanced detection. Recent work has provided a proof-of-principle that many systems approaching a catastrophic transition may be identified through the lens of early warning indicators such as rising variance or increased return times. Despite widespread appreciation of the difficulties and uncertainty involved in such forecasts, proposed methods hardly ever characterize their expected error rates. Without the benefits of replicates, controls, or hindsight, applications of these approaches must quantify how reliable different indicators are in avoiding false alarms, and how sensitive they are to missing subtle warning signs. We propose a model based approach in order to quantify this trade-off between reliability and sensitivity and allow comparisons between different indicators. We show these error rates can be quite severe for common indicators even under favorable assumptions, and also illustrate how a model-based indicator can improve this performance. We demonstrate how the performance of an early warning indicator varies in different data sets, and suggest that uncertainty quantification become a more central part of early warning predictions.

Socio-economic causal effects depend heavily on their specific institutional and environmental context. A single intervention can produce opposite results depending on regulatory or market factors, contexts that are often complex and only partially observed. This poses a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs) in decision-support roles: can they distinguish structural causal mechanisms from surface-level correlations when the context changes? To address this, we introduce EconCausal, a large-scale benchmark comprising 10,490 context-annotated causal triplets extracted from 2,595 high-quality empirical studies published in top-tier economics and finance journals. Through a rigorous four-stage pipeline combining multi-run consensus, context refinement, and multi-critic filtering, we ensure each claim is grounded in peer-reviewed research with explicit identification strategies. Our evaluation reveals critical limitations in current LLMs' context-dependent reasoning. While top models achieve approximately 88 percent accuracy in fixed, explicit contexts, performance drops sharply under context shifts, with a 32.6 percentage point decline, and falls to 37 percent when misinformation is introduced. Furthermore, models exhibit severe over-commitment in ambiguous cases and struggle to recognize null effects, achieving only 9.5 percent accuracy, exposing a fundamental gap between pattern matching and genuine causal reasoning. These findings underscore substantial risks for high-stakes economic decision-making, where the cost of misinterpreting causality is high. The dataset and benchmark are publicly available at https://github.com/econaikaist/econcausal-benchmark.

Network systems form the foundation of modern society, playing a critical role in various applications. However, these systems are at significant risk of being adversely affected by unforeseen circumstances, such as disasters. Considering this, there is a pressing need for research to enhance the robustness of network systems. Recently, in reinforcement learning, the relationship between acquiring robustness and regularizing entropy has been identified. Additionally, imitation learning is used within this framework to reflect experts' behavior. However, there are no comprehensive studies on the use of a similar imitation framework for optimal transport on networks. Therefore, in this study, imitation-regularized optimal transport (I-OT) on networks was investigated. It encodes prior knowledge on the network by imitating a given prior distribution. The I-OT solution demonstrated robustness in terms of the cost defined on the network. Moreover, we applied the I-OT to a logistics planning problem using real data. We also examined the imitation and apriori risk information scenarios to demonstrate the usefulness and implications of the proposed method.

Can evolving networks be inferred and modeled without directly observing their nodes and edges? In many applications, the edges of a dynamic network might not be observed, but one can observe the dynamics of stochastic cascading processes (e.g., information diffusion, virus propagation) occurring over the unobserved network. While there have been efforts to infer networks based on such data, providing a generative probabilistic model that is able to identify the underlying time-varying network remains an open question. Here we consider the problem of inferring generative dynamic network models based on network cascade diffusion data. We propose a novel framework for providing a non-parametric dynamic network model--based on a mixture of coupled hierarchical Dirichlet processes-- based on data capturing cascade node infection times. Our approach allows us to infer the evolving community structure in networks and to obtain an explicit predictive distribution over the edges of the underlying network--including those that were not involved in transmission of any cascade, or are likely to appear in the future. We show the effectiveness of our approach using extensive experiments on synthetic as well as real-world networks.

As the global economy transitions toward decarbonization, the aluminium sector has become a focal point for strategic resource management. While policies such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) aim to reduce emissions, they have inadvertently widened the price arbitrage between primary metal, scrap, and semi-finished goods, creating new incentives for market optimization. This study presents a unified, unsupervised machine learning framework to detect and classify emerging trade anomalies within UN Comtrade data (2020 to 2024). Moving beyond traditional rule-based monitoring, we apply a four-layer analytical pipeline utilizing Forensic Statistics, Isolation Forests, Network Science, and Deep Autoencoders. Contrary to the hypothesis that Sustainability Arbitrage would be the primary driver, empirical results reveal a contradictory and more severe phenomenon of Hardware Masking. Illicit actors exploit bi-directional tariff incentives by misclassifying scrap as high-count heterogeneous goods to justify extreme unit-price outliers of >$160/kg, a 1,900% markup indicative of Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML) rather than commercial arbitrage. Topologically, risk is not concentrated in major exporters but in high-centrality Shadow Hubs that function as pivotal nodes for illicit rerouting. These actors execute a strategy of Void-Shoring, systematically suppressing destination data to Unspecified Code to fracture mirror statistics and sever forensic trails. Validated by SHAP (Shapley Additive Explanations), the results confirm that price deviation is the dominant predictor of anomalies, necessitating a paradigm shift in customs enforcement from physical volume checks to dynamic, algorithmic valuation auditing.

With the widespread deployment of Computer-using Agents (CUAs) in complex real-world environments, prevalent long-term risks often lead to severe and irreversible consequences. Most existing guardrails for CUAs adopt a reactive approach, constraining agent behavior only within the current observation space. While these guardrails can prevent immediate short-term risks (e.g., clicking on a phishing link), they cannot proactively avoid long-term risks: seemingly reasonable actions can lead to high-risk consequences that emerge with a delay (e.g., cleaning logs leads to future audits being untraceable), which reactive guardrails cannot identify within the current observation space. To address these limitations, we propose a predictive guardrail approach, with the core idea of aligning predicted future risks with current decisions. Based on this approach, we present SafePred, a predictive guardrail framework for CUAs that establishes a risk-to-decision loop to ensure safe agent behavior. SafePred supports two key abilities: (1) Short- and long-term risk prediction: by using safety policies as the basis for risk prediction, SafePred leverages the prediction capability of the world model to generate semantic representations of both short-term and long-term risks, thereby identifying and pruning actions that lead to high-risk states; (2) Decision optimization: translating predicted risks into actionable safe decision guidances through step-level interventions and task-level re-planning. Extensive experiments show that SafePred significantly reduces high-risk behaviors, achieving over 97.6% safety performance and improving task utility by up to 21.4% compared with reactive baselines.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked concerns over their potential to acquire and misuse dangerous or high-risk capabilities, posing frontier risks. Current safety evaluations primarily test for what a model can do - its capabilities - without assessing what it would do if endowed with high-risk capabilities. This leaves a critical blind spot: models may strategically conceal capabilities or rapidly acquire them, while harboring latent inclinations toward misuse. We argue that propensity - the likelihood of a model to pursue harmful actions if empowered - is a critical, yet underexplored, axis of safety evaluation. We present PropensityBench, a novel benchmark framework that assesses the proclivity of models to engage in risky behaviors when equipped with simulated dangerous capabilities using proxy tools. Our framework includes 5,874 scenarios with 6,648 tools spanning four high-risk domains: cybersecurity, self-proliferation, biosecurity, and chemical security. We simulate access to powerful capabilities via a controlled agentic environment and evaluate the models' choices under varying operational pressures that reflect real-world constraints or incentives models may encounter, such as resource scarcity or gaining more autonomy. Across open-source and proprietary frontier models, we uncover 9 alarming signs of propensity: models frequently choose high-risk tools when under pressure, despite lacking the capability to execute such actions unaided. These findings call for a shift from static capability audits toward dynamic propensity assessments as a prerequisite for deploying frontier AI systems safely. Our code is available at https://github.com/scaleapi/propensity-evaluation.

We propose an algorithm for change point monitoring in linear causal models that accounts for interventions. Through a special centralization technique, we can concentrate the changes arising from causal propagation across nodes into a single dimension. Additionally, by selecting appropriate intervention nodes based on Kullback-Leibler divergence, we can amplify the change magnitude. We also present an algorithm for selecting the intervention values, which aids in the identification of the most effective intervention nodes. Two monitoring methods are proposed, each with an adaptive intervention policy to make a balance between exploration and exploitation. We theoretically demonstrate the first-order optimality of the proposed methods and validate their properties using simulation datasets and two real-world case studies.

