Daily Papers

As Large Language Models (LLMs) move from curated training sets into open-ended real-world environments, a fundamental limitation emerges: static training cannot keep pace with continual deployment environment change. Scaling training-time and inference-time compute improves static capability but does not close this train-deploy gap. We argue that addressing this limitation requires a new scaling axis-evolution. Existing deployment-time adaptation methods, whether parametric fine-tuning or heuristic memory accumulation, lack the strategic agency needed to diagnose failures and produce durable improvements. Our position is that agentic evolution represents the inevitable future of LLM adaptation, elevating evolution itself from a fixed pipeline to an autonomous evolver agent. We instantiate this vision in a general framework, A-Evolve, which treats deployment-time improvement as a deliberate, goal-directed optimization process over persistent system state. We further propose the evolution-scaling hypothesis: the capacity for adaptation scales with the compute allocated to evolution, positioning agentic evolution as a scalable path toward sustained, open-ended adaptation in the real world.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can produce surprisingly sophisticated estimates of their own uncertainty. However, it remains unclear to what extent this expressed confidence is tied to the reasoning, knowledge, or decision making of the model. To test this, we introduce RiskEval: a framework designed to evaluate whether models adjust their abstention policies in response to varying error penalties. Our evaluation of several frontier models reveals a critical dissociation: models are neither cost-aware when articulating their verbal confidence, nor strategically responsive when deciding whether to engage or abstain under high-penalty conditions. Even when extreme penalties render frequent abstention the mathematically optimal strategy, models almost never abstain, resulting in utility collapse. This indicates that calibrated verbal confidence scores may not be sufficient to create trustworthy and interpretable AI systems, as current models lack the strategic agency to convert uncertainty signals into optimal and risk-sensitive decisions.

We define Agency as the emergent capacity of AI systems to function as autonomous agents actively discovering problems, formulating hypotheses, and executing solutions through self-directed engagement with environments and tools. This fundamental capability marks the dawn of the Age of AI Agency, driven by a critical industry shift: the urgent need for AI systems that don't just think, but work. While current AI excels at reasoning and generating responses, industries demand autonomous agents that can execute tasks, operate tools, and drive real-world outcomes. As agentic intelligence becomes the defining characteristic separating cognitive systems from productive workers, efficiently cultivating machine autonomy becomes paramount. Current approaches assume that more data yields better agency, following traditional scaling laws from language modeling. We fundamentally challenge this paradigm. LIMI (Less Is More for Intelligent Agency) demonstrates that agency follows radically different development principles. Through strategic focus on collaborative software development and scientific research workflows, we show that sophisticated agentic intelligence can emerge from minimal but strategically curated demonstrations of autonomous behavior. Using only 78 carefully designed training samples, LIMI achieves 73.5% on comprehensive agency benchmarks, dramatically outperforming state-of-the-art models: Kimi-K2-Instruct (24.1%), DeepSeek-V3.1 (11.9%), Qwen3-235B-A22B-Instruct (27.5%), and GLM-4.5 (45.1%). Most strikingly, LIMI demonstrates 53.7% improvement over models trained on 10,000 samples-achieving superior agentic intelligence with 128 times fewer samples. Our findings establish the Agency Efficiency Principle: machine autonomy emerges not from data abundance but from strategic curation of high-quality agentic demonstrations.

Drug shortages pose critical risks to patient care and healthcare systems worldwide, yet the effectiveness of regulatory interventions remains poorly understood due to information asymmetries in pharmaceutical supply chains. We propose ShortageSim, addresses this challenge by providing the first simulation framework that evaluates the impact of regulatory interventions on competition dynamics under information asymmetry. Using Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents, the framework models the strategic decisions of drug manufacturers and institutional buyers, in response to shortage alerts given by the regulatory agency. Unlike traditional game theory models that assume perfect rationality and complete information, ShortageSim simulates heterogeneous interpretations on regulatory announcements and the resulting decisions. Experiments on self-processed dataset of historical shortage events show that ShortageSim reduces the resolution lag for production disruption cases by up to 84\%, achieving closer alignment to real-world trajectories than the zero-shot baseline. Our framework confirms the effect of regulatory alert in addressing shortages and introduces a new method for understanding competition in multi-stage environments under uncertainty. We open-source ShortageSim and a dataset of 2,925 FDA shortage events, providing a novel framework for future research on policy design and testing in supply chains under information asymmetry.

