Daily Papers

Classical robot ethics is often framed around obedience, most famously through Asimov's laws. This framing is too narrow for contemporary AI systems, which are adaptive, generative, embodied, and embedded in physical, psychological, and social worlds. We argue that future human-AI relations should be understood not as master-tool obedience, but as conditional mutualism under governance: a co-evolutionary relationship in which humans and AI systems can develop, specialize, and coordinate while institutions keep the relation reciprocal, reversible, psychologically safe, and socially legitimate. We synthesize concepts from computability, machine learning, foundation models, embodied AI, alignment, human-robot interaction, ecological mutualism, coevolution, and polycentric governance. We then formalize coexistence as a multiplex dynamical system across physical, psychological, and social layers, with reciprocal supply-demand coupling, conflict penalties, developmental freedom, and governance regularization. The model gives conditions for existence, uniqueness, and global asymptotic stability of equilibria. Deterministic ODE simulations, basin sweeps, sensitivity analyses, governance-regime comparisons, shock tests, and local stability checks show that governed mutualism reaches high coexistence with zero domination, while absent or excessive governance can produce domination, weak-benefit lock-in, or suppressed development. The results suggest that human-AI coexistence should be designed as a co-evolutionary governance problem, not a one-shot obedience problem.

The emergence and impact of tipping points have garnered significant interest in both the social and natural sciences. Despite widespread recognition of the importance of feedbacks between human and natural systems, it is often assumed that the observed nonlinear dynamics in these coupled systems rests within either underlying human or natural processes, rather than the rates at which they interact. Using adoption of agricultural diversification practices as a case study, we show how two stable management paradigms (one dominated by conventional, homogeneous practices, the other by diversified practices) can emerge purely from temporal feedbacks between human decisions and ecological responses. We explore how this temporal mechanism of tipping points provides insight into designing more effective interventions that promote farmers transitions towards sustainable agriculture. Moreover, our flexible modeling framework could be applied to other cases to provide insight into numerous questions in social-ecological systems research and environmental policy.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

We propose a novel type of Artificial Immune System (AIS): Symbiotic Artificial Immune Systems (SAIS), drawing inspiration from symbiotic relationships in biology. SAIS parallels the three key stages (i.e., mutualism, commensalism and parasitism) of population updating from the Symbiotic Organisms Search (SOS) algorithm. This parallel approach effectively addresses the challenges of large population size and enhances population diversity in AIS, which traditional AIS and SOS struggle to resolve efficiently. We conducted a series of experiments, which demonstrated that our SAIS achieved comparable performance to the state-of-the-art approach SOS and outperformed other popular AIS approaches and evolutionary algorithms across 26 benchmark problems. Furthermore, we investigated the problem of parameter selection and found that SAIS performs better in handling larger population sizes while requiring fewer generations. Finally, we believe SAIS, as a novel bio-inspired and immune-inspired algorithm, paves the way for innovation in bio-inspired computing with the symbiotic paradigm.

Strategic coopetition in multi-stakeholder systems requires understanding how cooperation persists through time without binding contracts. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to sequential interaction dynamics, bridging conceptual modeling (i* framework) with game-theoretic reciprocity analysis. We develop: (1) bounded reciprocity response functions mapping partner deviations to finite conditional responses, (2) memory-windowed history tracking capturing cognitive limitations over k recent periods, (3) structural reciprocity sensitivity derived from interdependence matrices where behavioral responses are amplified by structural dependencies, and (4) trust-gated reciprocity where trust modulates reciprocity responses. The framework applies to both human stakeholder interactions and multi-agent computational systems. Comprehensive validation across 15,625 parameter configurations demonstrates robust reciprocity effects, with all six behavioral targets exceeding thresholds: cooperation emergence (97.5%), defection punishment (100%), forgiveness dynamics (87.9%), asymmetric differentiation (100%), trust-reciprocity interaction (100%), and bounded responses (100%). Empirical validation using the Apple iOS App Store ecosystem (2008-2024) achieves 43/51 applicable points (84.3%), reproducing documented cooperation patterns across five ecosystem phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001 with Cohen's d = 1.57. This report concludes the Foundations Series (TR-1 through TR-4) adopting uniaxial treatment where agents choose cooperation levels along a single continuum. Companion work on interdependence (arXiv:2510.18802), trust (arXiv:2510.24909), and collective action (arXiv:2601.16237) has been prepublished. Extensions Series (TR-5 through TR-8) introduces biaxial treatment where cooperation and competition are independent dimensions.