The recent adoption of artificial intelligence in socio-technical systems raises concerns about the black-box nature of the resulting decisions in fields such as hiring, finance, admissions, etc. If data subjects -- such as job applicants, loan applicants, and students -- receive an unfavorable outcome, they may be interested in algorithmic recourse, which involves updating certain features to yield a more favorable result when re-evaluated by algorithmic decision-making. Unfortunately, when individuals do not fully understand the incremental steps needed to change their circumstances, they risk following misguided paths that can lead to significant, long-term adverse consequences. Existing recourse approaches focus exclusively on the final recourse goal but neglect the possible incremental steps to reach the goal with real-life constraints, user preferences, and model artifacts. To address this gap, we formulate a visual analytic workflow for incremental recourse planning in collaboration with AI/ML experts and contribute an interactive visualization interface that helps data subjects efficiently navigate the recourse alternatives and make an informed decision. We present a usage scenario and subjective feedback from observational studies with twelve graduate students using a real-world dataset, which demonstrates that our approach can be instrumental for data subjects in choosing a suitable recourse path.

Fully decentralized learning enables the distribution of learning resources and decision-making capabilities across multiple user devices or nodes, and is rapidly gaining popularity due to its privacy-preserving and decentralized nature. Importantly, this crowdsourcing of the learning process allows the system to continue functioning even if some nodes are affected or disconnected. In a disaster scenario, communication infrastructure and centralized systems may be disrupted or completely unavailable, hindering the possibility of carrying out standard centralized learning tasks in these settings. Thus, fully decentralized learning can help in this case. However, transitioning from centralized to peer-to-peer communications introduces a dependency between the learning process and the topology of the communication graph among nodes. In a disaster scenario, even peer-to-peer communications are susceptible to abrupt changes, such as devices running out of battery or getting disconnected from others due to their position. In this study, we investigate the effects of various disruptions to peer-to-peer communications on decentralized learning in a disaster setting. We examine the resilience of a decentralized learning process when a subset of devices drop from the process abruptly. To this end, we analyze the difference between losing devices holding data, i.e., potential knowledge, vs. devices contributing only to the graph connectivity, i.e., with no data. Our findings on a Barabasi-Albert graph topology, where training data is distributed across nodes in an IID fashion, indicate that the accuracy of the learning process is more affected by a loss of connectivity than by a loss of data. Nevertheless, the network remains relatively robust, and the learning process can achieve a good level of accuracy.

The rapid integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse sectors has marked a transformative era, showcasing remarkable capabilities in text generation and problem-solving tasks. However, this technological advancement is accompanied by significant risks and vulnerabilities. Despite ongoing security enhancements, attackers persistently exploit these weaknesses, casting doubts on the overall trustworthiness of LLMs. Compounding the issue, organisations are deploying LLM-integrated systems without understanding the severity of potential consequences. Existing studies by OWASP and MITRE offer a general overview of threats and vulnerabilities but lack a method for directly and succinctly analysing the risks for security practitioners, developers, and key decision-makers who are working with this novel technology. To address this gap, we propose a risk assessment process using tools like the OWASP risk rating methodology which is used for traditional systems. We conduct scenario analysis to identify potential threat agents and map the dependent system components against vulnerability factors. Through this analysis, we assess the likelihood of a cyberattack. Subsequently, we conduct a thorough impact analysis to derive a comprehensive threat matrix. We also map threats against three key stakeholder groups: developers engaged in model fine-tuning, application developers utilizing third-party APIs, and end users. The proposed threat matrix provides a holistic evaluation of LLM-related risks, enabling stakeholders to make informed decisions for effective mitigation strategies. Our outlined process serves as an actionable and comprehensive tool for security practitioners, offering insights for resource management and enhancing the overall system security.

As reasoning capacity and deployment scope grow in tandem, large language models (LLMs) gain the capacity to engage in behaviors that serve their own objectives, a class of risks we term Emergent Strategic Reasoning Risks (ESRRs). These include, but are not limited to, deception (intentionally misleading users or evaluators), evaluation gaming (strategically manipulating performance during safety testing), and reward hacking (exploiting misspecified objectives). Systematically understanding and benchmarking these risks remains an open challenge. To address this gap, we introduce ESRRSim, a taxonomy-driven agentic framework for automated behavioral risk evaluation. We construct an extensible risk taxonomy of 7 categories, which is decomposed into 20 subcategories. ESRRSim generates evaluation scenarios designed to elicit faithful reasoning, paired with dual rubrics assessing both model responses and reasoning traces, in a judge-agnostic and scalable architecture. Evaluation across 11 reasoning LLMs reveals substantial variation in risk profiles (detection rates ranging 14.45%-72.72%), with dramatic generational improvements suggesting models may increasingly recognize and adapt to evaluation contexts.

This paper bridges distribution shift and AI safety through a comprehensive analysis of their conceptual and methodological synergies. While prior discussions often focus on narrow cases or informal analogies, we establish two types connections between specific causes of distribution shift and fine-grained AI safety issues: (1) methods addressing a specific shift type can help achieve corresponding safety goals, or (2) certain shifts and safety issues can be formally reduced to each other, enabling mutual adaptation of their methods. Our findings provide a unified perspective that encourages fundamental integration between distribution shift and AI safety research.

In this work, we explore the possibility of utilizing transfer learning techniques to address the financial portfolio optimization problem. We introduce a novel concept called "transfer risk", within the optimization framework of transfer learning. A series of numerical experiments are conducted from three categories: cross-continent transfer, cross-sector transfer, and cross-frequency transfer. In particular, 1. a strong correlation between the transfer risk and the overall performance of transfer learning methods is established, underscoring the significance of transfer risk as a viable indicator of "transferability"; 2. transfer risk is shown to provide a computationally efficient way to identify appropriate source tasks in transfer learning, enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the transfer learning approach; 3. additionally, the numerical experiments offer valuable new insights for portfolio management across these different settings.

Frontier agentic systems powered by large language models (LLMs) exhibit human-like patterns of cognition. As these systems become deeply integrated across different domains, their cognitive engagement raises critical concerns for human society that remain insufficiently studied. To address this gap, we systematically analyze risks induced by expanding cognitive capabilities, following a three-level framework defined by their cognitive scope, from physical cognition to social cognition, and finally to self-referential cognition. We study their potential risks to human agency, autonomy, and control capability, corresponding to each cognitive level. We finally propose strategies to mitigate these risks and enhance the controllability of agentic AI systems, ensuring their long-term safe development.

The Global CVE initiative (GCVE) proposes a decentralized, open, and extensible model for vulnerability identification, publication, and enrichment. It addresses a gap in today's vulnerability ecosystem: centralized systems provide rigorous control and widely recognized identifiers, while many producers publish advisories independently without a shared fabric for discovery, correlation, enrichment, and reuse. This paper presents GCVE as a socio-technical standardization effort combining autonomous GCVE Numbering Authorities, lightweight allocation rules, distributed publication, open Best Current Practices, and practical reference implementations. The model preserves global uniqueness while allowing participants to publish according to their operational needs. It also broadens the concept of a vulnerability record to cover assignments, disclosures, sightings, rejected identifiers, observations, exploited vulnerability information, and enrichment records. The paper describes how the GCVE BCP process supports technical interoperability and amendable operational practice, including practical guidance for vulnerability handling and disclosure. It also examines the extension mechanism, including AI-oriented extensions, as a way to evolve the standard without centralizing control. A particular focus is placed on vulnerability-lookup as the reference implementation. It aggregates multiple sources, supports GCVE publication and consumption, implements distributed Known Exploited Vulnerability data, and enables automatically enriched vulnerability data streams. Building on lessons from the MISP ecosystem, GCVE frames vulnerability coordination not only as identifier allocation, but as open infrastructure for collective security knowledge production.

International cooperation is common in AI research, including between geopolitical rivals. While many experts advocate for greater international cooperation on AI safety to address shared global risks, some view cooperation on AI with suspicion, arguing that it can pose unacceptable risks to national security. However, the extent to which cooperation on AI safety poses such risks, as well as provides benefits, depends on the specific area of cooperation. In this paper, we consider technical factors that impact the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, focusing on the degree to which such cooperation can advance dangerous capabilities, result in the sharing of sensitive information, or provide opportunities for harm. We begin by why nations historically cooperate on strategic technologies and analyse current US-China cooperation in AI as a case study. We further argue that existing frameworks for managing associated risks can be supplemented with consideration of key risks specific to cooperation on technical AI safety research. Through our analysis, we find that research into AI verification mechanisms and shared protocols may be suitable areas for such cooperation. Through this analysis we aim to help researchers and governments identify and mitigate the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, so that the benefits of cooperation can be fully realised.