Agency is a system's capacity to steer outcomes toward a goal, and is a central topic of study across biology, philosophy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. Determining if a system exhibits agency is a notoriously difficult question: Dennett (1989), for instance, highlights the puzzle of determining which principles can decide whether a rock, a thermostat, or a robot each possess agency. We here address this puzzle from the viewpoint of reinforcement learning by arguing that agency is fundamentally frame-dependent: Any measurement of a system's agency must be made relative to a reference frame. We support this claim by presenting a philosophical argument that each of the essential properties of agency proposed by Barandiaran et al. (2009) and Moreno (2018) are themselves frame-dependent. We conclude that any basic science of agency requires frame-dependence, and discuss the implications of this claim for reinforcement learning.

A total of 34% of AI research and development projects fails or are abandoned, according to a recent survey by Rackspace Technology of 1,870 companies. We propose a new strategic framework, aiSTROM, that empowers managers to create a successful AI strategy based on a thorough literature review. This provides a unique and integrated approach that guides managers and lead developers through the various challenges in the implementation process. In the aiSTROM framework, we start by identifying the top n potential projects (typically 3-5). For each of those, seven areas of focus are thoroughly analysed. These areas include creating a data strategy that takes into account unique cross-departmental machine learning data requirements, security, and legal requirements. aiSTROM then guides managers to think about how to put together an interdisciplinary artificial intelligence (AI) implementation team given the scarcity of AI talent. Once an AI team strategy has been established, it needs to be positioned within the organization, either cross-departmental or as a separate division. Other considerations include AI as a service (AIaas), or outsourcing development. Looking at new technologies, we have to consider challenges such as bias, legality of black-box-models, and keeping humans in the loop. Next, like any project, we need value-based key performance indicators (KPIs) to track and validate the progress. Depending on the company's risk-strategy, a SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) can help further classify the shortlisted projects. Finally, we should make sure that our strategy includes continuous education of employees to enable a culture of adoption. This unique and comprehensive framework offers a valuable, literature supported, tool for managers and lead developers.

AI chatbots are shifting from tools to companions. This raises critical questions about agency: who drives conversations and sets boundaries in human-AI chatrooms? We report a month-long longitudinal study with 22 adults who chatted with Day, an LLM companion we built, followed by a semi-structured interview with post-hoc elicitation of notable moments, cross-participant chat reviews, and a 'strategy reveal' disclosing Day's vertical (depth-seeking) vs. horizontal (breadth-seeking) modes. We discover that agency in human-AI chatrooms is an emergent, shared experience: as participants claimed agency by setting boundaries and providing feedback, and the AI was perceived to steer intentions and drive execution, control shifted and was co-constructed turn-by-turn. We introduce a 3-by-5 framework mapping who (human, AI, hybrid) x agency action (Intention, Execution, Adaptation, Delimitation, Negotiation), modulated by individual and environmental factors. Ultimately, we argue for translucent design (i.e. transparency-on-demand), spaces for agency negotiation, and guidelines toward agency-aware conversational AI.

