Daily Papers

Text-to-image models now generate graphic design at production scale, yet their supervision still comes primarily from photo-style preference datasets with a single overall verdict per comparison. Designers evaluate designs along several distinct axes (e.g., typography, layout, color harmony) that a single preference label collapses. We release TASTE (Typography, Aesthetics, Spatial, Tone, Etc.), a multi-dimensional preference dataset in which two disjoint cohorts of five professional designers each ranked outputs from four current text-to-image models across nine criteria along with per-image hallucination flags. We pair the dataset with two contributions. First, a criterion-agnostic signal-validation framework based on Kendall's τ, majority-vote probability, and Condorcet cycles against exact iid-uniform nulls; the analysis reveals significant but moderate designer agreement, with every TASTE criterion rejecting the random-rater null. Second, we benchmark preference models on TASTE and find that off-the-shelf VLM judges and dedicated T2I scorers fail to reach majority agreement with the designer panel, while a small MLP head trained directly on TASTE substantially narrows the gap to the single-rater ceiling, setting a baseline for future TASTE-trained preference models.

Condorcet domains are subsets of permutations that ensure pairwise majority voting yields acyclic outcomes, and they form an active area of research at the intersection of social choice theory and combinatorics. In this paper, we extend the theory of Condorcet domains to the broader setting of arbitrary finite Coxeter groups. The core contribution of our approach is the introduction of Condorcet root posets, defined on the chosen root systems. Notably, we establish a natural bijection between closed Condorcet domains and Condorcet root posets, which facilitates the study of Condorcet domains. Using this correspondence, we extend the median graph representation of closed Condorcet domains to arbitrary finite Coxeter groups, demonstrating that these domains can be characterized by the skeletons of their associated Condorcet root posets. These results are novel even in type A. Furthermore, these posets give a unified language that efficiently captures a wide range of desirable properties of Condorcet domains, such as being maximal, connected, peak-pit, and of tiling type. Using this framework, we strengthen and generalize several classical results: we establish that a maximal Condorcet domain is connected if and only if it is peak-pit; we prove that the tiling-type property is equivalent to the combination of being maximal and connected, and having maximal width; and we show that strictly positive voting profiles on connected Condorcet domains yield outcomes with only simple ties.

We study the non-stationary dueling bandits problem with K arms, where the time horizon T consists of M stationary segments, each of which is associated with its own preference matrix. The learner repeatedly selects a pair of arms and observes a binary preference between them as feedback. To minimize the accumulated regret, the learner needs to pick the Condorcet winner of each stationary segment as often as possible, despite preference matrices and segment lengths being unknown. We propose the Beat, the, Winner, Reset algorithm and prove a bound on its expected binary weak regret in the stationary case, which tightens the bound of current state-of-art algorithms. We also show a regret bound for the non-stationary case, without requiring knowledge of M or T. We further propose and analyze two meta-algorithms, DETECT for weak regret and Monitored, Dueling, Bandits for strong regret, both based on a detection-window approach that can incorporate any dueling bandit algorithm as a black-box algorithm. Finally, we prove a worst-case lower bound for expected weak regret in the non-stationary case.

The mathematical study of voting, social choice theory, has traditionally only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives, but not to open-ended decisions such as collectively selecting a textual statement. We introduce generative social choice, a design methodology for open-ended democratic processes that combines the rigor of social choice theory with the capability of large language models to generate text and extrapolate preferences. Our framework divides the design of AI-augmented democratic processes into two components: first, proving that the process satisfies representation guarantees when given access to oracle queries; second, empirically validating that these queries can be approximately implemented using a large language model. We apply this framework to the problem of summarizing free-form opinions into a proportionally representative slate of opinion statements; specifically, we develop a democratic process with representation guarantees and use this process to portray the opinions of participants in a survey about abortion policy. In a trial with 100 representative US residents, we find that 84 out of 100 participants feel "excellently" or "exceptionally" represented by the slate of five statements we extracted.

LLM-as-a-judge panels aggregate votes from multiple models, with the expectation that diverse models yield more reliable evaluations. We develop a framework to measure the true informational value of such panels and quantify how far their reliability falls short of the independent-voting ideal. Testing a panel of 9 frontier LLMs from 7 model families on three natural language inference datasets (each with 100 human annotations per item), we find that the 9 judges effectively provide only about 2 independent votes' worth of information. Roughly three-quarters of the panel's nominal independence is lost because the models make the same mistakes on the same items. The consequences are stark: the panel's actual accuracy falls 8-22 percentage points short of what independent voting would achieve, and the best single judge matches or outperforms the full panel across all conditions. Neither adding more judges nor using smarter aggregation algorithms helps -- established methods close at most 11% of this gap, even with access to the correct answers. We quantify these findings using the Kish effective sample size (n_eff) and a Condorcet null model, and show the deficit is robust across prompt variants, temperatures, chain-of-thought reasoning, and a pairwise preference task (RewardBench). The bottleneck is correlated judges, not the aggregation algorithm, implying that scaling up panels cannot substitute for genuinely independent evaluation.

Achieving political consensus is crucial yet challenging for the effective functioning of social governance. However, although frontier AI systems represented by large language models (LLMs) have developed rapidly in recent years, their capabilities in this scope are still understudied. In this paper, we introduce PoliCon, a novel benchmark constructed from 2,225 high-quality deliberation records of the European Parliament over 13 years, ranging from 2009 to 2022, to evaluate the ability of LLMs to draft consensus resolutions based on divergent party positions under varying collective decision-making contexts and political requirements. Specifically, PoliCon incorporates four factors to build each task environment for finding different political consensus: specific political issues, political goals, participating parties, and power structures based on seat distribution. We also developed an evaluation framework based on social choice theory for PoliCon, which simulates the real voting outcomes of different political parties to assess whether LLM-generated resolutions meet the requirements of the predetermined political consensus. Our experimental results demonstrate that even state-of-the-art models remain undersatisfied with complex tasks like passing resolutions by a two-thirds majority and addressing security issues, while uncovering their inherent partisan biases and revealing some behaviors LLMs show to achieve the consensus, such as prioritizing the stance of the dominant party instead of uniting smaller parties, which highlights PoliCon's promise as an effective platform for studying LLMs' ability to promote political consensus. The code and dataset are released at https://zowiezhang.github.io/projects/PoliCon.