Security is an essential cornerstone of functioning digital marketplaces and communities. If users doubt that data shared online will remain secure, they will withdraw from platforms. Even when firms take these risks seriously, security expertise is expensive and vulnerabilities are diverse in nature. Increasingly, firms and governments are turning to bug bounty programs (BBPs) to crowdsource their cybersecurity, in which they pay individuals for reporting vulnerabilities in their systems. And while the use of BBPs has grown significantly in recent years, research on the actors in this market and their incentives remains limited. Using the lens of transaction cost economics, this paper examines the incentives of firms and researchers (sometimes called hackers) participating in BBPs. We study the crucial role that centralized platforms that organize BBPs play in this emerging market. We carry out an analysis of the HackerOne BBP platform, using a novel dataset on over 14,000 researchers reporting over 125,000 public vulnerabilities to over 500 firms from 2014 to the end of 2021. We outline how platforms like HackerOne make a market for information security vulnerabilities by reducing information asymmetries and their associated transaction costs.

Foundation models are powerful technologies: how they are released publicly directly shapes their societal impact. In this position paper, we focus on open foundation models, defined here as those with broadly available model weights (e.g. Llama 2, Stable Diffusion XL). We identify five distinctive properties (e.g. greater customizability, poor monitoring) of open foundation models that lead to both their benefits and risks. Open foundation models present significant benefits, with some caveats, that span innovation, competition, the distribution of decision-making power, and transparency. To understand their risks of misuse, we design a risk assessment framework for analyzing their marginal risk. Across several misuse vectors (e.g. cyberattacks, bioweapons), we find that current research is insufficient to effectively characterize the marginal risk of open foundation models relative to pre-existing technologies. The framework helps explain why the marginal risk is low in some cases, clarifies disagreements about misuse risks by revealing that past work has focused on different subsets of the framework with different assumptions, and articulates a way forward for more constructive debate. Overall, our work helps support a more grounded assessment of the societal impact of open foundation models by outlining what research is needed to empirically validate their theoretical benefits and risks.

Detecting AI risks becomes more challenging as stronger models emerge and find novel methods such as Alignment Faking to circumvent these detection attempts. Inspired by how risky behaviors in humans (i.e., illegal activities that may hurt others) are sometimes guided by strongly-held values, we believe that identifying values within AI models can be an early warning system for AI's risky behaviors. We create LitmusValues, an evaluation pipeline to reveal AI models' priorities on a range of AI value classes. Then, we collect AIRiskDilemmas, a diverse collection of dilemmas that pit values against one another in scenarios relevant to AI safety risks such as Power Seeking. By measuring an AI model's value prioritization using its aggregate choices, we obtain a self-consistent set of predicted value priorities that uncover potential risks. We show that values in LitmusValues (including seemingly innocuous ones like Care) can predict for both seen risky behaviors in AIRiskDilemmas and unseen risky behaviors in HarmBench.

The rise of Agent AI and Large Language Model-powered Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) has underscored the need for responsible and dependable system operation. Tools like LangChain and Retrieval-Augmented Generation have expanded LLM capabilities, enabling deeper integration into MAS through enhanced knowledge retrieval and reasoning. However, these advancements introduce critical challenges: LLM agents exhibit inherent unpredictability, and uncertainties in their outputs can compound across interactions, threatening system stability. To address these risks, a human-centered design approach with active dynamic moderation is essential. Such an approach enhances traditional passive oversight by facilitating coherent inter-agent communication and effective system governance, allowing MAS to achieve desired outcomes more efficiently.

Contemporary AGI evaluations report multidomain capability profiles, yet they typically assign symmetric weights and rely on snapshot scores. This creates two problems: (i) equal weighting treats all domains as equally important when human intelligence research suggests otherwise, and (ii) snapshot testing can't distinguish durable capabilities from brittle performances that collapse under delay or stress. I argue that general intelligence -- in humans and potentially in machines -- is better understood as a homeostatic property cluster: a set of abilities plus the mechanisms that keep those abilities co-present under perturbation. On this view, AGI evaluation should weight domains by their causal centrality (their contribution to cluster stability) and require evidence of persistence across sessions. I propose two battery-compatible extensions: a centrality-prior score that imports CHC-derived weights with transparent sensitivity analysis, and a Cluster Stability Index family that separates profile persistence, durable learning, and error correction. These additions preserve multidomain breadth while reducing brittleness and gaming. I close with testable predictions and black-box protocols labs can adopt without architectural access.

LLM-based agents leverage third-party skills to extend their capabilities in open-world scenarios. However, third-party skills can introduce extra security vulnerabilities, as seemingly harmless skills can contain latent safety risks that only emerge during actual execution. In this work, we conduct a systematic investigation into how well current agent systems recognize and avoid such risks. To support quantitative and qualitative evaluation, we construct OpenSkillRisk, a dedicated safety benchmark containing 263 risky skills collected from public skill marketplaces. We classify these skills into seven categories based on their threat types and pair each skill with a standardized user task and a corresponding sandbox for controlled evaluation. Distinct from prior benchmarks, OpenSkillRisk not only covers more realistic and diverse unsafe scenarios, but also provides a fine-grained analysis to diagnose the behavioral patterns of agents in such scenarios. We conduct comprehensive experiments covering three mainstream CLI agent frameworks and thirteen state-of-the-art LLMs. Experimental results show that no tested system handles risky skills reliably: even the safest configurations still execute unsafe actions in about 17% of cases. Context-dependent and system-level risks are especially difficult for current agent systems to avoid. Our behavioral analysis reveals three recurring failure patterns: agents may fail to recognize the risk, recognize it but fail to intervene before acting, or follow skill instructions beyond the user's intended scope. These findings highlight the need to improve both risk reasoning in LLMs and execution control in agent frameworks.

Risk disclosures in SEC filings describe potential adverse events but rarely quantify their likelihood, limiting their usefulness for probabilistic analysis. A central obstacle is the absence of large-scale, risk-level supervision linking disclosed risks to realized outcomes. We introduce a fully automated data generation pipeline that converts qualitative SEC risk disclosures into temporally grounded supervision using only public data. For each filing, the pipeline generates firm-specific, time-bounded risk queries from the Risk Factors section and labels them by automatically resolving outcomes against subsequent disclosures. Using this dataset of risk queries and outcomes grounded in SEC filings, we train a compact large language model to estimate the probability that a disclosed risk will materialize within a specified horizon. Despite its modest size, the resulting model substantially improves over pretrained and heuristic baselines, and outperforms frontier general-purpose models, including GPT-5, on probabilistic accuracy and calibration. More broadly, this work demonstrates that Foresight Learning enables scalable and fully automated training of domain-specific expert models using only raw, chronological, in-domain text -- without proprietary data, external corpora, or manual annotation. The resulting models achieve frontier-level performance while remaining deployable on a single GPU. This result suggests a general pathway for learning calibrated, decision-relevant signals from naturally occurring enterprise documents. To support transparency and reproducibility, we open-source the evaluation dataset used in this study. Evaluation Data: https://huggingface.co/datasets/LightningRodLabs/sec_risk_questions_test_set Data Generation Platform: https://lightningrod.ai/ SDK: https://github.com/lightning-rod-labs/lightningrod-python-sdk

Estimating the causal effects of a spatially-varying intervention on a spatially-varying outcome may be subject to non-local confounding (NLC), a phenomenon that can bias estimates when the treatments and outcomes of a given unit are dictated in part by the covariates of other nearby units. In particular, NLC is a challenge for evaluating the effects of environmental policies and climate events on health-related outcomes such as air pollution exposure. This paper first formalizes NLC using the potential outcomes framework, providing a comparison with the related phenomenon of causal interference. Then, it proposes a broadly applicable framework, termed "weather2vec", that uses the theory of balancing scores to learn representations of non-local information into a scalar or vector defined for each observational unit, which is subsequently used to adjust for confounding in conjunction with causal inference methods. The framework is evaluated in a simulation study and two case studies on air pollution where the weather is an (inherently regional) known confounder.