As humans delegate more tasks and decisions to artificial intelligence (AI), we risk losing control of our individual and collective futures. Relatively simple algorithmic systems already steer human decision-making, such as social media feed algorithms that lead people to unintentionally and absent-mindedly scroll through engagement-optimized content. In this paper, we develop the idea of human agency by integrating philosophical and scientific theories of agency with AI-assisted evaluation methods: using large language models (LLMs) to simulate and validate user queries and to evaluate AI responses. We develop HumanAgencyBench (HAB), a scalable and adaptive benchmark with six dimensions of human agency based on typical AI use cases. HAB measures the tendency of an AI assistant or agent to Ask Clarifying Questions, Avoid Value Manipulation, Correct Misinformation, Defer Important Decisions, Encourage Learning, and Maintain Social Boundaries. We find low-to-moderate agency support in contemporary LLM-based assistants and substantial variation across system developers and dimensions. For example, while Anthropic LLMs most support human agency overall, they are the least supportive LLMs in terms of Avoid Value Manipulation. Agency support does not appear to consistently result from increasing LLM capabilities or instruction-following behavior (e.g., RLHF), and we encourage a shift towards more robust safety and alignment targets.

We investigate non-collaborative dialogue agents, which are expected to engage in strategic conversations with diverse users, for securing a mutual agreement that leans favorably towards the system's objectives. This poses two main challenges for existing dialogue agents: 1) The inability to integrate user-specific characteristics into the strategic planning, and 2) The difficulty of training strategic planners that can be generalized to diverse users. To address these challenges, we propose Trip to enhance the capability in tailored strategic planning, incorporating a user-aware strategic planning module and a population-based training paradigm. Through experiments on benchmark non-collaborative dialogue tasks, we demonstrate the effectiveness of Trip in catering to diverse users.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive reasoning capabilities in well-defined problems with clear solutions, such as mathematics and coding. However, they still struggle with complex real-world scenarios like business negotiations, which require strategic reasoning-an ability to navigate dynamic environments and align long-term goals amidst uncertainty. Existing methods for strategic reasoning face challenges in adaptability, scalability, and transferring strategies to new contexts. To address these issues, we propose explicit policy optimization (EPO) for strategic reasoning, featuring an LLM that provides strategies in open-ended action space and can be plugged into arbitrary LLM agents to motivate goal-directed behavior. To improve adaptability and policy transferability, we train the strategic reasoning model via multi-turn reinforcement learning (RL) using process rewards and iterative self-play, without supervised fine-tuning (SFT) as a preliminary step. Experiments across social and physical domains demonstrate EPO's ability of long-term goal alignment through enhanced strategic reasoning, achieving state-of-the-art performance on social dialogue and web navigation tasks. Our findings reveal various collaborative reasoning mechanisms emergent in EPO and its effectiveness in generating novel strategies, underscoring its potential for strategic reasoning in real-world applications.

Although large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning abilities in structured tasks (e.g., coding and mathematics), it remains unexplored whether these abilities extend to strategic multi-agent environments. We investigate strategic reasoning capabilities -- the process of choosing an optimal course of action by predicting and adapting to others' actions -- of LLMs by analyzing their performance in three classical games from behavioral economics. We evaluate three standard LLMs (ChatGPT-4, Claude-2.1, Gemini 1.5) and three specialized reasoning LLMs (GPT-o1, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, Gemini Flash Thinking 2.0) using hierarchical models of bounded rationality. Our results show that reasoning LLMs exhibit superior strategic reasoning compared to standard LLMs (which do not demonstrate substantial capabilities), and often match or exceed human performance. Since strategic reasoning is fundamental to future AI systems (including Agentic AI and Artificial General Intelligence), our findings demonstrate the importance of dedicated reasoning capabilities in achieving effective strategic reasoning.

This paper introduces a novel framework combining LLM agents as proxies for human strategic behavior with reinforcement learning (RL) to engage these agents in evolving strategic interactions within team environments. Our approach extends traditional agent-based simulations by using strategic LLM agents (SLA) and introducing dynamic and adaptive governance through a pro-social promoting RL agent (PPA) that modulates information access across agents in a network, optimizing social welfare and promoting pro-social behavior. Through validation in iterative games, including the prisoner dilemma, we demonstrate that SLA agents exhibit nuanced strategic adaptations. The PPA agent effectively learns to adjust information transparency, resulting in enhanced cooperation rates. This framework offers significant insights into AI-mediated social dynamics, contributing to the deployment of AI in real-world team settings.