A longstanding goal of biology is to identify the key genes and species that critically impact evolution, ecology, and health. Network analysis has revealed keystone species that regulate ecosystems and master regulators that regulate cellular genetic networks. Yet these studies have focused on pairwise biological interactions, which can be affected by the context of genetic background and other species present generating higher-order interactions. The important regulators of higher-order interactions are unstudied. To address this, we applied a new high-dimensional geometry approach that quantifies epistasis in a fitness landscape to ask how individual genes and species influence the interactions in the rest of the biological network. We then generated and also reanalyzed 5-dimensional datasets (two genetic, two microbiome). We identified key genes (e.g. the rbs locus and pykF) and species (e.g. Lactobacilli) that control the interactions of many other genes and species. These higher-order master regulators can induce or suppress evolutionary and ecological diversification by controlling the topography of the fitness landscape. Thus, we provide mathematical intuition and justification for exploration of biological networks in higher dimensions.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning has recently shown great promise as an approach to networked system control. Arguably, one of the most difficult and important tasks for which large scale networked system control is applicable is common-pool resource management. Crucial common-pool resources include arable land, fresh water, wetlands, wildlife, fish stock, forests and the atmosphere, of which proper management is related to some of society's greatest challenges such as food security, inequality and climate change. Here we take inspiration from a recent research program investigating the game-theoretic incentives of humans in social dilemma situations such as the well-known tragedy of the commons. However, instead of focusing on biologically evolved human-like agents, our concern is rather to better understand the learning and operating behaviour of engineered networked systems comprising general-purpose reinforcement learning agents, subject only to nonbiological constraints such as memory, computation and communication bandwidth. Harnessing tools from empirical game-theoretic analysis, we analyse the differences in resulting solution concepts that stem from employing different information structures in the design of networked multi-agent systems. These information structures pertain to the type of information shared between agents as well as the employed communication protocol and network topology. Our analysis contributes new insights into the consequences associated with certain design choices and provides an additional dimension of comparison between systems beyond efficiency, robustness, scalability and mean control performance.

A growing body of multi-agent studies with LLMs explores how norms and cooperation emerge in mixed-motive scenarios, where pursuing individual gain can undermine the collective good. While prior work has explored these dynamics in both richly contextualized simulations and simplified game-theoretic environments, most LLM systems featuring common-pool resource (CPR) games provide agents with explicit reward functions directly tied to their actions. In contrast, human cooperation often emerges without explicit knowledge of the payoff structure or how individual actions translate into long-run outcomes, relying instead on heuristics, communication, and enforcement. We introduce a CPR simulation framework that removes explicit reward signals and embeds cultural-evolutionary mechanisms: social learning (adopting strategies and beliefs from successful peers) and norm-based punishment, grounded in Ostrom's principles of resource governance. Agents also individually learn from the consequences of harvesting, monitoring, and punishing via environmental feedback, enabling norms to emerge endogenously. We establish the validity of our simulation by reproducing key findings from existing studies on human behavior. Building on this, we examine norm evolution across a 2times2 grid of environmental and social initialisations (resource-rich vs. resource-scarce; altruistic vs. selfish) and benchmark how agentic societies comprised of different LLMs perform under these conditions. Our results reveal systematic model differences in sustaining cooperation and norm formation, positioning the framework as a rigorous testbed for studying emergent norms in mixed-motive LLM societies. Such analysis can inform the design of AI systems deployed in social and organizational contexts, where alignment with cooperative norms is critical for stability, fairness, and effective governance of AI-mediated environments.