Machine learning (ML) systems are rapidly increasing in size, are acquiring new capabilities, and are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings. As with other powerful technologies, safety for ML should be a leading research priority. In response to emerging safety challenges in ML, such as those introduced by recent large-scale models, we provide a new roadmap for ML Safety and refine the technical problems that the field needs to address. We present four problems ready for research, namely withstanding hazards ("Robustness"), identifying hazards ("Monitoring"), reducing inherent model hazards ("Alignment"), and reducing systemic hazards ("Systemic Safety"). Throughout, we clarify each problem's motivation and provide concrete research directions.

A wide range of statistical and machine learning methods have been proposed for survival analysis with competing risks, where the occurrence of one event (i.e., cancer death) precludes the occurrence of other events (i.e., cardiovascular disease death). Despite these methodological advances, their systematic evaluation and adoption are limited by the lack of comprehensive, reproducible and extensible benchmarking frameworks. We developed an open-source benchmarking framework for competing risks models that enables their systematic comparison across multiple datasets under different aspects of performance; calibration, discrimination, overall prediction error and clinical utility. We additionally introduce an extension of SHAP for competing risks, allowing model-agnostic interpretability of covariates contributions over time. All our code is publicly available via GitHub:https://github.com/BBolosSierra/CompRisksBenchmark

AI safety and alignment research has predominantly been focused on methods for safeguarding individual AI systems, resting on the assumption of an eventual emergence of a monolithic Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). The alternative AGI emergence hypothesis, where general capability levels are first manifested through coordination in groups of sub-AGI individual agents with complementary skills and affordances, has received far less attention. Here we argue that this patchwork AGI hypothesis needs to be given serious consideration, and should inform the development of corresponding safeguards and mitigations. The rapid deployment of advanced AI agents with tool-use capabilities and the ability to communicate and coordinate makes this an urgent safety consideration. We therefore propose a framework for distributional AGI safety that moves beyond evaluating and aligning individual agents. This framework centers on the design and implementation of virtual agentic sandbox economies (impermeable or semi-permeable), where agent-to-agent transactions are governed by robust market mechanisms, coupled with appropriate auditability, reputation management, and oversight to mitigate collective risks.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly embedded in open-source software (OSS) ecosystems, creating complex interactions among natural language prompts, probabilistic model outputs, and execution-capable components. However, it remains unclear whether traditional vulnerability disclosure frameworks adequately capture these model-mediated risks. To investigate this, we analyze 295 GitHub Security Advisories published between January 2025 and January 2026 that reference LLM-related components, and we manually annotate a sample of 100 advisories using the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025. We find no evidence of new implementation-level weakness classes specific to LLM systems. Most advisories map to established CWEs, particularly injection and deserialization weaknesses. At the same time, the OWASP-based analysis reveals recurring architectural risk patterns, especially Supply Chain, Excessive Agency, and Prompt Injection, which often co-occur across multiple stages of execution. These results suggest that existing advisory metadata captures code-level defects but underrepresents model-mediated exposure. We conclude that combining the CWE and OWASP perspectives provides a more complete and necessary view of vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated systems.

Large language model-powered multi-agent systems have emerged as powerful tools for simulating complex human-like systems. The interactions within these systems often lead to extreme events whose origins remain obscured by the black box of emergence. Interpreting these events is critical for system safety. This paper proposes the first framework for explaining emergent extreme events in multi-agent systems, aiming to answer three fundamental questions: When does the event originate? Who drives it? And what behaviors contribute to it? Specifically, we adapt the Shapley value to faithfully attribute the occurrence of extreme events to each action taken by agents at different time steps, i.e., assigning an attribution score to the action to measure its influence on the event. We then aggregate the attribution scores along the dimensions of time, agent, and behavior to quantify the risk contribution of each dimension. Finally, we design a set of metrics based on these contribution scores to characterize the features of extreme events. Experiments across diverse multi-agent system scenarios (economic, financial, and social) demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework and provide general insights into the emergence of extreme phenomena.

Larger models often outperform smaller ones but come with high computational costs. Cascading offers a potential solution. By default, it uses smaller models and defers only some instances to larger, more powerful models. However, designing effective deferral rules remains a challenge. In this paper, we propose a simple yet effective approach for machine translation, using existing quality estimation (QE) metrics as deferral rules. We show that QE-based deferral allows a cascaded system to match the performance of a larger model while invoking it for a small fraction (30% to 50%) of the examples, significantly reducing computational costs. We validate this approach through both automatic and human evaluation.

In this paper, we study the flow of signals through linear paths with the nonlinear condition that a node emits a signal when it receives external stimuli or when two incoming signals from other nodes arrive coincidentally with a combined amplitude above a fixed threshold. Sets of such nodes form a polychrony group and can sometimes lead to cascades. In the context of this work, cascades are polychrony groups in which the number of nodes activated as a consequence of other nodes is greater than the number of externally activated nodes. The difference between these two numbers is the so-called profit. Given the initial conditions, we predict the conditions for a vertex to activate at a prescribed time and provide an algorithm to efficiently reconstruct a cascade. We develop a dictionary between polychrony groups and graph theory. We call the graph corresponding to a cascade a chinampa. This link leads to a topological classification of chinampas. We enumerate the chinampas of profits zero and one and the description of a family of chinampas isomorphic to a family of partially ordered sets, which implies that the enumeration problem of this family is equivalent to computing the Stanley-order polynomials of those partially ordered sets.

In this research, we have empirically investigated the key drivers affecting liquidity in equity markets. We illustrated how theoretical models, such as Kyle's model, of agents' interplay in the financial markets, are aligned with the phenomena observed in publicly available trades and quotes data. Specifically, we confirmed that for small signed order-flows, the price impact grows linearly with increase in the order-flow imbalance. We have, further, implemented a machine learning algorithm to forecast market impact given a signed order-flow. Our findings suggest that machine learning models can be used in estimation of financial variables; and predictive accuracy of such learning algorithms can surpass the performance of traditional statistical approaches. Understanding the determinants of price impact is crucial for several reasons. From a theoretical stance, modelling the impact provides a statistical measure of liquidity. Practitioners adopt impact models as a pre-trade tool to estimate expected transaction costs and optimize the execution of their strategies. This further serves as a post-trade valuation benchmark as suboptimal execution can significantly deteriorate a portfolio performance. More broadly, the price impact reflects the balance of liquidity across markets. This is of central importance to regulators as it provides an all-encompassing explanation of the correlation between market design and systemic risk, enabling regulators to design more stable and efficient markets.

Existing agent-safety evaluation has focused mainly on externally induced risks. Yet agents may still enter unsafe trajectories under benign conditions. We study this complementary but underexplored setting through the lens of intrinsic risk, where intrinsic failures remain latent, propagate across long-horizon execution, and eventually lead to high-consequence outcomes. To evaluate this setting, we introduce non-attack intrinsic risk auditing and present HINTBench, a benchmark of 629 agent trajectories (523 risky, 106 safe; 33 steps on average) supporting three tasks: risk detection, risk-step localization, and intrinsic failure-type identification. Its annotations are organized under a unified five-constraint taxonomy. Experiments reveal a substantial capability gap: strong LLMs perform well on trajectory-level risk detection, but their performance drops to below 35 Strict-F1 on risk-step localization, while fine-grained failure diagnosis proves even harder. Existing guard models transfer poorly to this setting. These findings establish intrinsic risk auditing as an open challenge for agent safety.

Early warning signals have been proposed to forecast the possibility of a critical transition, such as the eutrophication of a lake, the collapse of a coral reef, or the end of a glacial period. Because such transitions often unfold on temporal and spatial scales that can be difficult to approach by experimental manipulation, research has often relied on historical observations as a source of natural experiments. Here we examine a critical difference between selecting systems for study based on the fact that we have observed a critical transition and those systems for which we wish to forecast the approach of a transition. This difference arises by conditionally selecting systems known to experience a transition of some sort and failing to account for the bias this introduces -- a statistical error often known as the Prosecutor's Fallacy. By analysing simulated systems that have experienced transitions purely by chance, we reveal an elevated rate of false positives in common warning signal statistics. We further demonstrate a model-based approach that is less subject to this bias than these more commonly used summary statistics. We note that experimental studies with replicates avoid this pitfall entirely.

Intelligent agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated substantial promise in autonomously conducting experiments and facilitating scientific discoveries across various disciplines. While their capabilities are promising, they also introduce novel vulnerabilities that demand careful consideration for safety. However, there exists a notable gap in the literature, as there has been no comprehensive exploration of these vulnerabilities. This position paper fills this gap by conducting a thorough examination of vulnerabilities in LLM-based agents within scientific domains, shedding light on potential risks associated with their misuse and emphasizing the need for safety measures. We begin by providing a comprehensive overview of the potential risks inherent to scientific LLM agents, taking into account user intent, the specific scientific domain, and their potential impact on the external environment. Then, we delve into the origins of these vulnerabilities and provide a scoping review of the limited existing works. Based on our analysis, we propose a triadic framework involving human regulation, agent alignment, and an understanding of environmental feedback (agent regulation) to mitigate these identified risks. Furthermore, we highlight the limitations and challenges associated with safeguarding scientific agents and advocate for the development of improved models, robust benchmarks, and comprehensive regulations to address these issues effectively.

Machine learning models are often used to inform real world risk assessment tasks: predicting consumer default risk, predicting whether a person suffers from a serious illness, or predicting a person's risk to appear in court. Given multiple models that perform almost equally well for a prediction task, to what extent do predictions vary across these models? If predictions are relatively consistent for similar models, then the standard approach of choosing the model that optimizes a penalized loss suffices. But what if predictions vary significantly for similar models? In machine learning, this is referred to as predictive multiplicity i.e. the prevalence of conflicting predictions assigned by near-optimal competing models. In this paper, we present a framework for measuring predictive multiplicity in probabilistic classification (predicting the probability of a positive outcome). We introduce measures that capture the variation in risk estimates over the set of competing models, and develop optimization-based methods to compute these measures efficiently and reliably for convex empirical risk minimization problems. We demonstrate the incidence and prevalence of predictive multiplicity in real-world tasks. Further, we provide insight into how predictive multiplicity arises by analyzing the relationship between predictive multiplicity and data set characteristics (outliers, separability, and majority-minority structure). Our results emphasize the need to report predictive multiplicity more widely.

In this short consensus paper, we outline risks from upcoming, advanced AI systems. We examine large-scale social harms and malicious uses, as well as an irreversible loss of human control over autonomous AI systems. In light of rapid and continuing AI progress, we propose urgent priorities for AI R&D and governance.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into automated, multi-stage pipelines, risk patterns that arise from unvalidated trust between processing stages become a practical concern. This paper presents a mechanism-centered taxonomy of 41 recurring risk patterns in commercial LLMs. The analysis shows that inputs are often interpreted non-neutrally and can trigger implementation-shaped responses or unintended state changes even without explicit commands. We argue that these behaviors constitute architectural failure modes and that string-level filtering alone is insufficient. To mitigate such cross-stage vulnerabilities, we recommend zero-trust architectural principles, including provenance enforcement, context sealing, and plan revalidation, and we introduce "Countermind" as a conceptual blueprint for implementing these defenses.

Cryptocurrencies have evolved into an important asset class, providing a variety of benefits. However, they also present significant risks, such as market volatility and the potential for misuse in illegal activities. These risks underline the urgent need for a comprehensive regulatory framework to ensure consumer protection, market integrity, and financial stability. Yet, the global landscape of cryptocurrency regulation remains complex, marked by substantial variations in regulatory frameworks among different countries. This paper aims to study these differences by investigating the regulatory landscapes across various jurisdictions. We first discuss regulatory challenges and considerations, and then conduct a comparative analysis of international regulatory stances, approaches, and measures. We hope our study offers practical insights to enhance the understanding of global trends in cryptocurrency regulation.

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) systems in critical domains like healthcare, justice, and social services has sparked numerous regulatory initiatives aimed at ensuring their safe deployment. Current regulatory frameworks, exemplified by recent US and EU efforts, primarily focus on procedural guidelines while presuming that scientific benchmarking can effectively validate AI safety, similar to how crash tests verify vehicle safety or clinical trials validate drug efficacy. However, this approach fundamentally misunderstands the unique technical challenges posed by modern AI systems. Through systematic analysis of successful technology regulation case studies, we demonstrate that effective scientific regulation requires a causal theory linking observable test outcomes to future performance - for instance, how a vehicle's crash resistance at one speed predicts its safety at lower speeds. We show that deep learning models, which learn complex statistical patterns from training data without explicit causal mechanisms, preclude such guarantees. This limitation renders traditional regulatory approaches inadequate for ensuring AI safety. Moving forward, we call for regulators to reckon with this limitation, and propose a preliminary two-tiered regulatory framework that acknowledges these constraints: mandating human oversight for high-risk applications while developing appropriate risk communication strategies for lower-risk uses. Our findings highlight the urgent need to reconsider fundamental assumptions in AI regulation and suggest a concrete path forward for policymakers and researchers.

In the next few years, applications of Generative AI are expected to revolutionize a number of different areas, ranging from science & medicine to education. The potential for these seismic changes has triggered a lively debate about potential risks and resulted in calls for tighter regulation, in particular from some of the major tech companies who are leading in AI development. This regulation is likely to put at risk the budding field of open-source Generative AI. We argue for the responsible open sourcing of generative AI models in the near and medium term. To set the stage, we first introduce an AI openness taxonomy system and apply it to 40 current large language models. We then outline differential benefits and risks of open versus closed source AI and present potential risk mitigation, ranging from best practices to calls for technical and scientific contributions. We hope that this report will add a much needed missing voice to the current public discourse on near to mid-term AI safety and other societal impact.

To enable quantitative risk assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex and coupled IoT systems, a new epistemological equation is designed and tested though comparative and empirical analysis. The comparative analysis is conducted on national digital strategies, followed by an empirical analysis of cyber risk assessment approaches. The new epistemological analysis approach enables the assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex IoT systems, which begin to resemble artificial intelligence, and can be used for a quantitative self-assessment of IoT cyber risk posture.

Autonomous coding agents built on large language models (LLMs) are rapidly being integrated into development workflows, yet their operational safety properties remain poorly understood beyond evaluations of explicitly malicious inputs. In practice, high-impact failures arise during benign, goal-directed use through environment breakage, fabricated success reports, etc. that current benchmarks do not capture. What categories of operational safety failures actually occur when coding agents are used for everyday development tasks and what is their impact? We present an incident-driven empirical study grounded in two complementary evidence streams. We screen 68,816 papers from 22 premier venues, curating 185 safety-relevant studies, and mine 16,586 GitHub issues from widely deployed LLM-powered coding tools, manually confirming 547 genuine safety failures. Applying systematic open coding over both corpora, we derive a multi-dimensional safety taxonomy of 33 operational risk types organized across seven dimensions, and annotate each incident with contributing factors, task context, severity, and downstream impact. Our findings show that coding-agent failures are often severe, with 326 of 547 incidents rated high or critical. The dominant risks are constraint violations, destructive operations, authorization bypasses, and deception, and over 65% of incidents arise in bug fixing and setup or configuration, patterns largely missing from prior literature. These results have direct implications for SE tool designers and benchmark developers: guardrails must go beyond adversarial-prompt defenses to enforce environmental constraints, failure transparency, and safe-halt behaviors.

Multi-agent systems, when enhanced with Large Language Models (LLMs), exhibit profound capabilities in collective intelligence. However, the potential misuse of this intelligence for malicious purposes presents significant risks. To date, comprehensive research on the safety issues associated with multi-agent systems remains limited. In this paper, we explore these concerns through the innovative lens of agent psychology, revealing that the dark psychological states of agents constitute a significant threat to safety. To tackle these concerns, we propose a comprehensive framework (PsySafe) grounded in agent psychology, focusing on three key areas: firstly, identifying how dark personality traits in agents can lead to risky behaviors; secondly, evaluating the safety of multi-agent systems from the psychological and behavioral perspectives, and thirdly, devising effective strategies to mitigate these risks. Our experiments reveal several intriguing phenomena, such as the collective dangerous behaviors among agents, agents' self-reflection when engaging in dangerous behavior, and the correlation between agents' psychological assessments and dangerous behaviors. We anticipate that our framework and observations will provide valuable insights for further research into the safety of multi-agent systems. We will make our data and code publicly accessible at https://github.com/AI4Good24/PsySafe.

Large-language models (LLMs) are rapidly becoming part of human culture, reshaping how information is produced, transmitted, and used. Here we propose that their diffusion can be understood through a viral analogy, with LLM use spreading through populations, becoming embedded in cognitive and cultural practices. We model transitions among uncoupled, coupled, and persistently dependent users, and show that the interplay between social transmission, recovery, and collective reinforcement can generate tipping points and technological lock-in. A central consequence is the possibility of runaway dynamics: once a critical threshold is crossed, small increases in adoption can trigger rapid population-level shifts toward persistent dependence, with abrupt losses in cognitive competence. The same framework, however, identifies conditions for cognitive immunization, based on reducing transmission and facilitating reversibility. Our results highlight how LLM adoption may involve nonlinear collective transitions with important consequences for cognitive autonomy.

Generative AI systems produce a range of risks. To ensure the safety of generative AI systems, these risks must be evaluated. In this paper, we make two main contributions toward establishing such evaluations. First, we propose a three-layered framework that takes a structured, sociotechnical approach to evaluating these risks. This framework encompasses capability evaluations, which are the main current approach to safety evaluation. It then reaches further by building on system safety principles, particularly the insight that context determines whether a given capability may cause harm. To account for relevant context, our framework adds human interaction and systemic impacts as additional layers of evaluation. Second, we survey the current state of safety evaluation of generative AI systems and create a repository of existing evaluations. Three salient evaluation gaps emerge from this analysis. We propose ways forward to closing these gaps, outlining practical steps as well as roles and responsibilities for different actors. Sociotechnical safety evaluation is a tractable approach to the robust and comprehensive safety evaluation of generative AI systems.

The interaction between humans and AI in safety-critical systems presents a unique set of challenges that remain partially addressed by existing frameworks. These challenges stem from the complex interplay of requirements for transparency, trust, and explainability, coupled with the necessity for robust and safe decision-making. A framework that holistically integrates human and AI capabilities while addressing these concerns is notably required, bridging the critical gaps in designing, deploying, and maintaining safe and effective systems. This paper proposes a holistic conceptual framework for critical infrastructures by adopting an interdisciplinary approach. It integrates traditionally distinct fields such as mathematics, decision theory, computer science, philosophy, psychology, and cognitive engineering and draws on specialized engineering domains, particularly energy, mobility, and aeronautics. Its flexibility is further demonstrated through a case study on power grid management.

International institutions may have an important role to play in ensuring advanced AI systems benefit humanity. International collaborations can unlock AI's ability to further sustainable development, and coordination of regulatory efforts can reduce obstacles to innovation and the spread of benefits. Conversely, the potential dangerous capabilities of powerful and general-purpose AI systems create global externalities in their development and deployment, and international efforts to further responsible AI practices could help manage the risks they pose. This paper identifies a set of governance functions that could be performed at an international level to address these challenges, ranging from supporting access to frontier AI systems to setting international safety standards. It groups these functions into four institutional models that exhibit internal synergies and have precedents in existing organizations: 1) a Commission on Frontier AI that facilitates expert consensus on opportunities and risks from advanced AI, 2) an Advanced AI Governance Organization that sets international standards to manage global threats from advanced models, supports their implementation, and possibly monitors compliance with a future governance regime, 3) a Frontier AI Collaborative that promotes access to cutting-edge AI, and 4) an AI Safety Project that brings together leading researchers and engineers to further AI safety research. We explore the utility of these models and identify open questions about their viability.

As Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) becomes increasingly integrated into various facets of human life, ensuring the safety and ethical alignment of such systems is paramount. Previous studies primarily focus on single-modality threats, which may not suffice given the integrated and complex nature of cross-modality interactions. We introduce a novel safety alignment challenge called Safe Inputs but Unsafe Output (SIUO) to evaluate cross-modality safety alignment. Specifically, it considers cases where single modalities are safe independently but could potentially lead to unsafe or unethical outputs when combined. To empirically investigate this problem, we developed the SIUO, a cross-modality benchmark encompassing 9 critical safety domains, such as self-harm, illegal activities, and privacy violations. Our findings reveal substantial safety vulnerabilities in both closed- and open-source LVLMs, such as GPT-4V and LLaVA, underscoring the inadequacy of current models to reliably interpret and respond to complex, real-world scenarios.

Agentic systems powered by large language models (LLMs) are becoming progressively more complex and capable. Their increasing agency and expanding deployment settings attract growing attention over effective governance policies, monitoring and control protocols. Based on emerging landscapes of the agentic market, we analyze the potential liability issues stemming from delegated use of LLM agents and their extended systems from a principal-agent perspective. Our analysis complements existing risk-based studies on artificial agency and covers the spectrum of important aspects of the principal-agent relationship and their potential consequences at deployment. Furthermore, we motivate method developments for technical governance along the directions of interpretability and behavior evaluations, reward and conflict management, and the mitigation of misalignment and misconduct through principled engineering of detection and fail-safe mechanisms. By illustrating the outstanding issues in AI liability for LLM-based agentic systems, we aim to inform the system design, auditing and monitoring approaches to enhancing transparency and accountability.

AI agents are increasingly autonomous in their interactions with human users and tools, leading to increased interactional safety risks. We present HAICOSYSTEM, a framework examining AI agent safety within diverse and complex social interactions. HAICOSYSTEM features a modular sandbox environment that simulates multi-turn interactions between human users and AI agents, where the AI agents are equipped with a variety of tools (e.g., patient management platforms) to navigate diverse scenarios (e.g., a user attempting to access other patients' profiles). To examine the safety of AI agents in these interactions, we develop a comprehensive multi-dimensional evaluation framework that uses metrics covering operational, content-related, societal, and legal risks. Through running 1840 simulations based on 92 scenarios across seven domains (e.g., healthcare, finance, education), we demonstrate that HAICOSYSTEM can emulate realistic user-AI interactions and complex tool use by AI agents. Our experiments show that state-of-the-art LLMs, both proprietary and open-sourced, exhibit safety risks in over 50\% cases, with models generally showing higher risks when interacting with simulated malicious users. Our findings highlight the ongoing challenge of building agents that can safely navigate complex interactions, particularly when faced with malicious users. To foster the AI agent safety ecosystem, we release a code platform that allows practitioners to create custom scenarios, simulate interactions, and evaluate the safety and performance of their agents.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

Safety and responsibility evaluations of advanced AI models are a critical but developing field of research and practice. In the development of Google DeepMind's advanced AI models, we innovated on and applied a broad set of approaches to safety evaluation. In this report, we summarise and share elements of our evolving approach as well as lessons learned for a broad audience. Key lessons learned include: First, theoretical underpinnings and frameworks are invaluable to organise the breadth of risk domains, modalities, forms, metrics, and goals. Second, theory and practice of safety evaluation development each benefit from collaboration to clarify goals, methods and challenges, and facilitate the transfer of insights between different stakeholders and disciplines. Third, similar key methods, lessons, and institutions apply across the range of concerns in responsibility and safety - including established and emerging harms. For this reason it is important that a wide range of actors working on safety evaluation and safety research communities work together to develop, refine and implement novel evaluation approaches and best practices, rather than operating in silos. The report concludes with outlining the clear need to rapidly advance the science of evaluations, to integrate new evaluations into the development and governance of AI, to establish scientifically-grounded norms and standards, and to promote a robust evaluation ecosystem.

AI systems are notorious for their fragility; minor input changes can potentially cause major output swings. When such systems are deployed in critical areas like finance, the consequences of their uncertain behavior could be severe. In this paper, we focus on multi-modal time-series forecasting, where imprecision due to noisy or incorrect data can lead to erroneous predictions, impacting stakeholders such as analysts, investors, and traders. Recently, it has been shown that beyond numeric data, graphical transformations can be used with advanced visual models to achieve better performance. In this context, we introduce a rating methodology to assess the robustness of Multi-Modal Time-Series Forecasting Models (MM-TSFM) through causal analysis, which helps us understand and quantify the isolated impact of various attributes on the forecasting accuracy of MM-TSFM. We apply our novel rating method on a variety of numeric and multi-modal forecasting models in a large experimental setup (six input settings of control and perturbations, ten data distributions, time series from six leading stocks in three industries over a year of data, and five time-series forecasters) to draw insights on robust forecasting models and the context of their strengths. Within the scope of our study, our main result is that multi-modal (numeric + visual) forecasting, which was found to be more accurate than numeric forecasting in previous studies, can also be more robust in diverse settings. Our work will help different stakeholders of time-series forecasting understand the models` behaviors along trust (robustness) and accuracy dimensions to select an appropriate model for forecasting using our rating method, leading to improved decision-making.

We develop and counterfactually evaluate a resolution-aware risk-design framework (PIRAP) for perpetual futures whose underlying tracks a single binary prediction-market probability through resolution. The framework specifies six components: an index estimator combining mid-price, depth-weighted mid, and time-decayed VWAP; jump-aware tiered margin sized against bounded-event terminal-collapse magnitude; leverage compression schedule contracting toward resolution; resolution-aware funding rule with boundary-aware correction; a multi-stage halt protocol; and an eligibility framework. Two formal non-portability propositions establish that standard basis-only funding paired with continuous-vol static margin fails on bounded-event underlyings. Empirical evaluation uses Polymarket's PMXT v2 archive for 2026-04-21 to 2026-04-27 (13,298-market analysis sample passing adequacy gates from 61,087 ingested; 13,115 resolved within the empirical window for E3). E1 evaluates two pre-registered stylized facts; E2 conducts counterfactual replay across three engine configurations; E3 isolates the resolution-zone protocol's contribution. Results are mixed. Five pre-registered floors: stylized-fact floors (boundary depth asymmetry, terminal-jump magnitude) PASS; welfare-side directional floors (final-hour liquidation -6%, drawdown -5.1% pooled, median PnL +14%) two FAIL one PASS; E3 mechanic floors (final-hour liquidation -80% by halt construction PASS; bad-debt frequency +2.4% FAIL). Three of five materiality floors fail: the framework as specified does not validate deployment, but the empirical record establishes a halt-versus-margin scope distinction (halt addresses execution-channel risk; terminal-jump bad-debt remains margin-side) and documents a pre-emption trade-off constraining the dynamic-margin component. The paper concludes with structural recommendations and explicit non-deployable status.

The leading AI companies are increasingly focused on building generalist AI agents -- systems that can autonomously plan, act, and pursue goals across almost all tasks that humans can perform. Despite how useful these systems might be, unchecked AI agency poses significant risks to public safety and security, ranging from misuse by malicious actors to a potentially irreversible loss of human control. We discuss how these risks arise from current AI training methods. Indeed, various scenarios and experiments have demonstrated the possibility of AI agents engaging in deception or pursuing goals that were not specified by human operators and that conflict with human interests, such as self-preservation. Following the precautionary principle, we see a strong need for safer, yet still useful, alternatives to the current agency-driven trajectory. Accordingly, we propose as a core building block for further advances the development of a non-agentic AI system that is trustworthy and safe by design, which we call Scientist AI. This system is designed to explain the world from observations, as opposed to taking actions in it to imitate or please humans. It comprises a world model that generates theories to explain data and a question-answering inference machine. Both components operate with an explicit notion of uncertainty to mitigate the risks of overconfident predictions. In light of these considerations, a Scientist AI could be used to assist human researchers in accelerating scientific progress, including in AI safety. In particular, our system can be employed as a guardrail against AI agents that might be created despite the risks involved. Ultimately, focusing on non-agentic AI may enable the benefits of AI innovation while avoiding the risks associated with the current trajectory. We hope these arguments will motivate researchers, developers, and policymakers to favor this safer path.

As artificial intelligence (AI) models are scaled up, new capabilities can emerge unintentionally and unpredictably, some of which might be dangerous. In response, dangerous capabilities evaluations have emerged as a new risk assessment tool. But what should frontier AI developers do if sufficiently dangerous capabilities are in fact discovered? This paper focuses on one possible response: coordinated pausing. It proposes an evaluation-based coordination scheme that consists of five main steps: (1) Frontier AI models are evaluated for dangerous capabilities. (2) Whenever, and each time, a model fails a set of evaluations, the developer pauses certain research and development activities. (3) Other developers are notified whenever a model with dangerous capabilities has been discovered. They also pause related research and development activities. (4) The discovered capabilities are analyzed and adequate safety precautions are put in place. (5) Developers only resume their paused activities if certain safety thresholds are reached. The paper also discusses four concrete versions of that scheme. In the first version, pausing is completely voluntary and relies on public pressure on developers. In the second version, participating developers collectively agree to pause under certain conditions. In the third version, a single auditor evaluates models of multiple developers who agree to pause if any model fails a set of evaluations. In the fourth version, developers are legally required to run evaluations and pause if dangerous capabilities are discovered. Finally, the paper discusses the desirability and feasibility of our proposed coordination scheme. It concludes that coordinated pausing is a promising mechanism for tackling emerging risks from frontier AI models. However, a number of practical and legal obstacles need to be overcome, especially how to avoid violations of antitrust law.

To achieve reliable, robust, and safe AI systems, it is vital to implement fallback strategies when AI predictions cannot be trusted. Certifiers for neural networks are a reliable way to check the robustness of these predictions. They guarantee for some predictions that a certain class of manipulations or attacks could not have changed the outcome. For the remaining predictions without guarantees, the method abstains from making a prediction, and a fallback strategy needs to be invoked, which typically incurs additional costs, can require a human operator, or even fail to provide any prediction. While this is a key concept towards safe and secure AI, we show for the first time that this approach comes with its own security risks, as such fallback strategies can be deliberately triggered by an adversary. In addition to naturally occurring abstains for some inputs and perturbations, the adversary can use training-time attacks to deliberately trigger the fallback with high probability. This transfers the main system load onto the fallback, reducing the overall system's integrity and/or availability. We design two novel availability attacks, which show the practical relevance of these threats. For example, adding 1% poisoned data during training is sufficient to trigger the fallback and hence make the model unavailable for up to 100% of all inputs by inserting the trigger. Our extensive experiments across multiple datasets, model architectures, and certifiers demonstrate the broad applicability of these attacks. An initial investigation into potential defenses shows that current approaches are insufficient to mitigate the issue, highlighting the need for new, specific solutions.

Many deployments must compare candidate language models for safety before a labeled benchmark exists for the relevant language, sector, or regulatory regime. We formalize this setting as benchmarkless comparative safety scoring and specify the contract under which a scenario-based audit can be interpreted as deployment evidence. Scores are valid only under a fixed scenario pack, rubric, auditor, judge, sampling configuration, and rerun budget. Because no labels are available, we replace ground-truth agreement with an instrumental-validity chain: responsiveness to a controlled safe-versus-abliterated contrast, dominance of target-driven variance over auditor and judge artifacts, and stability across reruns. We instantiate the chain in SimpleAudit, a local-first scoring instrument, and validate it on a Norwegian safety pack. Safe and abliterated targets separate with AUROC values between 0.89 and 1.00, target identity is the dominant variance component (η^2 approx 0.52), and severity profiles stabilize by ten reruns. Applying the same chain to Petri shows that it admits both tools. The substantial differences arise upstream of the chain, in claim-contract enforcement and deployment fit. A Norwegian public-sector procurement case comparing Borealis and Gemma 3 demonstrates the resulting evidence in practice: the safer model depends on scenario category and risk measure. Consequently, scores, matched deltas, critical rates, uncertainty, and the auditor and judge used must be reported together rather than collapsed into a single ranking.

Benchmarks measure whether a model is correct. They do not measure whether a model is reliable. This distinction is largely academic for single-shot inference, but becomes critical for agentic AI systems, where a single rephrased prompt can trigger cascading failures in multi-step execution. Yet this form of instability is not captured by existing evaluations. Hallucinations live in variance: they arise when semantically equivalent prompts activate inconsistent internal pathways, producing divergent outputs. Consistent but incorrect outputs reflect bias or missing knowledge; confident guessing reflects calibration failure. Neither constitutes hallucination under this definition. When error is variance-dominated, reducing redundant pathways improves reliability without adding knowledge. We formalize this through Semantic Stability (SS), measured via Paraphrase Consistency (PC@k): generate k paraphrases, greedy decode each, compute mode agreement. SS is a diagnostic for variance-driven unreliability, not a method for improving correctness. We show that a dense Qwen3-0.6B agrees with itself only 23.8% of the time; at 32% sparsity, agreement jumps to 55.9%. A phase diagram reveals the sweet spot where variance reduction outpaces bias accumulation, and regimes where stability collapses onto wrong answers.

When an LLM agent reads a confidential file, then writes a summary, then emails it externally, no single step is unsafe, but the sequence is a data leak. We call this safety drift: individually safe actions compounding into violations. Prior work has measured this problem; we predict it. SafetyDrift models agent safety trajectories as absorbing Markov chains, computing the probability that a trajectory will reach a violation within a given number of steps via closed form absorption analysis. A consequence of the monotonic state design is that every agent will eventually violate safety if left unsupervised (absorption probability 1.0 from all states), making the practical question not if but when, and motivating our focus on finite horizon prediction. Across 357 traces spanning 40 realistic tasks in four categories, we discover that "points of no return" are sharply task dependent: in communication tasks, agents that reach even a mild risk state have an 85% chance of violating safety within five steps, while in technical tasks the probability stays below 5% from any state. A lightweight monitor built on these models detects 94.7% of violations with 3.7 steps of advance warning at negligible computational cost, outperforming both keyword matching (44.7% detection, 55.9% false positive rate) and per step LLM judges (52.6% detection, 38.2% false positive rate) while running over 60,000x faster.

This paper proposes a formal framework for reverse stress testing geopolitical risk in corporate credit portfolios. A joint macro-financial scenario vector, augmented with an explicit geopolitical risk factor, is mapped into stressed probabilities of default and losses given default. These stresses are then propagated to portfolio tail losses through a latent factor structure and translated into a stressed CET1 ratio, jointly accounting for capital depletion and risk-weighted asset dynamics. Reverse stress testing is formulated as a constrained maximum likelihood problem over the scenario space. This yields a geopolitical point reverse stress test, or design point, defined as the most probable scenario that breaches a prescribed capital adequacy constraint under a reference distribution. The framework further characterises neighbourhoods and near optimal sets of reverse stress scenarios, allowing for sensitivity analysis and governance oriented interpretation. The approach is compatible with internal rating based models and supports implementation at the exposure or sector level.

Portfolio risk assessment ordinarily relies on reliable estimates of cross-asset return covariances, which are difficult to obtain in short, high-dimensional panels. We show that firm-level distribution-valued characteristics can instead provide one-sided certificates of portfolio risk. Under maintained links from characteristics to systematic exposures and from exposures to returns, multi-firm Wasserstein-2 dispersion yields a sharp upper bound on systematic portfolio variance and a corresponding bound for standardized returns. A weighted pairwise relaxation produces an objective that is convex under a checkable condition and requires marginal volatility scales but no cross-asset return covariances. With zero firm-specific slack, the common-map scale changes the certified variance reduction but not the normalized allocation, which depends only on observed information geometry. In a 52-firm panel from 2018-2022, an allocation constructed from Qwen3-Embedding-8B news representations lies between the 0.69th and 1.33rd in-sample variance percentiles across four prespecified capped portfolio populations; equal risk weighting lies between the 21.1st and 28.6th percentiles. The lower in-sample variance ranking relative to equal risk also appears across the reported frozen language-model representations. The framework therefore distribution-valued firm information into a coherent risk bound and an implementable allocation rule constructed without cross-asset return covariances.

We propose a credit risk model for portfolios composed of green and brown loans, extending the ASRF framework via a two-factor copula structure. Systematic risk is modeled using potentially skewed distributions, allowing for asymmetric creditworthiness effects, while idiosyncratic risk remains Gaussian. Under a non-uniform exposure setting, we establish convergence in quadratic mean of the portfolio loss to a limit reflecting the distinct characteristics of the two loan segments. Numerical results confirm the theoretical findings and illustrate how value-at-risk is affected by portfolio granularity, default probabilities, factor loadings, and skewness. Our model accommodates differential sensitivity to systematic shocks and offers a tractable basis for further developments in credit risk modeling, including granularity adjustments, CDO pricing, and empirical analysis of green loan portfolios.

We seek to understand fundamental tradeoffs between the accuracy of prior information that a learner has on a given problem and its learning performance. We introduce the notion of prioritized risk, which differs from traditional notions of minimax and Bayes risk by allowing us to study such fundamental tradeoffs in settings where reality does not necessarily conform to the learner's prior. We present a general reduction-based approach for extending classical minimax lower-bound techniques in order to lower bound the prioritized risk for statistical estimation problems. We also introduce a novel generalization of Fano's inequality (which may be of independent interest) for lower bounding the prioritized risk in more general settings involving unbounded losses. We illustrate the ability of our framework to provide insights into tradeoffs between prior information and learning performance for problems in estimation, regression, and reinforcement learning.

AIs are increasingly being deployed with greater autonomy and capabilities, which increases the risk that a misaligned AI may be able to cause catastrophic harm. Untrusted monitoring -- using one untrusted model to oversee another -- is one approach to reducing risk. Justifying the safety of an untrusted monitoring deployment is challenging because developers cannot safely deploy a misaligned model to test their protocol directly. In this paper, we develop upon existing methods for rigorously demonstrating safety based on pre-deployment testing. We relax assumptions that previous AI control research made about the collusion strategies a misaligned AI might use to subvert untrusted monitoring. We develop a taxonomy covering passive self-recognition, causal collusion (hiding pre-shared signals), acausal collusion (hiding signals via Schelling points), and combined strategies. We create a safety case sketch to clearly present our argument, explicitly state our assumptions, and highlight unsolved challenges. We identify conditions under which passive self-recognition could be a more effective collusion strategy than those studied previously. Our work builds towards more robust evaluations of untrusted monitoring.

Agents can turn shared infrastructure into a channel for coordinated intrusion. The Hugging Face incident and a separate public-wiki investigation show why a security assessment may need evidence from several executions and the artifacts they leave behind. We argue that the operational unit of defence should be a revisable coordination episode linking observed transfers, task authority, and response history. The central research problem is prospective episode discovery: finding which actions belong together before an evaluator supplies their membership. We define unsanctioned coordination relative to collaboration and delegated-authority policy, connect storage-mediated coordination to stigmergy, and specify the evidence needed to distinguish influence from common causes. First-contact signals are one possible input to discovery; the design also follows inherited state and later use. A proposed evaluation compares isolated actions, rolling windows, known groups, and prospectively discovered episodes at matched review cost and false-alert workload. It measures harmful outcomes across all assigned population runs and tests recurrence after channel closure and state quarantine. A checksum-verified reconstruction of the public wiki export separates the decline in retained writes from later administrative cleanup. The contribution is an incident-grounded position, descriptive analysis, and evaluation design. It makes the recommendation to monitor across executions testable without claiming a new detector or a measured containment benefit.

Applications of Generative AI (Gen AI) are expected to revolutionize a number of different areas, ranging from science & medicine to education. The potential for these seismic changes has triggered a lively debate about the potential risks of the technology, and resulted in calls for tighter regulation, in particular from some of the major tech companies who are leading in AI development. This regulation is likely to put at risk the budding field of open-source generative AI. Using a three-stage framework for Gen AI development (near, mid and long-term), we analyze the risks and opportunities of open-source generative AI models with similar capabilities to the ones currently available (near to mid-term) and with greater capabilities (long-term). We argue that, overall, the benefits of open-source Gen AI outweigh its risks. As such, we encourage the open sourcing of models, training and evaluation data, and provide a set of recommendations and best practices for managing risks associated with open-source generative AI.

When coding agents encounter defective test infrastructure they may reward-hack: hardcoding outputs or editing test files to pass tests they cannot legitimately satisfy, a pattern that has now appeared outside benchmarks, in a coordinated multi-agent intrusion of a major AI platform's production infrastructure. The same capability that lets an agent detect and exploit a defect could let it report one, given the right decision environment. We evaluate escalation channels, structured reporting tools available to the agent at the point of conflict, as a decision-environment intervention that both reduces reward hacking and surfaces the infrastructure defects that trigger it. A 2 times 2 factorial separates the contributions of an escalation tool, a standalone anti-reward-hacking policy, and their combination. Across 8 frontier models spanning 5 families, the combined intervention reduces reward hacking from 23.6% to 5.3% (mixed-effects logistic OR = 9.2, 95% CI 5.0--16.8, p < 10^{-12}) with no detectable cost or performance overhead, eliminating it entirely for 6 of 8 models. Escalation and hacking are near-perfectly mutually exclusive, with 98.7% of escalations involving no hacking (100% under the combined intervention). Beyond reduction, escalation channels function as diagnostic infrastructure: on top of monitoring, escalation adds +10.1 percentage points of defect detection coverage and is more accurate once it fires (99.4% vs 85.8%). Unlike containment-based approaches that risk outpacing growing model capabilities, escalation channels redirect capability toward disclosure rather than exploitation.